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This dissertation explores the economic origins of party-system structure and the
role of economic institutions in determining political outcomes and electoral partici-
pation. Chapter 2 studies the impact of unemployment on electoral fragmentation.
Employing a four-party model of redistributive politics with two dimensions of choice
(economic policy and ideology), we uncover a non-monotonic relationship between
unemployment and fragmentation. In equilibrium, big parties woo the unemployed
voters who are relatively more willing to switch their votes in response to generous
redistribution. When the tax-base is large enough, allowing for more redistribution,
an initial rise in unemployment favors the big parties by increasing the amount of
the target constituency that is up for grabs. We identify two necessary conditions
for opportunistic parties to be able to capitalize on this relationship: (i) the exis-
tence of an e¤ective public redistribution mechanism and (ii) the lack of institutional
checks and balances. Using data from OECD economies, we conrm empirically the
relationship between economic and political outcomes. We nd that variation in
unemployment alone can account for two-thirds of the variation in party-system
fragmentation. Using data from Greek local elections, to exploit the information
shock, we test the role of institutional constraints in limiting opportunistic redis-
tribution and increasing fragmentation. Overall, Chapter 2 lays a theoretical and
empirical framework that relates economic outcomes with party-system structure.
It also provides a special interest politics justication for redistribution. Finally, it
highlights the importance of institutional constraints and economic institutions in
guaranteeing political pluralism and power-sharing.
Chapter 3, using again data from Greek elections explores empirically the link
between economic adversity, trust and voter turnout. It identies two links: one
normative, declining trust in the party-system, and one rationalistic, the weakening
of party-group linkages. We nd that the scal shock caused a collapse in voter
turn-out. Moreover, the decline was larger in regions with relatively larger public
sector. Using suitable instruments from the institutional set-up of Ottoman Greece,
we document a negative relationship between economic adversity and voter turn-out
operating through both links (trust and party-group linkages). We also show that
the size of the public sector acts as a catalyst in exacerbating the e¤ects of economic
shocks on turn-out. The policy implications are clear: nancial or institutional
measures that reduce the size of public sector and aim at increasing transparency,
trust and voter participation might have a second-order negative e¤ect on turnout
by reducing party-voter linkages. For Greece, the latter e¤ect dominates, raising
questions for the future of political participation.
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Part I
Part A: The Economic Origins of
Party-Systems
1
Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation explores, both theoretically and empirically, the economic origins of
party-system structure, electoral competition and political participation via a model
of redistributive politics. Its primary focus will be to formalize the relationship be-
tween economic conditions, institutions and the fragmentation of the party-system1.
Furthermore, the exploration of the link connecting economic conditions with polit-
ical outcomes will also shed some light into the critical role that institutional checks
and balances play in determining the political landscape and the nature of electoral
competition by shaping electoral behavior. As a result, this dissertation aspires to
complete the bidirectional relationship between economic and political outcomes and
document the e¤ect of economic institutions (e.g. redistributive mechanisms) and in-
stitutional constraints (e.g. scal rules or balanced-budget constitutional provisions)
in changing the structure of the party-system.
In their recent book Why Nations Fail?, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) note
1We adopt the standard convention in the literature (e.g. Persson & Tabellini, 2007) and we
measure party-system fragmentation in a way analogous to market fragmentation, using an adjusted
Herndahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) where we replace market shares with partiesvote shares. As
a result, party-system fragmentation measures the dispersion of elctoral power among political
parties.
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that: Extractive rules are self-reinforcing. In the Spanish New World, plunder and
economic malaise further empowered the elite. [...] Inclusive economies [...] succeed
in keeping economic and political power dispersed. It is exactly this part of the
relationship that runs from economic institutions to political outcomes, as measured
by the dispersion of electoral power among political parties, that this dissertation
will try to address. In fact, it will uncover the opportunistic incentives of dominant
parties which, in the absence of institutional constraints, would be tempted to use
the redistribution mechanism in order to capitalize electorally on the most needy of
the voters (e.g. unemployed) and consolidate their political dominance.
The motivation for this dissertation came from empirical evidence and observa-
tion of how actual party-systems in industrialized democracies operate. Clearly, the
structure of the party-system and the nature of political competition are key deter-
minants for an array of important issues such as political stability and economic
prosperity (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000; 2006), institutional design2 and choice
(Colomer, 2005; Matakos & Xefteris, 2010) or welfare, civil order and conict (Es-
teban & Ray, 2011). Moreover, electoral participation and voter turnout are among
the most important determinants of democratic performance, legitimacy and quality
of political institutions (Powell, 1982 & 1986; Jackman, 1987; Blais, 2006). Hence,
the observed variation in the degree of electoral fragmentation and the level of voter
turnout across di¤erent party-systems during the second half of the 20th century,
even among those ones that share similar economic, socio-demographic and political
characteristics, poses some interesting questions.
In the remaining chapters, this dissertation will address some of them. In partic-
ular: Why do we observe such a big variation in the dispersion of electoral power and
2One of the most prominent institutions chosen within a party-systems is the electoral rule
which, in turn, sets the rules of the game and determines political outcomes (Blais, 1991; Benoit,
2004)
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in the number of political parties that dominate the electoral competition? What
can account for this observed variation in the fragmentation of the party-system and
the level of electoral participation, even among advanced industrialized democracies?
Moreover, what is the role of economic conditions in explaining these phenomena? Is
there a relationship between economic adversity, electoral fragmentation and voter
turnout? And if so, through which mechanisms and links do economic outcomes,
such as unemployment, inuence electoral competition and participation? Can re-
distributive politics and economic (opportunistic) voting provide an explanatory link?
Finally, what is the role of economic institutions and institutional constraints? The
detailed answer to some of those questions will be the main focus of Chapters 2 and
3.
So far, a large amount of scholars has extensively studied the impact of politi-
cal institutions on economic outcomes (e.g. Barro, 1996; Alesina, 1987; Alesina &
Roubini, 1992). The second chapter of this dissertation departs from this strand of
literature, being one of the rst to explore systematically the economic origins of
party-system structure. It will also propose a formal mechanism that links economic
conditions to political outcomes. More precisely, it will examine the impact of unem-
ployment and public spending on the distribution of electoral power among political
parties via redistributive politics. To do so, we employ a four-party rational choice
model of electoral competition which takes place in two dimensions: economic policy
(redistribution) and ideology. Then, we test the predicted relationships on two dif-
ferent data sets. First, on aggregate electoral and economic data from twenty-three
OECD economies during the period from 1960 to 2007. Then, on data from Greek
national and local elections, exploiting the Greek sovereign debt crisis as a natural
experiment (information shock) which altered economic expectations. As a result,
we aspire to conrm our ndings in multiple environments.
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In the third chapter, using again data from Greek elections, we explore the re-
lationship between economic adversity and electoral participation. We identify two
links through which the economic crisis has impacted on voter turnout. A normative
one (trust) and a rationalistic one (party-group linkages the rent-seeking behavior
of voters). In the Appendix, we include various information on our data and their
collection, the political context and the institutional set-up of our Greek case-study.
There, we also prove our theoretical results and we present in greater detail our
empirical ndings.
Overall, this dissertation lays a theoretical and empirical framework that relates
economic outcomes with political participation and party-system fragmentation. It
also highlights the role of institutional constraints (e.g. scal and monetary policy
rules) and economic institutions in determining its structure and the distribution of
political power. Next, we describe in more detail the motivating ideas behind the
two main chapters of this dissertation, coupled with a more extensive review of the
literature.
1.1 Unemployment and Redistribution
Studying the interaction between economic and political outcomes is central to
our understanding of political competition and party-system structure. Increased
electoral fragmentation3 (more dispersion of electoral power among parties) can be
viewed as a sign of increased political pluralism, more power-sharing and democratic
openness. This, in turn, can be an outcome of more inclusive economic institutions
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). But, at the same time, it can also constitute a sign of
increased political tension, polarization and centrifugal forces operating within a so-
3Hereinafter the terms electoral and party-system fragmentation will be used interchangeably
since the former has prevailed in political science whereas the latter in economics.
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ciety (Esteban & Ray, 2011). Since welfare, social order and the quality of democratic
institutions critically depend on political stability, the determinants of party-system
fragmentation seem to matter a lot. A quick look at Figure B.1, reveals that elec-
toral fragmentation varies considerably, even among the OECD countries which share
similar economic and political characteristics.
The exact nature of the relationship between unemployment and electoral frag-
mentation seems to be a bit puzzling. Stylized evidence (Fig. B.1) seem to suggest
a non-monotonic relationship between unemployment and electoral fragmentation
across countries. Moreover, for low levels of unemployment the relationship is nega-
tive before taking the uphill, meaning that vote dispersion decreases with unemploy-
ment4. This latter observation might initially come as a surprise, since retrospective
or punitive voting would predict a positive relationship between unemployment and
support for marginal parties which entails higher fragmentation. It would appear
more likely that voters tend to punish the big parties when unemployment is rising.
Nevertheless, data suggest that something more than retrospective voting might be
going on.
In order to account for this unexpected relationship, in the second chapter, we
build a model of economic (opportunistic) voting where redistributive politics act
as the key mechanism. We aim to answer the following questions: Can an increase
in unemployment benet electorally the dominant parties? If so, under what condi-
tions? Without discarding the merits of retrospective voting, our model provides an
answer to those questions and a comprehensive explanation for this non-monotonic
relationship between unemployment and electoral fragmentation which traditional
voting theories have, so far, ignored. In order to shed more light to this relationship
4An equivalent statement is to say that the concentration of electoral power among parties is
increasing with unemployment.
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our mechanism focuses on the behavior of the unemployed voters and the oppor-
tunistic incentives of political parties and their promises. Our model predicts that
the dominant parties5 will always try to woo the unemployment voters who are rel-
atively more willing to switch their votes in response to more generous redistribution
promises(Dixit & Londregan, 1995 & 1996). The intuition is that for the poorest of
the voters (unemployed) ideology is more or less a luxury good and economic consid-
erations are more salient determinants of electoral choice. Hence, they are more likely
to vote for the parties which can credibly promise and deliver more redistribution,
nanced through labor income or ination taxes (monetary expansion).
This non-monotonic relationship is an outcome of two counter-acting forces. The
initial decline in electoral fragmentation, as unemployment is low and rising, can be
attributed to the following reason: the opportunistic (vote maximizing) behavior of
dominant parties that use the redistributive mechanism in order to attract the vote
of the unemployed who are more responsive to transfers promised by them. In the
spirit of the models of redistributive politics (Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Larcinese et
al., 2012) unemployed voters can be thought of as the target constituency of those
parties (cheaper perfect substitute). Hence, the initial rise in unemployment increase
the size of this target group of voters from which parties can sh for votes. Yet, as
unemployment gets out of control, the revenue raising capabilities of the state are
shrinking due to economic under-performance and a shrinking tax base. As a result,
less funds are available for redistribution and any generous promise is no longer seen
as credible since it cannot be nanced. Therefore, the redistribution mechanism
becomes impotent and the trend is reversed. Now, unemployment leads to more
dispersion of votes and more fragmentation.
But for this argument to hold two conditions have to be met. First, an e¤ective,
5By dominant we mean parties that have real chances of winning elections.
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publicly nanced, through labor income- or ination-taxes, redistribution mechanism
has to be in operation. Second, dominant parties must face low institutional checks
and balances (e.g. independent Central Bank, scal and budget rules, bicameralism,
scal federalism etc.) in their ability to utilize and nance this mechanism for own
electoral benet (e.g. print money or raise taxes to nance promises made to poor
voters). That is, to put it the words of Larcinese, Snyder and Testa (2012), who
nd modest support for the conjecture that politicians will favor nancially their
core supporters, their ndings [M]ight reect features of distributive politics that
are particular to the US. Congress is one of the most powerful [...] legislatures in the
world and guards control over the public purse. Committees are powerful [...] and
give committee leaders [...] a substantial degree of independence from party leaders.
Individual senators pursue their own re-election goals [...]. The federal structure [...]
further complicates the situation. [...] As a result, the President may have relatively
little inuence over the distribution of federal expenditures. Perhaps, even though he
would like to target [...] voters, he cannot. It is exactly this notion of institutional
constraints that our model highlights. This can become more clear by looking at
Figures B.3.a and B.3.b.
The intuition behind our argument follows a carrot-and-stickrationale. Unem-
ployed voters have less economic means relative to employed ones. They are more
responsive to redistribution because their marginal rate of substitution of income for
ideology is relatively higher. That is, they are willing to sacrice more in ideology
for a given increase in income. An employed person who would have otherwise voted
for another party, given the same ideological distance, is more likely to vote for a
party promising redistribution once she becomes unemployed. Hence, the voting be-
havior of the unemployed is dominated by the economic dimension (carrot). Given
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su¢ cient redistribution promises by dominant parties6, unemployment acts like the
stick that allows big parties to get more votes. Thus, ceteris paribus, they are more
willing to vote for the dominant parties that can credibly promise and implement
(upon assuming o¢ ce) more generous redistribution. Even more so, when the public
nances are healthy (or scal and institutional constraints are low) and allow for
more generous redistribution.
This situation, where dominant parties exploit small increases in unemployment
for own electoral benet, clearly portrays the dilemma in which unemployed voters
are caught. Instead of punishing the dominant parties for their policies that have led
them into unemployment, they are more likely to vote for them since they are depen-
dent on their transfers. That is, economic necessity dominates their voting decision.
Hence, as the unemployment rate goes up, and as long as funds for redistribution are
available, so does the vote share of dominant parties. Nevertheless, this argument
has its limits. When unemployment gets out of control, the economy and the tax
base shrink dramatically, thus making income transfers virtually impossible. Since
dominant parties can no longer use redistribution to gain votes, those poor voters
now have nothing to expect from them. Hence, they turn against them.
In the rst place, our claim might sound a little counter-intuitive, given more
traditional approaches of voting behavior. Yet, it is in line with rational choice theory.
Moreover, its empirical documentation paves the ground to complete and revise the
theory of political business cycles (Nordhaus 1975; Alesina et al., 1987 & 1992) in
two directions: Firstly, it will complete the two-way relationship between economic
and political outcomes. So far, in the existing literature (Barro 1996; Persson et
al. 2007) the impact of political institutions, such as the electoral rule, on economic
6In our formal model, we do not assume that some parties are ex-ante dominant. Rather,
dominant parties arise endogenously exactly because they rely more on transfers.
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outcomes has been extensively studied and very well documented both theoretically
and empirically. Nevertheless, the reverse direction of causality is understudied.
Hence, this dissertation aspires to bridge this gap. Secondly, our model endogenizes
partisan preferences over unemployment and redistribution in a way that the political
business cycles theory did not capture.
More importantly, our mechanism can provide a special interest politics justi-
cation for redistribution. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) show how general interest
political considerations (e.g. avoiding a costly revolution) forced political elites to in-
troduce more inclusive power-sharing political institutions that ended up expressing
the median voters preferences for more redistribution. In parallel with this point,
our model highlights the partisan, opportunistic incentives that dominant parties
have to exploit economic malaise (e.g. excess unemployment) and woo this reserve
army of potential voters for own electoral benets, by promising more generous
redistribution. Especially in the presence of weak economic institutions and low in-
stitutional checks and balances, that place minimal limitations to the opportunistic
behavior of dominant parties, a vicious circle might arise: dominant parties can cap-
italize on economic malaise to consolidate their rule by exploiting weak institutional
constraints. This in turn, might lead to those dominant parties having more control
and access over economic institutions (e.g. redistribution mechanism) which will
further utilize to consolidate electorally. Thus, our work supplements Acemoglu and
Robinson by pointing to an extra necessary condition for turning the vicious circle
into a virtuous one: apart from inclusive economic institutions of power-sharing, at
the same time, we also need strong institutional constraints in order to limit the
access of dominant parties to those institutions. Otherwise, economic institutions
that are meant to serve economic and political power-sharing can be exploited for
partisan purposes and lose their original inclusive identity.
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In order to verify the importance of constraints in increasing political power-
sharing and electoral fragmentation, we use the data on Greek Elections. Here,
we exploit the 2009-10 revisions7 on the level of Greek public decit for the 2006-08
period as an information shock8 that generated expectations for large public spending
cuts. The intuition is clear: the revelation of scal derailment and the resulting
austerity measures imposed by the Troika acted as an exogenously imposed constraint
that extinguished the ability of the big parties to credibly promise higher public
spending in the future. These expected cuts severely weakened the strength of party-
voter linkages and undermined the bipartisan foundations of the greek party-system,
since there is not much left for the parties to promise anymore9. As a result, rent-
seeking voters who are now less likely to vote for the big parties, ceteris paribus. Even
more so in regions with larger public sector (linkages are stronger), since the bulk of
the core constituencies of the two big parties is located there. This in turn, led to a
record increase in electoral fragmentation in those regions, as evidence from Greek
Elections suggest (Fig. B.10). This latter nding conrms intuition that economic
adversity, acting as an exogenous constraint, and low public spending are associated
with increases both in electoral fragmentation and polarization.
7As it can be seen in Figure A.1, Eurostat revised its estimates on the level of Greek public debt
upwards, twice within a year (October 2009 and October 2010), and by almost 27% over the period
extending from 2006-2010 of which 12% referred to the 2006 decit.
8This second revision was due to the Greek Governments book-ddling activity and misreporting
of scal data for the whole period from 2006 to 2008. Since decits were already there but remained
concealed until their revelation at a later date (October 2010) by Eurostat, and prior to the 2010
Elections, we consider it as a pure information shock. This generated expectations for large scale
public spending cuts which a¤ected di¤erentially regions with larger public sector size. This was
reected in the 2010 vote (Fig. B.10).
9In this particular case due to an exogenously imposed institutional constraint (the Troika bail-
out agreement).
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1.1.1 Literature Review
The idea of unemployment being used as a coercion or discipline device is not new
in economics. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) apply this idea in the labor market. Yet,
our application on political theory and voting behavior is quite new. Building on
Tullocks assertion that voters and buyers are essentially the same people, we
move one step further and treat parties like rms that try to increase their vote
(market) shares and dominate the electoral (market) competition. Therefore, we
can paraphrase Marx10 and hypothesize that big parties require a reserve armyof
(unemployed) voters in order to dominate in the political competition.
Political scientists have always been interested in examining the structure of the
party-system and have adopted various approaches to describe it. Duverger (1954),
rst noted that the observed variation in party-system fragmentation among coun-
tries may be attributed to the particular political institutions that characterize the
political environment of each state, the most prominent of them being the electoral
rule. Duvergers rst law asserts that the simple majority, single ballot system
favours the two-party system. That is, if a majoritarian electoral rule is applied
then, we should expect a low level of electoral fragmentation. By contrast, his second
hypothesis11 suggests that both the simple-majority system with second ballot and
proportional representation favour multi-partism. Hence, when a proportional elec-
toral rule is in place, fragmentation should be relatively higher. Individual voters are
driven to vote for the larger parties in the rst case, as a vote for a small party in a
majoritarian system is seen as a lost vote. In a sense, this accounts to citizens voting
strategically, since voting for a minor party that has minimal chances of wining may
alter the election result in their disfavor.
10Karl Marxs initial quote was Big industry constantly requires a reserve army of unemployed
workers [...]
11The division of Duvergers two statements into one law and one hypothesis is due to Riker.
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Nevertheless, this approach does not account for the complete story. Looking
again at the data (Fig. B.1), we observe the following paradox: countries with
extremely stable electoral rules and solid party systems throughout their recent po-
litical history, like the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden12
exhibit a rather unexpected volatility in electoral fragmentation overtime. Interest-
ingly enough, and contrary to Duvergerian predictions, countries like Greece, where
changes in electoral rules have been frequent over the years and the party system is
more fragile, exhibit signicantly lower volatility in electoral fragmentation.
To address this issue, two strands were developed in the literature. Firstly,
Colomer (2005) points out that the electoral rule itself might also be endogenously
determined through some political processes. These in turn, might depend on elec-
toral fragmentation. Secondly, political outcomes and electoral fragmentation might
also be linked with economic outcomes. To the support of this claim there is a large
and growing body of literature in economics. Several studies so far have attempted
to relate political outcomes with macroeconomic variables. Alesina (1987), Persson
and Tabellini (2003), Persson et al. (2007), Acemoglu et al. (2000, 2005 & 2006), and
Barro (1996) have extensively analyzed the impact of institutions and other politi-
cal indicators on the economic performance of a country. Specically, Barro studies
how political development and institutions a¤ect economic performance and growth
whereas, Alesina develops a rational expectations political cycles model, where par-
tisan electoral competition a¤ects unemployment and ination.
More recently, Persson et. al (2007) examine the e¤ect that the electoral rule has
on government spending in parliamentary democracies. They conclude that elec-
toral rules a¤ect public spending indirectly through the fragmentation of the party
12The rst two having a majoritarian electoral rule (rst-past-the-post), with Germany having a
mixed rule and Sweeden having a PR rule with a list.
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system. They support that proportional electoral rules induce a more fragmented
party system. As a result, they are associated with a larger incidence of coalition
governments, which in turn induce larger scal decits than single party govern-
ments. In fact, their results are in line with the Duvergerian approach, since they
suggest a link between electoral rules, the resulting party system fragmentation and
economic outcomes.
Nevertheless, this approach explores the link between fragmentation and eco-
nomic outcomes in only one direction. Namely, how the fragmentation of the party
system a¤ects public nances. As such, it cannot explain how economic outcomes
might a¤ect fragmentation. And even though the impact of political institutions
and party-system structure on economic and political outcomes has been extensively
studied, the reverse direction of the relationship has not been systematically docu-
mented. In fact, the impact of unemployment and redistribution on party-system
fragmentation is a fundamental question that has not yet been thoroughly addressed.
Therefore, our second chapter explores the reverse direction of the relationship be-
tween economic conditions and fragmentation.
The inuence of economic variables on electoral outcomes and especially on in-
cumbency has been studied by a large variety of scholars, especially in bipartisan
systems (e.g. USA). Economic conditions are found to have a signicant impact on
determining the winner of an electoral competition, both at an individual (Fiorina
1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Kiewiet 1983) and at a country-level (Kramer
1971; Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Bloom and Price 1975; Tufte 1978; Kinder Adams,
Gronke 1989; Campbell 2000; Holbrook 2008). Nevertheless, the main focus of these
studies was not that broad in the following sense: it might be informative on a par-
tisan level, but it fails to capture whether economic conditions have an impact on
the shape and structure of the party system itself. Moreover, they are silent with
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respect to the mechanisms that drive this relationship, the centrifugal or centripetal
forces that dominate the political system and the role of economic institutions and
constraints.
This dissertation di¤ers from existing literature in two respects. Firstly, it ad-
dresses the relationship between economic and electoral outcomes under a bi-directional
prism. To this aim, we propose redistributive voting as an explanatory mechanism
that links economic outcomes to political ones. Secondly, the scope of our study is
more broad. We are interested in studying the impact of economic conditions on
the structure of the party system, not just on the re-election chances of the incum-
bent13. For this reason, we focus on a broader denition of the electoral outcome:
the fragmentation of the party-system. This is so, because electoral fragmentation
can better capture the changes that occur in the structure of the party system and
the distribution of electoral power. Finally, our study extends the results to a set
of countries with multi-party systems. And given that the key economic indicator
is the unemployment rate, we will attempt to account for the variation in electoral
fragmentation caused by changes in unemployment.
13This is identical to the distinction between the sales and prots of a rm and the structure of
the market as a whole.
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Chapter 2
Unemployment, Redistributive
Politics and Electoral
Fragmentation
This Chapter documents, both theoretically and empirically, the existence of a non-
monotonic relationship between the unemployment and party-system fragmentation.
In fact, it will show that the variation in a single key economic variable, the unem-
ployment rate, can account for much of the variation in electoral and party-system
fragmentation, controlling for a set of relevant political, economic, institutional (e.g.
electoral rule) and historical parameters. Furthermore, it also explores the link
through which this e¤ect operates. Applying a four-party model of redistributive
politics, in the spirit of Dixit and Londregan (1996), it documents the importance
of economic conditions as determinants of the party-system structure. Finally, it
highlights the role of institutional checks and balances in shaping the political land-
scape. Section 2.1 presents the theoretical model. Section 2.2 tests its predictions on
the OECD data set. Section 2.3 explores the role of institutional constraints in the
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Greek case study, while Section 2.4 summarizes the discussion of this chapter and
draws some useful conclusions.
2.1 Theoretical Model
We consider a model where electoral competition takes place among four parties1, in a
two-dimensional policy space. Following the literature (Stokes 1992; Groseclose 2007;
Krasa and Polborn 2012), we will name the two dimensions social2 and economic
policies, respectively3. Following the literature (e.g. Krasa and Polborn 2010, 2012;
Dziubinski and Roy 2010) we assume a di¤erentiated candidate framework, where
the four mixed- (o¢ ce and policy) motivated parties di¤er in their xed4 social policy
position, while in the second dimension (economic policy) they strategically choose
a level of redistributive spending (and implied taxes) to maximize their vote share5.
Moreover, the preferences of the voters in both dimensions will be heterogeneous
(unemployed voters prefer more redistribution, whereas, the opposite is true for the
1In another version of the model, we allow for endogenous party-entry.
2A typical dichotomy in the dimension of social policies can be, for instance, libertarian vs.
authoritarian policies or liberal vs. socially conservative ones (e.g. Groseclose 2007).
3Examples of the rst dimension (social policies) may include policies such as: abortion, same-
sex marriage or secularism. The second dimension may include policies such as: redistribution,
taxation and government spending.
4Krasa and Polborn (2012) also assume that that partiesposition on the social policy (social
ideology in their terms) dimension is xed. Yet our set-up is quite distinct, and quite richer in
the following aspects: i) we have four parties competing in elections instead of two, since we are
interested in studying electoral fragmentation (trivial for the two-party case); ii) In our framework
parties have mixed motives (both policy and o¢ ce motivated), while in theirs parties are only
o¢ ce-motivated; iii) our model allows for more complex institutional architechture (e.g. coalition
governments as we discuss in the Appendix) and iv) we allow for voter heterogeneity in both
dimensions (ideology and tax preferences). Also in the Appendix, we allow for the two dimensions
of political competition to be interconnected.
5Krasa and Polborn (2010) consider a similar model of electoral competition where candidates
[...] are exogenously committed to particular positions on some issues while they choose positions
for the remaining issues [redistributive spending]. Moreover, Dziubinski and Roy (2010) consider
a model with exactly two dimensions where parties are commited in one dimension but have the
freedom to (credibly) choose any position in the other.
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employed ones)6. Finally, both dimensions consist of a continuum of policies7. In
the economic dimension the promised level of redistribution will depend on the level
of the tax rate, which is also chosen from a continuum. In the standard version of
the model, we think of those two dimensions as being independent (an assumption
maintained by Krasa and Polborn 2012). In the Appendix, we extend the model to
allow for the two dimensions to be interdependent. That is, we assume that socially
progressive or liberal parties (and voters for that matter) will be assumed to favor
redistribution policies a little bit more. Since our main result does not depend on the
relationship between the two dimensions, in our analysis we treat the two dimensions
as independent, for expositional simplicity.
2.1.1 Political Parties
We can formally dene the social policy space as follows:
P = fl; L;A; ag  [0; 1] such that l < L < A < a
where l is the extreme libertarian party, L is a moderate socially liberal party,
A is a moderate socially conservative party and a is an extreme authoritarian party.
We shall assume that a partys index p 2 P coincides with its position on the social
policy dimension. The social policy space is the normalized interval [0; 1]. In order
to give more structure to our model we consider the symmetric case.
Condition 1 (Symmetry) Parties l and a are positioned in the extremes of the
social policy space, that is at l = 0 and a = 1. Parties L and A are symmetrically
positioned at distance  around the median. That is, at L = 1=2   and A = 1=2+ .
6In fact, our results also carry through in the case where voters have homogenous preferences
over government spending (everyone prefers high to low).
7In Krasa and Polborn (2010) all policy dimensions are binary. In Krasa and Polborn (2012)
the bidimensional policy space is continuous, just like ours.
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Each partys position in the social policy dimension is public knowledge (and
xed)8. Furthermore, each party will propose in the pre-election stage a level of
redistribution, which also implies a tax rate, since the budget must be balanced and
the total amount of redistribution transfers should always equal the total revenues
raised through taxation. Formally, each party p proposes a tax rate tp such that
tp 2 [0;  ] and  2 (0; 1). Clearly, a proposal of tax rate  is associated with highest
possible level of redistribution and vice versa9. Further assume that parties are
rational vote share maximizers that are both policy and o¢ ce motivated and derive
utility from the policy that is implemented, as well as from the vote share that they
receive. That is, they care about winning in order to implement their policy and
also receive o¢ ce rents (proportional to their vote shares). In contrast, the level
of proposed redistribution a¤ects their utility only indirectly by altering their vote
shares. Formally, their utility function takes the following form:
Vp(!; vp) =  j!   pj+ vp; p 2 P
where vp is the vote share of party p 2 P, and ! is the policy that gets imple-
mented by the winner (or winners), once the electoral result has been realized. For
instance, if party L wins in the electoral competition it implements !L = 1=2   .
Given that ! is the social policy of the winner10, it clearly depends on the resulting
8See e.g. Krasa and Polborn (2010, 2012) and also Dzuibinski and Roy (2010).
9An alternative and politically more desireable way for the parties to nance redistribution is
by engaging in expansionary monetary policy (money printing), in which case tp can be thought
of as the rate of ination tax (growth rate of monetary base) proposed by each party. One can
dene the growth rate of the monetary base gM as follows: g
p
M  t
p
1 tp : Then, our analysis goes
through, this time with parties choosing gpM . Hence, t
p can have an alternative interpretation: it is
the implicit rate of ination-tax chosen by the parties. Hence, the variable upper limit  of tp can
be interpreted as the degree of toughness (or autonomy) of the cetnral bank. An independent bank,
following tough anti-ination policies, will only allow for a very low  , which means that the ability
of parties to propose generous redistribution nanced through ination-taxes is limited. That is, 
measures the degree of institutional constraints (e.g. scal or monetary policy rules).
10Clearly the identity of the winner(s) depends on the electoral and the institutional architecture
of government formation. We postpone further discussion on those issues until the next section.
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vote share allocation. Hence, we can formally dene it as follows: !(v) 2 [0; 1],
where v is the vector of vote shares (vl; vL; vA; va). To conclude the discussion, we
note that each partys social policy p, together with its tax rate proposal tp (uniquely
associated with a level of redistributive transfers) is party ps political platform, upon
which citizens vote.
2.1.2 The Voters
We consider two groups of voters, each consisting of a continuum whose preferences
over social policies (ideal points) are single-peaked and distributed according to a
uniform distribution on the [0; 1] interval. That is, x  U(0; 1) in both cases. The
two continua are identical in all respects apart from two: rstly, they can be of
unequal size and secondly, citizens have di¤erent initial incomes. We assume that
the rst group of voters, of mass q 2 (0; 1) will be the unemployed ones, whose income
m 2 (0;M) is a fraction of the market wage M . The second group representing the
remaining (1  q) will be the employed ones, receiving income M .
As a result of di¤erent incomes, agents have di¤erential preferences over taxa-
tion and redistribution. Employing a redistribution mechanism identical to that of
Meltzer and Richard (1981), we can compute the total revenue raised, and trans-
ferred to the citizens in the form of redistributive transfers, when a party proposes
tax rate tp 6= 0. Otherwise, if tp = 0, redistributive transfers are also zero. Then, if
budget balance is satised with equality, the total revenue raised and transferred to
each voter is given by the following expression:
T (tp) = tp
[qm+(1 q)M ]
q+(1 q) ; tp 2 [0;  ] such that  2 (0; 1)
Given initial income y 2 fm;Mg, with m 2 (0;M), the utility of an agent with
ideal policy x and income y (we name this voter fx; yg) is given by:
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U(!; x; y) =  j!   xj + f(y + T (t!)),
where T (t!) is the transfer proposed by the winner, denoted as !. The rst
component of this expression,  j!  xj, is the utility that voter x receives from the
ideology of the winner. The second component, f(y+T (t!)), is the utility that voter
fx; yg receives from her initial income y, plus the received transfer amount T (t!),
given the proposed tax rate t! of the winner. We assume that f() is a continu-
ous, strictly concave, monotonically increasing and twice continuously di¤erentiable
function with f 0() > 0 and f 00() < 0.
Then, the resulting utility of income for an unemployed voter, given transfer
T (t!), is given by:
f (m(1  t!) + qmt! + (1  q)Mt!) = f (m+ (1  q)(M  m)t!) > f(m)
whereas, for an employed one it is:
f(M(1  t!) + qmt! + (1  q)Mt!) = f(M   q(M  m)t!) < f(M)
Since the LHS of both inequalities is income after redistribution, while the RHS
is income when redistribution is zero, we can deduce that by monotonicity of f()
all unemployed voters prefer the highest possible tax rate  since redistribution
takes place in their favour. On the contrary, employed voters have no preference for
redistribution and strictly prefer zero taxes11. Hence, a party proposing a positive
tax rate  will be getting the votes of the unemployed at the cost of losing votes from
the employed.
11This formulation of preferences, within each group, is exactly equivalent to Grosecloses (2007)
one-and-a-half dimensionalpreferences where alternatives are described by two characteristics:
their position in a spatial dimension, and their position in a good-bad [high-low tax rate] dimension,
over which voters [of the same group] have identical preferences.
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An interesting point to note is that, given the proportional taxation scheme, par-
ties will always have an incentive to propose a strictly positive tax rate and capture
the votes of the unemployed, even when there are few of them. The intuition is
the following. First, due to the diminishing marginal utility of income, unemployed
voters are more responsive to generous redistribution. In fact, social policy is like a
luxury good for them (the marginal rate of substitution of income for social policies
is relatively higher for an unemployed voter). Second, a very high nominal tax rate
(t) does not always imply very aggressive redistribution. In fact, whenever unem-
ployment (q) is very low, even for extremely high values of t, due to the proportional
redistribution scheme, redistribution from the employed towards the unemployed will
be extremely mild (the term q(M m)t! will be close to zero)12. Hence, the trade-o¤
always works in favor of those parties that target the unemployed voters by propos-
ing more redistribution. Then, one might ask the following question: Why dont
we observe all parties making identical tax proposals? The answer to this is can
be found to the strategic behavior of some parties who try to manipulate electoral
competition and alter the outcome by bringing it closer to their ideal point. We will
come back to this point in the next section. First, we want to formally state and
discuss our main result.
2.1.3 The Voting Game
We consider a voting game with three stages. Ballots are secret. All information is
publicly available and known ex ante to all agents. The equilibrium solution concept
we employ is Nash. The three stages of the game are as follows:
Stage 1: Parties announce simultaneously their complete political platforms
12To see this, check that for q = 0, or for q = 1 for that matter, redistribution will always be
zero, even if t = 1.
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fp; tpg. Since tp is the only strategic choice made by parties, we can rewrite their
maximization problem as follows13:
max
tp
Vp(tp; t p) =  j!(v(tp; t p))  pj+ vp(tp; t p)
The winning party is denoted by !. Clearly, the winner depends on the allocation
of vote shares among parties, which in turn depends on the tax-rate proposal tp.
Hence, we can express the winner of the electoral game as !(v(t)). Formally, we
have !(v(t)) 2 [0; 1], where v is the vector (vp)p2P and t is the vector (tp)p2P .
Stage 2: Voters vote sincerely for their most preferred platform14, given parties
tax rate announcements. Formally, sincere voting in this setup means that each voter
fx; yg solves the following maximization problem:
max
p2P
U(p; x; y) =  jp  xj+ f(y + T (tp)):
Stage 3: Given voters choices at Stage 2, each party receives its vote share
vp 2 [0; 1] such that
P
p2P vp = 1, and the voting outcome is realized. The party
that collects most votes wins the electoral competition and is called upon to form the
government and implement its political platform. In case of ties, parties do so with
equal probability. We assume commitment. That is, the winner fully implements its
tax (transfer) announcements.
Since we make no reference to coalition government formation here, we are implic-
itly assuming that the electoral rule is simple plurality (or FPTP). In the Appendix,
13Given that in the social policy dimension the position of each party p is xed, we can save in
notation by omitting p from fp; tpg.
14Benoit et al. (2011) make a distinction of sincerevoting into expressive and simple. They
nd experimental evidence that in large representative elections where voters have heterogeneous
preferences they tend to vote sincerely (simple voting). It is this concept that we utilize here,
although in our set up expressive voting would not produce di¤erent outcomes.
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we examine in more detail the case of more complex institutional architectures (coali-
tion governments and proportional rule) and we briey discuss why our main results
are not a¤ected by allowing for those changes15. Here, we only stress in advance
something that will become obvious as we solve our model: the choice of rule has no
e¤ect on the policy outcome, the equilibrium characterization and the comparative
statics analysis that follows. The reason is that, as Groseclose (2007) demonstrated,
when voterspreferences are single-peaked and concave over the rst dimension [so-
cial policy], majority rule is transitive, and the majoritys preferences are identical
to the median voters.We show that in our model the outcome of simple plurality
coincides with that of the majority rule. Hence, there is no need for further worry.
Clearly, the electoral outcome depends on the positions of the four parties in the
social policy space and on their tax rate (redistributive transfers) proposals. Since
parties ultimately choose tp, and all that voters do is to vote sincerely for the party
whose proposed tax rate tp in conjunction with its social policies maximize their
utility, there is only one dimension of strategic competition among parties. Finally, to
conclude the discussion, we will now dene our variable of interest. Given vp 2 [0; 1],
for every p 2 P and following Rae (1968) and Laakso and Taagepera (1979) we can
dene electoral fragmentation as an inverse Herndahl-Hirchman Index:
F (v) = 1  P
p2P
(vp)
2
2.1.4 Results
In this section, we present our main results. In fact, we will show that for relatively
mild assumptions, the game has a unique and symmetric pure-strategy NE. Since
15In the case of proportional rule and coalition government the implemented policy is a weighted
average such that ! =
P
p2C
(vpp)P
p2C
vp
, where C is the set that includes the coalition parties.
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the main purpose of this chapter is to study how economic parameters a¤ect elec-
toral fragmentation, equilibrium uniqueness can provide the necessary framework to
perform a comparative statics analysis. To prove our main result, we construct our
argument in two steps. First, we show how partiesvote shares vary with the chosen
tax-rates for all possible values of the parameters. Then, we show uniqueness by
highlighting the strategic behavior of the extremist parties. Before presenting the
results, we dene a symmetric equilibrium.
Denition 2 An equilibrium is symmetric if and only if parties play mirror strate-
gies. That is, both conditions have to be satised: (i) tl = tr and, (ii) tL = tR:
We also denote a useful function that measures the maximum gain in votes for a
party, as a function of unemployment (q) and its tax rate (redistribution) mark-up
with respect to one of its neighboring parties. Dene the tax rate mark-up for a
party p as t^p  tp   t p16. Also, to spare on notation, dene (1   q)(M  m)  
and q(M   m)   and let m^  m + t p and M^  M   t p. Then, for every
q; t^ 2 (0; 1) and every m and M , such that m 2 (0;M) dene:
z(q; t^p)  q

f(m^+ t^p)  f(m^)
| {z }
Vote Gains from Unemployed
  (1  q)
h
f(M^)  f(M^   t^p)
i
| {z } :
Vote Losses from Employed
Then, the following Lemma will help us to shed some light on the equilibrium
behavior of the parties vis-à-vis their choice of strategies (tax rates).
Lemma 3 The following statements are true: (i) z(q; t^p) is continuous in [0; 1] and
di¤erentiable in (0; 1) for every q;m; tp; p 2 (0; 1); (ii) z(q; t^p) is positive i¤ t^p > 0
16For instance w.l.o.g, one can dene t^R  tR   tr the di¤erential between tR and tr or alterna-
tively, we can dene t^r  tr   tR. Clearly if we have that tR =  and tr = 0 then, obviously t^R = 
while t^r =   .
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(i.e. tp > t p) 8 p; p and tp; t p 2 (0; 1); and (ii) @z(; t^p)=@tp > 0 for all tp and
8q;m.17
In gures B.7.a and B.7.b we o¤er a graphical exposition of Lemma 3, for f(y) =
p
y. Clearly, z() is strictly increasing with respect to t^, and positive whenever party
p proposes higher redistribution (taxes). It is also bounded18 above and below (see
Fig. B.7). Hence, Lemma 3 highlights the incentive that parties have to target the
unemployed and go for redistribution. The rst component is the gain in votes from
the unemployed voters for a party proposing excess taxation t^p, compared to its
opponents proposal. The second part captures the loss in votes from the employed
voters19. Since z(;t^p) is always positive whenever tp > t p, it can be interpreted as
the net gain in votes for party p as a result of its tax rate mark-up. In the previous
section, we have provided some intuition as to why a party can gain more votes if it
proposes a high tax rate, even for low levels of unemployment. We postpone further
discussion until the next section. First, we state our main characterization result.
Proposition 4 For every q 2 (0; 1), every m 2 (0;M) and every  2 (0; 1), 9 ^ 2
(0; 1
2
) such that 8  > ^ the following vector t = (tl ; tL; tA; ta) = (0;  ;  ; 0) constitutes
the unique Nash equilibrium of the electoral game and induces the following policy
outcome: !(v(t)) = 1
2
(median).
Our rst result simply says that for a large range of values for , it always exist a
unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies such that the two moderate
parties propose the highest possible tax rate  while, the two extremists propose
zero tax. The resulting vote share allocation is symmetric, with the two moderate
17All Proofs in the Appendix.
18To identify upper and lower bounds we used approximation techniques in Matlab.
19Clearly t^p measures the net income transfer to an unemployed voter, due to taxation, whereas
 t^p measures the net income transfer to an employed one.
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parties sharing rst place, and the median policy is implemented. For values of
 < ^ an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist (see Fig. B.15). Fortunately,
Proposition 8 (Appendix B) generalizes our equilibrium characterization for the case
of mixed strategies and guarantees the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in mixed-
strategies for almost all values of .20
In any such mixed-strategy equilibrium (t) the tax-rate proposal of the two
extremist parties is (in expectation) strictly less than that of the two moderate ones.
Since, even for  < ^ we still have that extremist parties are choosing lower taxation
(and less redistribution) than the moderate ones, our comparative statics analysis
would yield identical results. The reason is that our comparative statics depend on
extremist parties behaving strategically and proposing a strictly lower tax rate than
the moderate ones.
Discussion of the Results
One interesting feature of our equilibrium is that only moderate parties will always
go after the vote of the unemployed and propose the highest possible tax rate, even
when unemployment is low. In the previous section, we have argued why parties
would want to target the unemployed voters, regardless of the size of this target
constituency. The reasons were: i) the proportional nature of the redistribution
scheme, which means that a high nominal tax rate need not always imply an extreme
income loss for the employed21 (especially when unemployment is low, employed
voters have almost nothing to lose) and ii) the relatively higher responsiveness of
unemployed voters to economic transfers (diminishing marginal utility of income
implies that, for the unemployed, the relative marginal rate of substitution of income
20In fact, Proposition 4 is a special case of Proposition 8 where all parties choose degenerate
strategies with L(tL = ) = 

R(tR = ) = 1 and 

l (tl = 0) = 

r(tr = 0) = 1.
21Recall that the e¤ective tax levied on employed voters (redistribution in favor of the unem-
ployed) also depends on q, apart from the nominal tax rate t.
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for ideology is larger). Since every vote counts the same, and given xed resources
available, parties always have an incentive to redistribute them in a fashion that
targets the unemployed (cheaper perfect substitute)22. Hence, moderate parties are
pursuing a redistribution policy for purely opportunistic, vote-maximizing reasons
(special interest politics for redistribution).
Then, the question is why extreme parties do not follow the moderates in pursuing
the same vote-maximizing strategy and promise high redistribution. The answer lies
in the strategic behavior of the two extreme parties: if they propose high redistribu-
tion they will be shooting themselves in the footby reducing the vote shares of their
sister-parties, thus adversely a¤ecting the implemented social policy. In fact, what
appears to be a cost-less promise changes the equilibrium outcome to their disfavor
and causes a less desired party to win with certainty. That is, extreme parties face a
trade-o¤ between their o¢ ce motivation (which dictates vote-maximization and high
redistribution promises) and their policy motivation which triggers their strategic
behavior in an attempt to manipulate the electoral outcome and the implemented
social policies. by implicitly colluding with the party that is23.
In fact, our model delivers a great deal of realism and highlights a trademark
characteristic of multi-party electoral competition. It can explain why we observe
some implicit collusion between parties that are closer to each other in the social
policy dimension, even under the most competitive conditions found in a multi-party
system. That is, we show how extremist parties strategically choose to specializeon
the social policy dimension of their agenda by not attempting to woo the unemployed
22Recall that the function z(q; t^) is strictly increasing in tp and positive for every q. Figure B.14
compares the utility of a moderate party proposing the highest tax-rate  with its utility from a
deviation to tp = 0. Clearly, for every q 2 (0; 1) the moderate party is better-o¤ by proposing the
high tax-rate.
23The same incentives for strategic behavior and an analogous trade-o¤ are also present in the
case of coalition government formation, as we exhibit in the Appendix. Figure B.15.a represents
this trade-o¤ graphically
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via redistribution24. As a result, our model highlights the key trade-o¤ between
vote maximization, which induces more intense competition, and policy motivation
(strategic behavior), which induces tacit collusion that cannot completely eliminate
competition.
2.1.5 Main Comparative Statics Results
After this brief analysis of our equilibrium, we proceed by presenting our main com-
parative statics results. That is, we will examine how electoral fragmentation varies
with changes in unemployment and redistribution. Hereinafter, for expositional sim-
plicity, we assume  > ^. First, we compute the electoral fragmentation index
F (v) = 1   P
p2P
(vp)
2, as a function of the vote share allocation that corresponds
to the symmetric equilibrium of Proposition 4. Recall that:the induced vote share
allocation vector v(t) = (vl ; v

L; v

R; v

r) takes the following form:
vL(t
) = vR(t
) = 1
4
+ 
2
+ 1
2
[z(q; )]25
and
vl (t
) = vr(t
) = 1
4
  
2
  1
2
[z(q; )]26
Hence, we can compute:
F (v) = 1  2[vL(t)2 + vl (t)2]:
We can, then, rewrite F as a function of q;m and  :
F (q;m; ) = 1  2
n 
1
4
+ 
2

+ 1
2
z(q; )
2
+
 
1
4
  
2
  1
2
z(q; )
2o
=
= 1  21
2
[z(q; )]2 + z(q; ) + (1
4
+ 
2
)2 + (1
4
  
2
)2
	
.
24Rick Santorums statement during his campaign reminds us this: I dont care what the unem-
ployment rate is going to be. It doesnt matter to me. My campaign doesnt hinge on unemployment
rates [...].
25By symmetry of equilibrium note that t^L = tL   tl = tR   tr = t^R =  and hence, z(q; t^L) =
z(q; t^R) = z(q; )
26Again by symmetry z(q; t^l) = z(q; t^r) =  z(q; t^L) =  z(q; t^R) =  z(q; )
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For simplicity let (1
4
+ 
2
)2 + (1
4
  
2
)2 = C, a constant, so that F becomes:
F (q;m; ) = 1  [z2(q; ) + 2z(q; ) + 2C].
Proposition 5 Assume that conditions of Proposition 4 hold. Then 9 ~q such that
F (~q; ) = 0 and the following statements are true: (i) for q 2 (0; ~q) the electoral
fragmentation index F (q; ) decreases as the unemployment rate is increasing (that
is @F (q;)
@q
< 0), ceteris paribus; and (ii) for q 2 (~q; 1) the fragmentation index F (q; )
increases as unemployment increases (@F (q;)
@q
> 0).
The indi¤erent voter among parties L and R is the median, due to the fact that
the two moderate parties make the same redistribution (tax rate) proposals. Hence,
the distribution of votes among the two moderate parties remains constant. As a
result, the e¤ect of unemployment on the fragmentation index comes through the
shift of votes from the extremist parties (l and r) to the moderate ones (L and R).
Therefore, changes in fragmentation capture the net changes in the party-system
structure and the distribution of electoral power between moderate and extremist
parties. Hence, we disentangle the incumbency e¤ect (vote exchanges between the
two moderate parties) from our e¤ect (vote di¤usion from the centre to the extremes).
The comparative statics results of Proposition 5 conrm our hypothesis for a non-
monotonic relationship between unemployment and electoral fragmentation. Unem-
ployed voters with lower initial income are more responsive to generous transfers.
Given that in equilibrium, only the two centrist parties promise high redistribution,
it follows that initially an increase in the unemployment rate will result in those
parties increasing their vote shares (target groups gets larger). Yet, once unemploy-
ment gets out of control, the tax base shrinks dramatically (more voters are poor)
and the ability to redistribute is severely undermined due to insu¢ cient funds. In
such a case, further rise in the unemployment rate results in less redistribution and
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more fragmentation. Figures B.5.a and B.5.b, depict this non-monotonic relationship
between unemployment and fragmentation.
Furthermore, our model can explain, via opportunistic motives, why di¤erent
societies have di¤erent tolerance levels for unemployment. As shown in the proof
of Proposition 5, F (q; ) is non-monotonic with respect to q. For every q < ~q, we
have shown that F (q; ) is decreasing (i.e. @F (q;)
@q
< 0), whereas the opposite is true
for every q > ~q (i.e. @F (q;)
@q
> 0). That is, there exist ~q(m; ) such that F (~q; ) = 0
for all m;  2 (0; 1). In turn, ~q(m; ) varies with m and  . The following Corollary
summarizes this relationship.
Corollary 6 Assume that conditions of Proposition 4 hold. That is, 9 ~q(m; ) such
that F (~q; :) = 0 for all m;  2 (0; 1). Then, the following statements are true: (i)
@~q(m;)
@m
< 0 and, (ii) @~q(m;)
@
> 0.
The above Corollary just states that the critical point ~q()27, after which frag-
mentation F () becomes an increasing function of unemployment, is increasing in
 and decreasing in m (see Fig. B.6.a). Hence,whenever the ability of governing
parties to engage in redistributive transfers (by raising taxes) is limited, perhaps due
to strict scal and monetary policy rules or institutional constraints (e.g. strong
control of the legislature over the public purse), ceteris paribus, the party-system
has a lower tolerance for unemployment (e.g. USA). This is so, because the critical
level of unemployment (~q), beyond which unemployment stops serving their oppor-
tunistic goals, is lower. Contrary to that, in societies where redistribution is more
generous, perhaps due to lower constraints (e.g. politically controlled central bank)
the tolerance for unemployment is higher (e.g. Greece).
Finally, our last result summarizes the relationship between electoral fragmenta-
tion and institutional constraints (redistribution). Here, we need to clarify that the
27We name this ~q as the tolerance levelof unemployment.
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level of redistribution is endogenously determined through the choice of the tax-rate.
The comparative statics exercise, therefore, refers to exogenous variations on the
maximum rate  that is allowed.28
Proposition 7 Assume that conditions of Proposition 1 hold. Then, an increase
in the permissible tax rate ceiling  (redistribution) causes a decrease in electoral
fragmentation F (q; ). That is, @F ( ;)
@
< 0, for all  2 (0; 1).
This proposition says that as institutional constraints on economic policy are
lifted and higher tax rates, leading to more redistribution are possible, the leverage
that moderate parties (which are the only ones proposing redistribution) have on
unemployed voters increases. Hence, so do their vote shares. This time, the relation-
ship is monotonic. Figure B.6.b summarizes the relationships of Propositions 5 and
7 together.
2.1.6 Some Remarks
After presenting our main comparative statics result, a short comment with respect
to the number of parties in our model (and the value of parameter ) is in order.
Expositional simplicity considerations aside, there is another intuitive reason, related
with the desired nature of political competition. If   ! 1
2
, this means that the two
moderate parties are converging to the extremes in terms of ideology. In such a case,
our four-party model becomes a standard two-party model where the study of frag-
mentation becomes trivial. On the other hand, if   ! 0, the two moderate parties
converge to the centre (and to each other). In this case as well, the study of elec-
toral fragmentation becomes trivial29. In order to study how electoral fragmentation
28E.g. the degree of CB independence can determine the maximum level of seignorage or ination-
tax allowed.
29The two extremists are now indi¤erent between the two moderate parties. Hence, they prefer
to promise high spending as well, leading to an equilibrium where redistribution (economic policy)
32
evolves when economic variables change we need a) multi-party political competition
and b) di¤erentiation among the redistribution promises of the parties. Hence, we
only require that  simultaneously satises both conditions. Luckily enough, we can
guarantee that for almost all values of . We examine the non-symmetric case in the
Appendix.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we test comparative statics prediction of our model summarized in
Proposition 5: the non-monotonic (and initially decreasing) relationship between un-
employment and fragmentation30. We will also present some evidence in the support
of Proposition 7 (the role of institutional constraints). For this reason, we use ag-
gregate political, socio-demographic and macroeconomic data for 23 western OECD
democracies during the period from 1960 to 2007. Our hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1 (Proposition 5): The relationship between unemployment and elec-
toral fragmentation is non-monotonic (convex).
Hypothesis 2 (Proposition 7): An increase in the degree of institutional constraints
results in more electoral fragmentation.
Our rst hypothesis (H1 ) is a straightforward corollary of the model. We expect
a non-monotonic (and convex) relationship between unemployment and fragmenta-
tion. That is, contrary to the traditional protest voting hypothesis that postulates
a monotonic (and most importantly positive31) relationship between unemployment
dimension is practically cancelled-out.
30An implicit test of our proposed mechanism of redistributive politics (Proposition 1) is contained
in the Appendix.
31It might not be straightforward why protest or retrospective voting theories would predict a
monotonic and positive relationship between unemployment and fragmentation, especially in the
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and support for marginal parties, we claim that electoral fragmentation initially
declines with unemployment (and reaches a minimum), before taking the up-hill.
Our second hypothesis (H2 ) is a re-statement of Proposition 7: more institutional
checks and balances constrain the ability of dominant parties to engage in electorally
motivated redistribution in order to gain more votes. Hence their vote shares decrease
(and electoral fragmentation increases) with the degree of constraints.
Bringing the models main predictions to data will be an interesting exercise. So
far, there are few comprehensive and comparative empirical studies on the economic
determinants of electoral fragmentation. Thus, our study is a rst attempt to docu-
ment systematically the economic origins of party-system fragmentation in western
democracies. Of course, we need stress once more that this empirical study does not
aspire to give a complete account on how (unemployed) citizens vote. Rather, we
aspire to provide some evidence on the e¤ect of economic variables, such as unemploy-
ment, on electoral fragmentation. Surely, unemployment is not the sole determinant
of electoral fragmentation. Yet, we think that it is one of the most important ones.
case where protest voting implies punishing one dominant party by voting for the other one. In such
a case the relationship between unemployment and electoral fragmentation might even be negative.
Consider the following example: the two extremists each get 10% of the vote and the two centrists
each get 40%. Then, protest voting might imply the following two cases: i) 10% for the extremists,
30% for the incumbent and 50% for the challenger or ii) 15% for the two extremists 30% for the
incumbent and 40% for the challenger. Clearly, under case i), protest voting results in a reduction
in electoral fragmentation (from 66 to 64), whereas in case ii) it results in an increase (from 66
to 70.5). According to our theory, fragmentation is expected to decline, like case (i), but via a
di¤erent channel: the increase in the vote shares of the dominant parties (say from 40 to 45%) at
the expense of smaller parties. Luckily, we can completely shut-o¤ the rst channel through which
protest voting might operate (vote transfers between the two dominant parties) by re-estimating
our models replacing electoral fragmentation with the sum of vote shares of the top-two dominant
parties as our dependent variable. Thus, if protest voting was taking place our new dependent
variable would have to either remain unchanged (case i), or move in the opposite direction than
our prediction (fragmentation expected to increase and the sum of vote shares of the two dominant
parties is expected to decrease from 80 to 70%). In fact, if one is to estimate our model using the
vote shares of the top-two (dominant) parties as the dependent variable, our prediction is distinctly
di¤erent from that of protest voting: we expect a concave (and initially increasing) relationship
between unemployment and the vote shares of dominant parties (the mirror image of electoral
fragmentation) whereas protest voting can only imply a decreasing (and monotonic) relationship,
as explained above.
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2.2.1 Data Description
For our empirical analysis, we have compiled a data set that contains observations of
many political, socio-demographic and macroeconomic variables from twenty-three
OECD states that are all consolidated democracies32. Our main source of data is
The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2007 which is a collection of political,
economic and institutional data33. It consists of a compilation of (mostly) annual
data for 23 OECD states from 1960 to 2007. We have supplemented the data set
with economic data retrieved from the SourceOECD Database34 and with observa-
tions collected from the OECD i-Library, for reasons of consistency with the initial
data. Data for oil prices were retrieved from OPEC and the US Energy Information
Administration (EIA). Finally, data on parties political positions and ideological
proximity were taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project (DZW Berlin).
Our data are suited for cross-country, longitudinal and pooled time series analysis.
We organize the data in a way that is suitable for a cross-national pooled time series
analysis, using electoral years (not calendar) as our unit of analysis. The reason is
that political, electoral and institutional variables (and most crucially our dependent
variable, electoral fragmentation) only vary at election years. To deal with this
complication we have decided to conduct our analysis at the election year (or term)
level35. After aggregation, we are left with 322 observations at the election year (and
term) level36, out of 1,022 in total. For a complete description of the data set we refer
32As we will illustrate even in consolidated and industrialized democracies redistributive (oppor-
tunistic) politics can play an important role in determining electoral outcomes.
33Data have been assembled in the context of the research projects Die Handlungsspielräume
des Nationalstaates and Critical junctures: An international comparison directed by Klaus
Armingeon and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
34In the cases of Greece, Spain and Portugal, political data were collected only for the democratic
periods. Data for Greece are missing during the period 1967-1973. Data for Portugal are missing
until 1975, and for Spain until 1976.
35The average electoral period (term) is close to 3 years. On average, we have 14 electoral contests
per country in a period of 48 years.
36In fact, for large parts of our analysis, which we will clearly indicate, we conduct our analysis
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the reader to the comprehensive list of all variables which is available in the online
appendix. Finally, the data set contains some additional demographic, socio- and
economic variables37. For a brief description of those variables we refer our readers
to the OECD online database (OECD i-Library). Finally, following the literature we
dene our dependent variable38, electoral fragmentation, as a Rae Index. Formally:
Fi;t = 1 
Ni;tP
n=1
(vn;i;t)
2;
where vn;i;t is the vote share of party n in country i at election year (or term) t,
and Ni;t is the total number of parties in country i that contested elections in year t.
2.2.2 The OLS Model
In order to test our two hypotheses, we estimate the following OLS model:
Fi;t = 0 + 1  qi;t + 2  q2i;t + 3  CONSTRAINTS +X 0i;t + ai + t + i;t
where the dependent variable Fi;t is the index of electoral fragmentation in country
i at election term t, qi;t is the unemployment rate for country i in election year (or
term) t. Our explanatory variable, unemployment, is measured as a percentage of
the total active labor force. We have included a quadratic term on unemployment to
account for the non-monotonic relationship, suggested by the theory. According to
our hypothesis, we anticipate 1 < 0 and 2 > 0 (convex relationship)
39. Moreover,
at the election term level. That is, we average all economic data at the election term level (usually
3-year averages) so as not to discard valuable information.
37A few variables have been copied from a data set collected by E. Huber, Ch. Ragin, J. Stephens,
D. Brady and J. Beckeld (2004), as well as from a data set collected by D. Quinn.
38As stressed before, in order to completely distinguish our theory from protest and retrospective
voting theories we also employ an alternative dependent variable: the sum of vote shares of the top
two (dominant) parties. We need to stress here that the identity of the two dominant parties need
not necessarily be the same over time, even though in most countries the two dominant parties have
remained unchanged for roughly the whole period under study.
39And if we replace fragmentation with the vote shares of the two top parties we expect a concave
relationship.
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X 0i;t is the set of control variables (such as the proportionality of the electoral rule,
the incumbency e¤ect, the type of government, the number of parties contesting
the elections, voter turnout and other economic and demographic controls). A key
control variable included in the model is CONSTRAINTS, measuring the degree
of institutional constraints40 in using the public purse for opportunistic (electorally
motivated) purposes. We expect 3 > 0. Finally, i and t are country and year
xed e¤ects, respectively.
We have decided to include country specic xed e¤ects in all specications. The
main idea behind it is the fact that electoral outcomes and fragmentation might
depend on time-invariant, country-specic characteristics (e.g. historical attributes
of the political system, demographics, minority and ethnic parties etc.). Hence, in
order to account for all these factors, we always use a xed e¤ects (FE) estimator.
Our decision to also include year xed e¤ects requires some further discussion.
Since the aim of this study is to document the e¤ect of unemployment on elec-
toral fragmentation, the best way to do this would have been to exploit aggregate
shocks on the economy. By doing so we would have been able to capture changes
in unemployment that are beyond the control of domestic political competition41.
Exploiting those exogenous variations in unemployment would have been ideal for
the purposes of this study. Yet, a potential source of worry comes from the fact that
voting behavior and as a result electoral fragmentation may also depend on year
40The CONSTRAINTS variable is the Index of institutional constraints of central state govern-
ment according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6; Range of data from 0 to
5, high values indicate powerful constraints, low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room
available to central state government. Description: additive index composed of 6 dummy-variables
(1= constraints, 0=else) (1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state structure
(federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions/balanced-budget constitutional provisions
(very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda
= 1. Source: Schmidt (1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data. Data for central
bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece
1967-1973, Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977
41For instance, international nancial contagion could have been an ideal source of exogenous
variation in unemployment.
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specic political shocks that a¤ect uniformly all western democracies42. Of course,
the incidence of such political phenomena is more rare than that of aggregate macro-
economic shocks, which we ideally want to exploit. Nonetheless, we have decided to
include year xed e¤ects in almost all subsequent specications, knowing that this
will also kill most of the variation in institutional constraints.
2.2.3 OLS Results
We rst present our OLS results that serve as a benchmark. The main coe¢ cients of
interest are 1, 2 and 3. Table B.1 presents our initial OLS estimates under ve
alternative specications. Columns 1 and 2 simply check and verify Duvergers Law
(1954) that simple majority and First-Past-The-Post electoral rules are associated
with bipartisan systems and hence, lower levels of electoral fragmentation. The coe¢ -
cient on F-P-T-P electoral rule is negative (range from  8 to  16:5) and statistically
signicant at any conventional level. Moreover, the coe¢ cient on CONSTRAINTS
is also positive (range from 1:8 to 1:1), under both specications, providing evidence
in the support of our second hypothesis (H2 ). These ndings serve as a consistency
check on the relevance of our data set. Note that in column 2 we introduce year
xed e¤ects. Thus, it is normal to anticipate that this inclusion will eliminate much
of the e¤ect of institutional constraints. In columns 3 to 5 we introduce our key
explanatory variable (unemployment and its square) to test H1. First, note that
the coe¢ cient on unemployment 1 is always negative (range from  0:6 to  1) and
statistically signicant at any conventional level. At the same time, 2 is also al-
ways positive (range from :02 to :03) and statistically signicant under all alternative
specications, just as predicted by our theoretical model.
42Such examples are the fall of the Berlin Wall, or the 9/11 terrorist attacks, that can have an
impact on partisanship and voting behavior (Kaplan and Mukand, 2011).
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In addition, note that together with the quadratic term (Columns 3 and onwards)
that accounts for the non-monotonic relationship, we include an interaction term
between unemployment and institutional constraints to account for the di¤erential
impact of unemployment on fragmentation in party-systems that limit the excessive
use of electorally motivated redistribution (see Corollary 6) via institutional checks
and balances. As predicted by our theory, the coe¢ cient is positive (range from
0:14 to 0:21) and statistically signicant. The positive coe¢ cient on the interaction
term (roughly one-quarter the magnitude of 1) can be interpreted as follows: the
more institutional constraints a country introduces, limiting the ability of dominant
parties to use the public purse for electoral purposes (e.g. by increasing the autonomy
of the Central Bank), the more extremist parties get to benet from an increase in
unemployment, ceteris paribus43. This conrms our results on the varying politically
sustainablelevels of unemployment across countries (Corollary 6).
In summary, our OLS estimates constitute a rst indication of a clear and sta-
tistically signicant non-monotonic relationship between unemployment and party-
system fragmentation. Since our study is among the rst that uncovers a relationship
that runs from unemployment to electoral fragmentation, there is hardly any the-
oretical or empirical evidence suggesting the existence of any kind of link running
from electoral fragmentation to unemployment. As we have stressed extensively in
the introduction, there is a large strand in the literature that documents how politi-
cal institutions can a¤ect growth and other economic variables (Alesina 1987; Barro
1996; Persson et al. 2007). To the extend that electoral fragmentation (as an ag-
gregate index) carries some information on the structure of the party-system which,
43In our sample the critical point (~q) seems to be around 15% for countries with no institutional
constraints. If a country were to introduce some constraints (average value in sample is 2:5) then,
the critical value becomes 8% (which roughly corresponds to the average long-run unemployment
rate for the countries in our sample). That is, more constraints reduce the ability to manipulate
redistributive transfers thus, reducing the politically sustainable level of unemployment.
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in turn, might a¤ect the choice of political institutions, the possibility that electoral
fragmentation can a¤ect unemployment cannot be ruled out completely, at least not
without further theoretical and empirical exploration. Hence, despite the absence of
any other theoretical or empirical piece of evidence suggesting a relationship from
fragmentation to unemployment (and the fact that our theoretical model which we
clearly believe postulates the opposite), we do not want to completely dismiss this
possibility without further investigation. With this in mind, in the next section we
introduce instrumental variable (IV/2SLS) models44, using oil price shocks to instru-
ment for exogenous (non-policy-induced) changes in unemployment, in an attempt
to insulate our estimates from the possible presence of reverse causality.
2.2.4 Accounting for Endogeneity and OVB: Introducing Oil
Price Shocks
As stressed above, a potential sources of worry with the OLS estimates is reverse
causality (endogeneity). To address those concerns, we introduce instrumental vari-
ables in our econometric specication in order to estimate the causal e¤ect of unem-
ployment on electoral fragmentation. Ideally, one would like to nd a suitable, that
is, both valid and relevant instruments, to account for exogenous, non-policy induced
changes in unemployment. Fortunately, we can use oil price shocks.
The idea of using oil price shocks as an instrument for unemployment is exten-
sively discussed by Levitt (2001) who summarizes strategies for identifying the causal
link of unemployment on crime45. In an other study, at the US states level, Raphael
44As a point of clarication, hereinafter with some abuse of terminology we use the term IV to
characterize only the just-identied IV models with a single endogenous regressor and one instru-
ment. All other models (e.g. overidentied models with a single regressor and multiple instruments,
or models with two endogenous regressors and at least two instruments) are characterized as 2SLS
models. Yet, all of them are estimated using the ivregress routine in Stata to avoid getting the
wrong standard errors as a result of a two-step estimation process.
45The di¢ culty in identifying the causal e¤ect of unemployment on crime is similar to ours due
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and Winter-Ebmer (2000) argue that oil price shocks are relevant instruments for
unemployment. But apart from Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, we also have good rea-
sons for introducing oil price shocks as instruments for unemployment as stylized
evidence suggest (Fig. B.4). To make the case for the suitability of our IVs, we
rst discuss the relevance of oil price shocks in a¤ecting unemployment. Then, we
make a brief comment on whether the IV satises the exclusion restriction, in order
to be a valid instrument (we also report test results for the overidentied cases even
though they do not constitute a direct test of the exclusion restriction per se).
Clearly, as many studies point out both at the theoretical (e.g. van Wijnbergen
1985) and at the empirical level (e.g. Keane and Prasad 1996; Blanchard and Gali
2007; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2000) oil price shocks can a¤ect unemployment
and the labour market, mainly through two channels: as adverse supply shocks and
via the real wage e¤ect. In the very short-run the supply shock in the goods market,
caused by increased oil prices, dominates and causes unemployment to increase. Yet,
in the medium and long run the labour market adjusts. The increase in the price
level causes real wage to fall below the workers productivity and hence rms are
willing to employ more (net perfect substitutability between oil-intense capital and
labour) and produce more, given demand46. This increase in investment and the real
wage e¤ect dominate over the medium-run and as a result, the e¤ect of an oil price
increase on employment (unemployment) is positive (negative). That is, the initial
response to the shock driving unemployment upwards, is quickly reversed. Stylized
evidence and empirical studies (e.g. Keane and Prasad 1996) conrm these ndings.
Hence, we conclude that oil prices are a relevant instrument for unemployment47.
to reverse causality and unobserved policies that a¤ect simultaneously both the crime rates and
unemployment.
46Investment will increase and there will be excess demand in both labour and goods markets,
especially for the economies that run current account decits.
47For a more detailed discussion on the subject see also Appendix B.
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Coming back to the exclusion restriction, the requirement is that oil price shocks
a¤ect electoral fragmentation only through unemployment, that is the vector of in-
strumentsZit is uncorrelated with the second-stage residuals it (implyingE[Zitit] =
0). The main issue with the exclusion restriction is whether fragmentation and oil
price shocks can be related via variables other than unemployment. For instance,
an increase in the price of oil can induce di¤erent policy responses in countries with
di¤erent levels of fragmentation and these policy responses may, in turn, a¤ect un-
employment. While this is clearly a possibility, our defense comes in three parts.
First, as Bernanke et al. (1997) note [...] most of the observed movement in
the instruments of monetary policy [...] is endogenous; that is, changes in policy are
largely explained by macroeconomic conditions, as one might expect, given the Feds
commitment to macroeconomic stabilization.Moreover, they nd that [...] shocks
to monetary policy explain relatively little of the overall variation (typically, less
than 20 percent) in output [and employment].As a consequence their ndings do
not support the view that changes in monetary policy responses are a primary cause
of business cycles uctuations. To put it more simply, any case for an important
role of monetary policy in the business cycle rests on the argument that the choice
of the monetary policy rule (the reaction function) has signicant macroeconomic
e¤ects.
This brings us to our second point: in almost all OECD states Central Banks
have a large degree of policy independence and autonomy, which insulates the banks
reaction function from the politicianscontrol. In addition, much of the output (and
employment) stabilization takes place via automatic stabilizers (e.g. scal and Taylor
rules) which are also beyond the political control of governments. As a result, it
is very unlikely that policy responses to oil price shocks might be correlated with
electoral fragmentation. And even if this was the case, it is still very dubious that
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those policy responses have any important e¤ect on unemployment (and the business
cycle).
Finally, to further insulate our results we exclude from our sample all the oil
producing countries (e.g. UK, Norway) and the US48. This addresses two other
adjacent concerns: the monotonicity condition49 and reverse causality (we need to
make sure that fragmentation does not a¤ect the shocks on oil prices). It is extremely
hard to argue that changes in electoral outcomes in any non-oil producing small
or medium-sized OECD economy can a¤ect the price of oil. But, even if ones
demand for oil depends on electoral fragmentation a single countrys demand is still
a negligible part of the aggregate world demand. Thus, we can be more sure that
electoral fragmentation cannot a¤ect oil prices50, not to mention oil price shocks.
For this reason, we conduct our analysis on a restricted set of countries. Overall,
we believe that our IV is certainly a relevant and valid instrument satisfying the
exclusion restriction. That is, the e¤ect of oil price shocks on voting behavior and
electoral fragmentation is coming solely through changes in unemployment51.
48The US is excluded for a variety of reasons: as a large open economy and also an oil producer
with signicant oil reservesits its demand for energy might a¤ect oil prices. Moreover, it has
a bipartisan, presidential system so the study of electoral fragmentation becomes uninformative.
Nonetheless, repeating our estimates are robust to sample size alterations and the inclusion of the
US and other oil producers.
49In a world of potentially heterogeneous treatment e¤ects, the IV may have no e¤ect on some
subjects, but all those who are a¤ected should be a¤ected in the same direction.
50There is a growing amount of empirical evidence that suggest that oil prices follow a pattern
that is hardly a¤ected by the voting behavior in any OECD economy (Pindyck, 1999; Barnett &
Vivanco, 2003; Cashin et al., 2000; Engel & Valdes, 2000; Bartsch, 2006). Moreover note that in
all specications we use lags of oil price shocks that cannot be a¤ected by current demand.
51A potential source of worry for the exclusion restriction would have been the case of the US,
where anecdotal evidence suggests that oil prices have a direct e¤ect on the winning probability of
the incumbent. We provide a test that invalidates this claim in Table B.7 by estimating a reduced
form equation of the e¤ect of oil prices on the re-election probability of the incumbent.
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Baseline 2SLS Model Specication
To predict the oil price shocks we estimate the following AR(2) model52:
Pi;t = i;0 + i;1Pi;t 1 + i;2Pi;t 2 + ui;t
where Pi;t 1 is the real (PPI-index) price of imported crude oil at renery and ui;t
is the residual of the AR(2) process. Since the literature (e.g. Blanchard and Gali
2007) suggest that the full e¤ect of oil price shocks on the labour market materializes
after Q.4, in some specications we use more than one lag of the predicted residuals
(oil price shocks) u^i;t, weighted by the index of industrial intensity wi;t (constructed
using OECD data on industrial production and employment) for each country i at
year t. We dene the vector of our instruments as follows53:
Zi;t = ((w  u^)i;t 1;    ; (w  u^)i;t n)
where Zi;t is an ndimensional vector (with n = 2 for the just-identied model
and n  3 when the model is overidentied)54. Formally, we estimate the following
2SLS model:
qi;t
q2i;t

= b00 + b  Z 0i;t +X 0i;t +i + t + i;t (1st stage regressions)
and
Fi;t = 0 + Z^
0
i;t +X
0
i;t + i + t + i;t (2
nd stage regression)
52The choice of an AR(2) process was dictated by the systematic and signicant second-degree
auto-correlation in the residuals that was observed. An AR(2) process is the best way to get a more
precise estimate on the oil price shocks.
53We also employ more simple methods of estimation for our IVs (oil price shocks) that involve
less complex or no indexation at all (in some cases we use simple real imported oil prices at renery
without predicting the residuals of an AR(2) process). We present those estimates in Tables B.3,
B.4 and B.5. Since all of them are almost identical, we think that a more elaborate discussion on
those alternative estimation techniques of oil price shocks is not warranted.
54Another reason to include multiple lags of the predicted residuals of real oil prices is associated
with the fact that in some specications we aggregate our data on unemployment at the electoral
term level which usually contains information over the past 3 years. Hence, the use of at least 3
lags becomes imperative.
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where b0 and  are 1  2 vectors, b is a 2  n matrix, Z^ = (q^i;t; q^2i;t), X i;t is a
k-dimensional vector with the control variables55, whereas i and t are country and
year dummies (FE) respectively. Contrary to popular wisdom, but in accordance
with empirical literature (e.g. Keane and Prasad 1996) we expect b < 0 (oil price
increases were found to have a positive e¤ect on employment56 and thus, reduce
unemployment in the long-run). Given that we use lags of weighted real oil price
shocks, the long-run e¤ect dominates57. Again the expectation is that 1 < 0 and
2 > 0. Results of this specication are presented in Tables B.2 and B.3.
Table B.2. presents the results of the baseline model (both for the full and re-
stricted sample). Columns 1 and 2 refer to the full sample of countries. Column 3 is
the benchmark58 that we compare with the OLS estimates (Column 4). Columns 5
and 6 are the cases when we use non-weighted instruments (in column 6 the model
is just-identied). As we can see, both 1 and 2 have the correct signs and are
statistically signicant even at the 1% level. Compared to the OLS estimates the
coe¢ cients increase in magnitude by four times (so do the standard errors as ex-
pected) and they range from  2:1 to  3:2 for the linear term (OLS range from  0:6
to  0:9). The same is true for the squared-term (:18). Moreover, the coe¢ cient
on institutional constraints is also positive in all the 2SLS specications, large in
55We use the exact same controls as in the OLS specication with two exceptions: turnout and
the coalition government dummy because they are outcomes that are either co-determined with
fragmentation (e.g. turn-out) or determined afterwards (e.g. coalition government). Moreover,
they are highly colinear with the number of parties and the electoral rule dummy (the probability
of ending up with a coalition government is lower when majoritarian rules are applied e.g. Duverger
1954) two variables included in alla subsequent specications.
56Keane and Prasad (1996) note: We nd that oil price increases result in a substantial decline
in real wages for all workers [...]. The use of panel data econometric techniques to control for
unobserved heterogeneity is essential to uncover this result, which is completely hidden in OLS
estimates. While the short-run e¤ect of an oil price increase on aggregate employment is negative,
the long-run e¤ect is in fact positive.
57Table B.6 summarizes the rst stage results of our reduced IV model, presented in Table
B.5. Our estimates on the impact of an oil price increase on unemployment are robust under all
alternative specications.
58The overidentied case with 2 endogenous regressors (unemployment and unemployment-
square) and 3 IVs on the restricted sample.
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magnitude (range from 2:2 to 1:8) and statistically signicant (though not always at
the 5% level59). Taken altogether, those estimates constitute a joint verication of
our hypotheses (H1 and H2 ). Furthermore, the reported J-test (Sargan) statistic on
overidentifying restrictions (where applicable), fails to reject the null that the vec-
tor of our instruments (Zit) is orthogonal to the second-stage residuals (it) at any
conventional level. Hence, our instruments are valid. Moreover, our 2SLS estimates
are robust to various alternative specications, as Table B.3 demonstrates60. In all
cases our coe¢ cient estimates are almost identical in magnitude (range from  3:2
to  3:3 for the linear term and from :25 to :2 for the squared term) and statistically
signicant at any conventional level.
Of special interest is the coe¢ cient on the degree of institutional constraints
which is always positive (ranging from 1:8 to 2:2) and statistically signicant at the
5% level61. It can be interpreted as saying that conditional on a country exhibit-
ing high institutional constraints (e.g. an independent central bank, tight monetary
and scal policy rules, balanced-budget clauses in the constitution, scal federalism
or bicameralism) that do not leave much room to dominant parties for electorally
motivated (opportunistic) redistributive spending, the impact of unemployment on
fragmentation via our mechanism of redistributive politics is mitigated. Exactly as
we have hypothesized (H2) and in accordance with our models prediction (Propo-
sition 3) and stylized evidence presented in Figures B.3.a and B.3.b. Hence, more
59As we have explained before institutional constraints is a slow-changing variable and much of
the variation is being subsumed by the use of country and year FE.
60In Table B.3 we introduce two important variations on the models specication: we average
the data at the electoral term level and we introduce a Lagged Dependent Variable in the model
(LDV). We continue to estimate an overidentied model (3 lags). Column 1 in Table B.3 replicates
Column 3 of Table B.2 with the inclusion of a LDV. In Column 6 we use lags of real imported oil
prices (not the predicted shocks) as instruments, as robustness check.
61This is true only for the case of non-averaged data. As stressed in the previous section, intro-
ducing both country and year xed e¤ects eliminates much of the variation in this variable. On
the top of it, if one also aggregates the data at the election term level the e¤ect vanishes to a large
extend.
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institutional constraints induce more fragmentation (and less concentration of elec-
toral power).
The only issue that still remains to be addressed is related to a well-known prob-
lem in the IV literature: weak instruments. Since in almost all specications pre-
sented so far, we estimate an overidentied model (a choice dictated by the fact
that we average our data at the electoral term level) our instruments appear to be
relatively weak (as the F -statistics inform us). This is the case, even though our
instruments are certainly relevant and have a clear economic interpretation (as Ta-
ble B.7 with the reduced form regressions demonstrates). We attribute this fact to
two reasons: the simultaneous inclusion of two endogenous regressors and the overi-
dentication we impose to the model. We deal with those two complications in the
section that follows.
2.2.5 Addressing Concerns of Weak Instruments: The Just-
identied Model
The problem with the inclusion of many (potentially weak) instruments is that it tend
to increase the bias of the 2SLS estimator towards the probability limit of the OLS
estimates. To address this issue, we reduce the number of endogenous regressors to
a single one (which reduces the requirement for an instrument to the bare minimum)
and we follow two steps, common in the IV literature: we make use of alternative
estimators (such as the LIML estimator) for the overidentied models (with multiple
instruments) and we also estimate a just-identied model (in which case it becomes
a standard IV model with one endogenous regressor and one instrument). First, we
need to justify our choice to estimate a variant of our baseline 2SLS model using
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only one endogenous regressor (the linear term on unemployment qi;t)62.
The technical reason for estimating a simplied version of our model should be
clear by now. Since it is extremely challenging to nd two distinct and valid instru-
ments for the same variable and its square, we have resorted to the solution of using
multiple lags of oil price shocks. This, together with the use of averaged data, gener-
ated concerns of weak instruments. Clearly then, reducing the number of endogenous
regressors to just one and using our best available instrument is the most e¢ cient
way out of this situation. Nevertheless, one might question our decision to exclude
the quadratic term from the estimated equation. If one adheres to our theoretical
ndings (as we do) then, certainly the relationship between unemployment and elec-
toral fragmentation is non-monotonic. Why then exclude the quadratic term? Is
there any intuitive justication apart from the technical one and how does it a¤ect
our estimates? Our answer comes in two parts. We believe that there is an intuitive
justication and moreover, there is no need for extra worry, because the decision to
go with only the linear term, in fact, strengthens our point.
First, note that the main contribution of this paper is to question the conven-
tional wisdom (e.g. theories of retrospective and protest voting) on the e¤ect of
unemployment on electoral outcomes by uncovering an decreasing (increasing) re-
lationship between unemployment and electoral fragmentation (the vote shares of
dominant parties)63. The increasing part of this relationship, though an integral
piece of the argument, could have been easily justied, even without invoking a
model of redistributive politics64. Moreover, trying to estimate a negative linear re-
62Formally, we estimate: qi;t = b0 +
mP
n=1
(bn  u^i;t n) +X 0i;t + i + t + i;t and Fi;t = 0 + 1 
q^i;t+X
0
i;t+i+t+ "i;t. Again, in some specications we include a lag of the dependent variable
(LDV).
63Recall that our second dependent variable (top two partiesvote shares) is the mirror image of
electoral fragmentation.
64Simple theories of retrospective or protest-punitive can only explain why fragmentation (and
the vote shares of the two dominant parties) increases (decrease) as unemployment rises, but not
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lationship, instead of convex one, would result in signicant under-estimation of our
coe¢ cient on unemployment (smaller negative value65), as Figure B.2.b shows. That
is, excluding the quadratic term runs against us, since it makes it much harder to
establish the rst (decreasing) part of the relationship between unemployment and
fragmentation. If we are still able to nd a clear, negative and statistically signicant
relationship between unemployment and fragmentation, despite the fact that we are
deliberately underestimating (in absolute terms) the value of 1, this will strengthen
our argument. Hence, the trade-o¤ of estimating a simplied version of the model,
in order to deal with the weak instrumentissue, comes at a virtually zero cost.
IV Model: Results
Table B.4 compares the estimates of the overidentied models (with one endogenous
regressor) using the LIML estimator with those of a standard 2SLS one. Table B.5
presents the results of the just-identied model with a single endogenous regressor. In
all specications, the coe¢ cient on unemployment is negative66 (range from  1:3 to
 0:8) and statistically signicant at least at the 5% level, albeit smaller in magnitude
than our estimates on the baseline 2SLS model (Table B.3) as expected (recall we
are underestimating 1). From table B.4, where we compare the 2SLS and the LIML
estimators (and continue to use data averaged at the election term level) one can
see that the 2SLS estimates are slightly biased towards the OLS estimates, when
compared with the LIML ones. Moreover, when the number of instruments included
in the regressions increases from two to three (compare columns 1 with 3 and 7 with
8) the bias on the 2SLS estimates is larger (and the coe¢ cient is closer to the OLS
the opposite as our theory predicts.
65Or smaller positive value when our dependent variable is the sum of vote shares of the two top
parties.
66Positive when the dependent variable is the sum of vote shares of the top two parties, as
expected, ranging from 2:2 to 4:9.
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estimates) while the LIML estimates remain virtually unchanged (and statistically
signicant). Of course, this comes at the cost of the LIML estimates being a bit more
imprecise (standard errors are larger) but not to the extend of being uninformative
and causing worry67. Since in all specications the 2SLS and the LIML estimates
are quite similar in magnitude and informative we conclude that the relatively low
F statistic (ranging from 2 to 4:5) is not detrimental to our results.
Nevertheless, in table B.5 we present the IV estimates of the just-identied model
(one endogenous regressor) where we use our single best instrument (the rst lag). In
columns 1 to 6 we estimate the model with electoral fragmentation as our dependent
variable. In the remaining two columns, we replace it with the sum of vote shares of
the two top (dominant) parties. In all specications (with and without weights and
using alternative versions of the instrument) our results are informative, statistically
signicant and in accordance with our predictions (the coe¢ cient on unemployment
is negative with range from  1:3 to  0:8). More importantly, the weak instrument
problem is completely resolved. As one can observe, the rst-stage F statistic on
the excluded IV is above the desired critical value(F > 10), under all alternative
specications. Hence, we conclude that our instrument is not weak (as the F -score
on excluded IV suggests) and clearly valid (as the Hansen/Sargan J-test statistic
suggests). Moreover, our estimates are statistically signicant and also very robust
to model alterations, large in magnitude and thus, qualitatively important as well
(one standard deviation in unemployment, roughly 4% can explain almost two-thirds
of the variation in fragmentation, ceteris paribus). For a single economic variable,
the e¤ect is quite impressive and lends strong support to our hypothesis.
67Also note that, when compared with the IV estimates of the just-identied model in Table B.5
the LIML estimates seem to be statistically indistinguishable from the IV ones.
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Discussion of Results
The importance of our empirical ndings is dual. Firstly, our results yield support
to our model of redistributive politics and its main underlying idea: Absent of in-
stitutional checks and balances, dominant parties can exploit the relatively higher
responsiveness of the unemployed to generous redistribution in order to score elec-
toral gains (opportunistic, special interest motivation for redistribution). Second,
they verify the important e¤ect of economic conditions on voting behavior, electoral
outcomes and the structure of the party-system. Even though there are, of course,
other factors (e.g. the electoral rule) that a¤ect fragmentation the impact of un-
employment seems to be very strong. If we also account for the e¤ect of economic
institutions (e.g. redistribution mechanism) then, it becomes clear that economic
conditions are among the most prominent determinants of electoral behavior and
party-system structure in industrialized democracies. Hence, our ndings support
the existence of a bidirectional link between economic conditions and political out-
comes.
In specic, given our ndings that a 1% increase in unemployment is causing
an almost 3% decrease in electoral fragmentation, one can calculate that the po-
litically sustainablelevel of unemployment for an average country in our sample is
roughly 6-7%68. That is, when unemployment exceeds that level dominant parties
are starting to pay the price and redistribution promises are not enough (or not
seen as credible) in order to reverse this trend. One cannot escape from noticing
the coincidence that the average long-run (steady-state) unemployment rate for the
countries in our sample is 6.2%. That is, party-systems seem to operate close to the
opportunistically optimal level of unemployment (for the big parties of course).
Although we do not go as far as to suggest that big parties are deliberately exploit-
68For a country with average institutional constraints constraints.
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ing higher unemployment, we note that our empirical ndings pave the ground to
complete and revise the theory of political business cycles (Nordhaus 1975; Alesina
et al., 1987 and 1992) in two directions. First, by completing the two-way relation-
ship between economic and political outcomes. Secondly, by endogenizing parties
preferences over unemployment69 and redistribution we provide some reasoning as
to why some parties of factions within parties (in our case the extremist ones) might
favor scal discipline and the introduction of scal constraints over higher taxation
or generous redistribution.
2.3 The Role of Institutional Constraints: The
Greek Case
In the introduction we identied two conditions under which dominant parties can
capitalize on the unemployed to score electoral gains and a¤ect electoral fragmenta-
tion and the structure of the party-system. We have explored the rst one (redistrib-
utive politics) both theoretically and empirically, in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Here, in this
section, we exploit the action of the greek government to ddle the books and mis-
report the level of public decit for the period 2006-2008 as a natural experiment70,
in order to analyze the second one: the importance of institutional constraints. Our
aim is to demonstrate in more clarity our second necessary condition for unemploy-
ment to have an impact on electoral fragmentation: the role of institutional checks
and balances in limiting the ability of dominant parties to engage in redistribution
for electoral purposes (Proposition 7).
69For instance, in Alesina (1987) preferences over unemployment are assumed to be exogenous.
70For more details on the information shock that this action generated refer to Appendix A.1
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2.3.1 A Shock on Information
Using data from greek local elections is the best empirical strategy to follow, mainly
for two reasons. Firstly, the greek political system is characterized by long-lasting
linkages between politicians and voters and lack of institutional checks and bal-
ances71. Secondly, and more importantly, the two step audit and revision of greek
public nances that was published in October of 2009 and 2010 respectively, o¤ers
the opportunity for a natural experiment. The reason is that while the rst revision
was referring to the FY2009 public decit, the second one was concerning the decits
accrued in the period from 2006 to 2008 and were previously concealed. That is, the
second revision was a pure information shock that drastically changed the publics
expectations on the states and the local authoritiesability to engage in public sec-
tor expansion and extensive redistributive transfers for many years to come. A brief
look at Figure A.1 helps clarifying the point. As we can see, out of the 12 percentage
points of the second revision almost all referred to the hiddendecits of FY2006-
2008. In fact, more than 80% of this revision was solely referring to the FY2006
decit alone. Clearly then, this second upward revision, that occurred between two
electoral contests, is not attributed to policies followed in 2010. Rather, it was al-
ready there but was not disclosed to the public and the markets earlier. That is why,
we refer to this second revision as a pure information shock since it was back-dated
as it had occurred at least three years ago. What was indeed new is the revelation of
this new information that occurred just weeks before the November 2010 Elections.
We present a brief time-line of events that lead to consecutive revisions of greek
public nances in Appendix A.1. where it becomes more evident why we can exploit
this information shock as a natural experiment.
71For more information on the institutional and political context of Greece refer to Appendix A.2
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2.3.2 Data and Identication Strategy
Before presenting our key ndings, we present our data and our identication strat-
egy in detail. The data on regional electoral fragmentation were collected by the
Greek Ministry of Interior and compiled by us. The nal calculations of electoral
fragmentation indexes are our own. The time span of the data in the sample runs
from 1998 until 2010. This includes 8 electoral races (4 at the local level and 4 at the
national), each taking place every four years. We have also supplemented our data
on electoral fragmentation with a series of economic and socio-demographic variables
at the NUTS-3 level72 which we have retrieved from the Eurostat LFS Survey (2009)
and the 2010 Regional Yearbook. In total we have 384 observations. The basic unit
of analysis is a NUTS-3 region, of which Greece has 48. We also repeat our estimates
for the NUTS-2 level. Since we do not get dramatically di¤erent results, we decided
to focus on the NUTS-3 regions in order to have a larger sample size. From those 48,
twenty-two NUTS-3 regions (or 6 NUTS-2 regions) that account for the 60% of the
population are classied as High Public Sector Employment regions (quasi-treatment
group), whereas the remaining twenty-six (or 6 at the NUTS-2 level) are categorized
as our quasi-control group. In those regions the main sources or economic activity
and employment are non-government related (e.g. tourism and agriculture). Table
A.3, presents the key summary statistics for those regions.
As we have argued, the information shock will allow us to identify the e¤ect
of expected public spending cuts (constraints on redistribution) on fragmentation
since the information shock altered voters expectations on the statess ability to
nance generous transfers to the voters and the local authorities73. But this shock
72NUTS stands for Nomenclature Unitaire de Territoire Statistique and is the basic unit for
reporting regional statistics by the EU. There are three levels of regional sub-units. At the NUTS-1
level Greece has 2 regions (North and South), at the NUTS-2 level it has 12 regions and 48 at the
NUTS-3 level, the smallest possible sub-unit.
73Most of the funding for Greek local administrations comes from the central budget and EU
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a¤ected disproportionately some regions as it appears to be the case, if one looks at
Figure B.10. In order to measure the intensity of the e¤ect across regions, we need
to split Greek NUTS-3 prefectures into two groups: those with larger public sector
size (and perhaps stronger and more persistent linkages) and others with lower. The
identifying hypothesis is that we should expect to nd a di¤erential e¤ect of spending
cuts on electoral fragmentation in these regions. In fact, this is what we observe:
the rise in fragmentation was larger in regions with higher share of public sector
employment exactly because expected cuts in public spending and government job
creation (an alternative form of redistributive transfers in clientelistic systems) are
expected to be more deep there. Formally, we estimate the following model:
Fs;t = 0 + s + t + 1(HighPS)s  2010 +
2009P
=1996
 (HighPS)s   +Xs;t + "s;t
where Fs;t = 1  
NtP
n=1
(vn;s;t)
2 is the index of electoral fragmentation at the re-
gional (NUTS-3) level, dened as before, with Nt being the number of parties at
electoral year t, and vn;s;t is the vote share of a party n 2 N . Moreover, s are region
(NUTS-3) dummies, t are electoral year dummies (i.e. 2010 is the post info-shock
dummy) and HighPublicSector2010 is the interaction dummy of interest. Finally,
Xs;t is the set of other controls (e.g. unemployment, local elections dummy, socio-
demographic controls etc.). In some specications we interact the control variables
with the High Public Sector dummy in order to control for the possibility that some
variables might have a di¤erential impact on high public sector regions (heteroge-
neous treatment e¤ects). Since we also introduce regional dummies (at the NUTS-3
level), electoral year dummies and the interaction terms
P
  (HighPS)s   , our
funds. Local authorities in Greece have extremely limited capacity to generate and raise revenue
and nance their operations. More than 80% of their funds comes from the central government and
EU subsidies (see Appendix A.2).
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chosen specication is equivalent to a standard Di¤erences-in-Di¤erencesmodel
with treatment leads. The coe¢ cient of interest is 1 which captures the di¤erential
impact of the shock (expected cuts) on the regions with larger share of public sector
employment. It is expected to be positive since our model predicted that in regions
where spending-cuts and public sector job-cuts are expected to be larger (in this case
due to an exogenously imposed constraint) electoral fragmentation will increase by
more due to less transfers.
Furthermore, in order to insulate our estimation we take three important steps:
Firstly, only for the post-shock electoral results but not for the pre-shock ones,
we group the rebel candidatesvote shares74 (expressing disagreement with their
mother parties and in this particular case with the IMF memorandum) with the vote
shares of the o¢ cially endorsed candidates of their respective mother-parties75.
Secondly, we estimate our model using the NUTS-3 regions as our main unit of
analysis. Going from the NUTS-2 to the NUTS-3 level we ensure that the metropol-
itan regions of Athens and Thessaloniki, the two regions that exhibit the highest
volatility in fragmentation and where the most sharp increase in fragmentation was
recorded in 2010, are signicantly under-represented in the sample. Rather than
being two out of 12 regions (almost 17% of the sample) they are now recorded as
two out of a total of 48 regions (only 4% of the sample).
Moreover, in some specications we completely exclude those regions to account
for the educatione¤ect. That is, since the level of college graduates is higher in
those regions and given that literature suggests that more educated voters are more
74All political parties that are represented in the Parliament o¢ cially endorse candidates for each
regional electoral competition both at the NUTS-2 and -3 levels. Moreover, in most of the cases
those candidates are high-prole party members. Party members who disagree with those choices
or want to express a general disagreement against the pursued policies of party leadership may
contest this choice by entering the race as rebelcandidates.
75Greek Local elections, as evidence in Figures B.11, B.12 and B.13 show, have a avour of
national mid-term elections.
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likely to acquire and process faster politically relevant information with regards to
the economic situation it might be the case that the di¤erence in fragmentation we
pick up is driven by this e¤ect. Yet, by excluding those regions from the estimation
we can account for this without our results changing dramatically. Finally, we use
pre-shock lags (the terms
P
  (HighPS)s   in the estimated equation) in order
to analyze the trend of fragmentation across the two groups of regions over time. The
general idea of all these steps is to articially suppress downwards the post-shock
levels of electoral fragmentation for the quasi-treatment regions (in crude numbers
the di¤erence is cut down in half). If we still manage to get a statistically signicant
and large in magnitude positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term then, this would
imply that the e¤ect we are capturing is large in magnitude.
Before presenting our main results, and in order to address some concerns that
might arise due to the fact that we are using observations both from national and local
elections, we need to make a short comment on the nature of electoral competition
in Greece both at a local and national level76. Here, we briey refer to Figures B.12
and B.13, where we compare the trend of electoral fragmentation between national
and local elections both within and across groups of regions. As we can see, there
seems to be no signicant di¤erence in the trend either within or across groups.
Since the common (in our case almost identical) trends assumptions is satised, we
can proceed with our estimation. Nevertheless, in all estimated specications we use
a local elections dummy to control for any unobserved di¤erential e¤ect.
2.3.3 Estimation Results: NUTS-3 Level
In Tables B.10 and B.11, we present the results of our main estimates under alter-
native specications. In all of them our key estimate, the coe¢ cient on the inter-
76For a more detailed review see Appendix A.2
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action dummy between high public sector regions and the post-shock time variable
is positive, large in magnitude (from 2:4 to 3:0) and statistically signicant at any
conventional level. Especially in Columns (2) and (4), when we include the leads,
the coe¢ cient gains in signicance. The positive value of 1 conrms our hypothesis
that the expectation of reduced redistributive transfers and public spending (and less
rents) has led to a larger increase in electoral fragmentation in regions with larger
public sector share. The increase in fragmentation is more than double in those
regions. Hence, we conclude that the e¤ect is also economically signicant.
Those results can be interpreted as follows: the expected cuts in redistributive
transfers and public spending that generated expectations for lower rents and govern-
ment jobs caused a di¤erential response among regions where the expectation is that
they are going to be more adversely impacted by these cuts. As a result, the initial
positive impact of more constraints on fragmentation is exacerbated. This nding
comes as further support to the hypothesized positive relationship between institu-
tional constraints on economic policy (this time imposed by the Troika) and electoral
fragmentation. Collecting together all the evidence, we conclude that the expected
reduction in redistributive transfers and public spending had an undisputed negative
(positive) e¤ect on the concentration of electoral power (fragmentation) shaking the
foundations of the Greek bipartisan system.
2.3.4 Discussion of the Results
Our case study on greek local elections provided empirical support for the importance
of constraints in conducting economic policy. More specically, through a natural ex-
periment that exploits an information shock, we showed a causal relationship between
decreasing expected redistributive transfers and increasing party-system fragmenta-
tion. We have also highlighted the importance of constraints (scal or institutional)
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in reshaping the political landscape and the structure of the party-system. In fact,
we have argued that scal discipline, austerity measures and the reforms in public
sector, which were adapted by the greek Parliament in order to tackle the debt crisis
and receive EU aid, were an exogenous constraint to the Greek governments freedom
in conducting economic policy and engaging in generous redistribution according to
electoral (opportunistic) motives. This constraint facilitated and accelerated the
weakening of the bipartisan basis of the Greek party-system.
Although we do not go as far as claiming that the generalized public spending
cuts signaled the end of bipartisanship in the greek political system, we can say with
certainty that they have weakened the dominant position that the two major parties
enjoyed, undermining the bipartisan foundations of the party-system which were laid
on the patron-client relation between voters and politicians. As a result, the policy
constraints imposed by the austerity measures increased the level of electoral frag-
mentation and political pluralism. Yet, this increase in the vote shares of smaller
parties came at the cost of both an increased level of polarization and extremism in
public a¤airs and also drastically reduced political participation and voter turn-out,
as our next Chapter discusses. On the other hand, it might lead into more inclusive
and pluralistic political institutions in the long-run. Overall, it is too early to con-
clude whether the benets of increased political pluralism and representation and
weaker clientelism will overrun the potential costs of reduced stability and modera-
tion that the bipartisan system was o¤ering. Nevertheless, no matter which side the
argument goes, one key point remains: the impact of economic institutions, such as
redistributive mechanisms, and of institutional constraints on the structure of the
party-system are of outmost importance.
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2.4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have given a comprehensive account on the relationship between
economic conditions and the structure of the party-system by exploring the impact
that unemployment and redistribution have on the distribution of electoral power
among parties (electoral fragmentation). Departing from previous literature, which
argues that party-system fragmentation depends mainly on the existing institutional
arrangements, we have presented a theoretical framework of electoral competition
that relates fragmentation and party-system structure to changes in economic condi-
tions. In particular, the main contribution of this paper is the theoretical formulation
and the empirical verication of this non-monotonic relationship between unemploy-
ment and fragmentation that we uncover and which was so far ignored by other
voting theories. We have also suggested a link that connects unemployment and
party-system structure: redistributive politics and economic voting. In that respect,
our ndings echo Tullocks assertion that, since consumers and voters are practically
the same individuals, they should apply the same criteria (economic rationality and
expected utility maximization) when it also comes to their political choices. Hence,
our study supports prospective over retrospective and protest voting theories.
Another important nding of our model is that it highlights the relatively stronger
rent-seeking elements in the voting behavior of the unemployed and the incentives of
dominant to exploit this behavior and capitalize electorally on it by proposing more
redistribution. Additionally, the model also o¤ers an interesting insight, based on ra-
tional choice theory, as to why extremist parties target the more ideologically driven
voters and lobby for more institutional checks and balances that subject the power of
dominant parties to exogenous constraints, while the moderate ones might focus more
on tangible political promises and inclusive economic institutions, such as increased
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redistribution. In that respect, our empirical study is among the rst to document
systematically the economic origins of party-system structure and the relationship
between unemployment and the distribution of electoral power-sharing among par-
ties. Moreover, our study brings into surface an innate tension between institutional
checks and balances (inclusive political institutions) and redistribution mechanisms
(inclusive economic institutions). Taken altogether, our ndings highlight the impor-
tance of economic conditions as determinants of party-system structure and electoral
behavior.
Overall, our work paves the way, theoretically and empirically, for a more system-
atic study of the bidirectional relationship between economic outcomes, institutions
and political competition. By endogenizing partiespreferences over economic out-
comes, such as unemployment, public spending and redistribution, our model allows
the study of the link between economic and political outcomes in both directions.
And even though this paper does not explicitly provide a theoretical model of po-
litical cycles, it clearly hints the intuition behind such a model since some parties,
driven by opportunistic (electoral) motives, might favor policies that prioritize re-
distribution at the expense of scal discipline. As a result, we present a special
interest politics justication for redistribution which in turn, points to an important
reason for caution: inclusive economic institutions (e.g. welfare state) might end
up, in the absence of institutional checks and balances, promoting the interests of
dominant parties by helping them to consolidate their power, instead of increasing
political power-sharing. Hence, this study highlights the limitations of institutional
arrangements in guaranteeing prosperity.
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Chapter 3
Economic Adversity, Trust and
Turnout: A Natural Experiment
The structure of the party-system and the nature of electoral competition aside, there
are other equally important parameters that determine the degree of democratic
legitimacy and performance of a polity and a¤ect the quality of political institutions
and governments alike. Such parameters are the degree of civic engagement in formal
political processes and the level of voter participation in elections. Yet, what drives
voters to participate is still an open question, both theoretically and empirically. Is
voting simply a habitual behavior (Aldrich & Montgomery, 2011), or do economic
conditions play a signicant role (Rosenstone, 1982) in determining whether citizens
will show up in the voting booths? Moreover, if economic conditions do play an
important role in determining voter turnout, what is the link through which they
operate? Is it via trust (Hansen & Rosenstone, 1993) or via the strong party-group
linkages(Powell 1986, p.21-22) and the opportunistic behavior of voters and political
parties as Chapter 2 will illustrate? As a result, exploring the impact that economic
conditions have on voter turnout and the links through which they operate, can have
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important implications in understanding what drives electoral participation and civic
engagement in a democracy. Moreover, it can have some implications in the design
of policies aiming at increasing the level of voter participation in electoral processes.
Especially in advanced western democracies, in Europe and North America, which
exhibit a declining trend in voter turnout, the exploration of those links can shed some
light in understanding the phenomenon of declining civic engagement in electoral
politics.
Therefore, Chapter 3 will examine the impact of economic adversity on voter
turnout through two channels: a rationalistic one (party-group linkages) as in Powell
(1982 & 1986)1, and an indirect (normative) one through the impact that economic
adversity can have on trust, both towards political institutions and governments
(Citrin, 1974; Hansen & Rosenstone, 1993; Hetherington, 1999). Powells (1982)
main conclusion was that American turnout is inhibited by its institutional con-
text, and the main emphasis is on party-group linkages.On the other hand, Jackman
(1987) inspired by Powells approach, placed even stronger emphasis on the institu-
tional determinants of turnout. Yet, he arrived at completely opposite conclusions.
Most importantly, as Blais notes (2006), he left out Powells key explanatory factor,
party-group linkages, simply because it was found to have no systematic e¤ect on
turnout. As a result, the relative importance of party-voter linkages, as determinants
of turnout, is a controversial issue.
Chapter 3, in line with Powells ndings, stresses the importance of these linkages
and attempts to evaluate their relative strength in explaining higher voter turnout. In
order to make the point more clear, we utilize the recent economic crisis in Greece,
as a case study of a country which historically had very strong linkages. Voter
1Powell found that turnout tends to be higher in countries with strong party-group linkages
due to the fact that vote choice is simpler when and where groups (e.g. labor unions, civil servants,
professional associations, churches etc.) are clearly associated with specic parties.
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turnout in Greek elections (national and local) has always been very high, exhibiting
little variation, until recently (2010) when the public debt crisis struck the economy.
This generated a large economic shock which also a¤ected the level of trust in the
party-system (see Fig. C.1.a). Subsequently, voter turnout also collapsed. The third
chapter will attempt to disentangle two links that connect economic adversity and
turnout: trust and party-group linkages. It will also try to identify the causal e¤ect
of each one of them on voter turnout. Finally, it will assess their relative strength.
3.0.1 Literature Review
Economic Adversity and Turnout
The impact of economic adversity on turnout and electoral participation has re-
ceived extensive coverage in the literature, especially in political science. Yet, dif-
ferent scholars have arrived at very divergent ndings. Hence, the exact impact of
economic hardship on turnout and the links through which it operates (if any) still
remain an open question. Rosenstone (1980; 1982) and Wolnger (1980) provide a
detailed account of theories and competing claims that attempt to associate economic
conditions with voter turnout. The rst stream of those, pioneered by Schlozman
and Verba (1979) and known as the mobilization e¤ect, argues that ... economic ad-
versity increases voter turnout since people under economic strain are more likely to
blame the government for their situation and thus vote, organize, lobby and protest
to redress their grievances.Lipset (1960) also stresses that: Groups subject to eco-
nomic pressures with which individuals cannot cope [...] might also be expected to
turn to government action as a solution and show a high voting average.An alter-
native link that leads to the same conclusions is provided via the theory of negative
voting. Kernell (1977), presents evidence that the motivation to punish is greater
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than the motivation to reward the government. Hence, it is reasonable to expect
that those who experience economic hardship, the punishers,would be more likely
to vote than other citizens (Kernell 1977).
On the other hand, theories of withdrawal, the second stream, make the opposite
claim. That is, economic adversity decreases voter participation. The reason is that
economic adversity is stressful. As Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980) note ... [eco-
nomic adversity] causes preoccupation with personal economic well-being leaving
aside broader considerations about external matters such as politics. Hence, eco-
nomic duress both increases the opportunity cost of political participation and also
reduces ones capacity to attend politics.Since the poor are nancially constrained,
they prefer to spent their scarce resources on guring out how to make ends meet,
instead of worrying about remote considerations such as politics (Kosa 1969; Fried
1969; Brody and Sniderman 1977; Wilcock and Franke 1963; Stein 1964; Maurer
1980; Rosenstone 1982). As a result, Wolnger and Rosenstone (1980) conclude that
the poor are less likely to vote. Yet, both strands of literature focus on individual,
not aggregate, economic adversity. That is, they interpret economic adversity as
personal economic duress and strain that impacts on political participation through
individual behavior that demands remedial government action.
A third strand in the literature contests both claims made above and stresses that
the link between personal well-being and political participation might be weak, or
even nonexistent (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979; 1981). An assumption of the mobiliza-
tion argument was that citizens who experience economic hardship tend to hold the
government accountable for their problems and believe that changes in government
policies might improve their personal economic situation. But, this link seems to
be under question. One reason why personal economic conditions are unrelated to
political preferences and electoral behavior might be that most people do not seek a
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political solution to their personal economic problems (Fiorina 1978). Rather, they
hold themselves accountable (Sniderman and Brody, 1977; Schlozman and Verba,
1979) since economic discontents and political judgements might inhabit separate
mental domains(Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979). An alternative explanation might be
that unemployment, poverty and other economic problems do not produce much
personal strain (Garraty, 1978), especially if the incidence of unemployment is tem-
porary and income support services are in operation. In short, people with economic
problems do not experience personal duress or not draw a connection between their
personal economic condition and politics and as a result, they are not more likely to
vote. Several empirical studies conrm the no e¤ectclaim (Arcelus and Meltzer,
1975; Fiorina, 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). Fiorina (1978, p. 439) concludes
that there is no discernible relationship between economic conditions and voting
turnout.
Our third chapter, departs from previous literature in the following sense. As far
as the denition of economic adversity is concerned, the literature focused solely on
economic hardship that struck the individual voter. That is, the strain placed on
citizenswell-being due to personal economic adversity that demanded either more
government action (mobilization e¤ect) or reduced their capacity to participate in
politics due to higher opportunity cost (withdrawal e¤ect). In Chapter 3, we focus on
another form of economic adversity: aggregate economic adversity which takes the
form of the states inability to provide public spending, social payments and rents
to specic groups of voters or the society at large. It is this latter form of economic
adversity that we examine hereinafter. The most e¢ cient way of doing it is to study
the case of Greece that was hit by severe economic adversity in the last couple of
years.
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Literature Review: Trust and Turnout
When it comes to the impact of trust on political participation and turnout the
literature seems to have reached to much more conclusive, yet negative, results.
Hetherington (1999) in an article that summarizes recent literature a¢ rms that:
Scholars exploring the link between declining political trust and declining political
participation have consistently arrived at null ndings. Citrin (1974) nds that
those who trust the government are [N]o more likely to vote, engage in campaigning
activities or any other form of formal political participation than those who do not.
His nds no evidence in support of the claim that political cynics are more likely
to withdraw from participation in conventional electoral politics than people who
do trust the government. He also o¤ers a potential explanation as to why trust
for the government might not be a key determinant of turnout by reversing the
line of causality. In his words: [...] behaviors may cause attitudes rather than
the reverse. That is, trust to government might be endogenous to participation.
Citizens who choose not to participate in formal political activities (e.g. voting)
may, in time, develop a higher level of apathy and cynicism for the party-system
and governments which can then be translated into lower levels of trust. Similarly,
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) nd that: [C]ontrolling for a set of other parameters,
trust has no signicant e¤ect on any form of electoral participation. Only one study
(Miller et al., 1979) nds that [...] trust might have a small indirect e¤ect on
electoral participation through the link of external e¢ cacy, that is, the perception
that citizens have on the governments responsiveness to their demands. In that
sense, this argument is more closely related to this chapter, although we focus on an
alternative measure of trust: trust towards the party-system, not just government.
Overall, there seems to be a wide consensus on the statement that empirical research
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has so far consistently demonstrated that no direct link exists between trust and
turnout (Hetherington, 1999).
3.1 Evidence on Turnout from Greek Elections
In the introduction we identied two potential links through which economic adver-
sity can a¤ect electoral participation and voter turnout. One link is via trust (or
lack of it) that can have a positive (negative) e¤ect on voter turnout. The second
one is via the linkages between parties and voters and the latters expectations for
rent-seeking. That is, conditional on higher expected public spending and public
sector job-creation, especially in regions where public sector is large and the chances
of nding government employment are higher, voters inclination towards political
participation is driven by their desire to increase the probability of being among
the beneciaries (rent-seeking). Data reveal that there was a sharp, more than ten
percentage-point, decline in voter turnout at the 2010 elections, which also coincided
with a large decline in trust (Fig. C.1.a). Moreover, it appears that this decline was
larger in regions where the size of public sector over total employment is larger (Fig.
C.2). Hence, stylized evidence suggest that economic adversity, in the form of the
debt shock, has had a di¤erential impact on these regions. In this context, the recent
economic crisis that struck Greece and forced the state to engage in extensive public
spending and public sector job cuts, can be used to examine the impact of those cuts
on voter turnout, both directly and indirectly (via declining political trust). The
latter being an outcome of scal irresponsibility by the two major parties2 which
were found guilty, by the European Commission, of forging Greeces scal data.
2Historically, since the restoration of the Republic in 1974 there were only two parties that
participated in government: the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] and the centre-
right New Democracy [Nea Dimokratia].
68
Furthermore, the revelation of the actual data on Greek public nances for the
2006-08 period occurred in mid-2010. A look at Figure A.1 makes this point more
clear3. As we stressed in Chapter 2, Section 3, the rst revision that took place
in the period from May-September 2009, related to the FY2009 decit. But, the
second revision (May-September 2010) was mainly due to concealed information on
the decit of the Greek central government for FY2006-07 that authorities kept secret
from voters and markets. Hence, the second revision is not an outcome of current
political actions. The decits were old. What was indeed new is the revelation of this
piece of information to the public that occurred just days before the November 2010
elections. That is why, we refer to this second revision as a pure information shock on
past economic performance which did not alter the current economic fundamentals.4
Hence, we can exploit the action of the Greek Government to ddle the books to
identify the causal link that runs from expected spending cuts (economic adversity)
to electoral participation and voter turnout.
Focusing on the Greek debt crisis and using data from Greek local and national
elections is a promising empirical strategy for a set of reasons. Firstly, the Greek
case study allows us to explore the two links though which economic adversity can
have an impact on voter turnout: the decline in trust and the expected sharp cut in
government spending and in public sector job creation. Secondly, the Greek political
system is characterized by long-lasting clientelism and strong party-group linkages,
especially for the dominant ones. The origins of the clientelistic nature of the Greek
political system date back to the beginning of the 20th century5. Hence, Greece o¤ers
3A more detailed description of the timing of events and the generated information shock is
included in Appendix A.1.
4In fact, the economy was in recession from the second quarter of 2008 and Greece was recording
decits since 2006. Yet, this was only revealed in May 2010, when the international audit by the
Troika (IMF, EU, ECB) took place.
5A more detailed description of the structure of the Greek party-system can be found in the
Appendix A.2, together with some discussion on regional governance in Greece.
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an ideal case study for examining the impact of rent-seeking on political participation.
Thirdly, and more importantly, the two step audit and revision of Greek public
nances that was published in October of 2009 and 2010 respectively, o¤ers the
opportunity to exploit the information shock as a natural experiment in order to
identify the causal link running from economic adversity to electoral participation.
The reason is that this second revision altered voters expectations on the states
ability to engage in public sector expansion and extensive public spending in the
future.
3.1.1 Working Hypotheses
The goal of this chapter is to identify the causal relationship that runs from economic
adversity to voter turnout and political participation. Furthermore, it will try to
assess the relative strength of two di¤erent links through which this e¤ect operates:
political trust and expected public spending (rents). In order to investigate those
relationships we will formulate three hypotheses which will then test using data from
Greek elections since 1996.
Hypothesis 1 Only the level of trust that citizens have for the party-system and
political parties matters for political participation and voter turnout. Trust towards
the government is cyclical and plays no role.
In line with stylized evidence, we hypothesize that economic adversity, caused
by scal derailment and the subsequent falsication of the data by the Greek gov-
ernment, reduced the level of trust that citizens have both for the government and
the party-system as a whole. It is the reduced trust for the latter that caused the
sharp decline in voter turnout, observed in 2010 elections. It is crucial to mention
that our rst hypothesis makes a clear distinction between trust in government and
trust in the party-system. As a result, our hypothesis has two components: On the
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one hand, we hypothesize that the decline in trust for government is not a signicant
determinant of voter turnout. The reason is that trust for government follows the
political cycle: voters tend to trust more newly-elected governments whereas trust to
government sharply declines before a government is being voted-out in elections. In
fact, it might be the case that voter turnout can increase when trust in government
is low for reasons related to the votersdesire to vote them out of o¢ ce. Hence,
one should expect that trust in government should not have a systematic e¤ect on
turnout. The second part of our hypothesis states that only changes in core trust,
dened as trust in the political parties and the party-system, can lead to changes in
voter turnout. In this respect, our rst hypothesis, in part, runs against mainstream
consensus reached so far that there is no systematic link between trust and turnout.
Our contribution is that we disentangle these two aspects of political trust and we
show that only trust in the party-system matters.
Hypothesis 2 A decrease in expected public spending and in public sector job
creation rate is associated with a decrease in voter turnout. Moreover, regions with
higher share of public sector employment are more adversely a¤ected by the cuts.
Our second hypothesis explores the direct link between anticipated economic
adversity and voter turnout. By economic adversity we mean the expected cuts in
public spending and public sector job creation that voters rationally anticipate as a
result of the scal derailment started in 2005 but only revealed in 2010, culminating
into a debt crisis that resulted in massive austerity (actual and expected) under
the auspices of the Troika (IMF, EU, ECB). As a result, we hypothesize that the
expectation of less public spending and public sector job creation decreased the
incentives of opportunist rent-seeking voters to participate in elections and express
their support for the parties. We also hypothesize that regions with larger share
of public sector employment before the onset of the crisis were disproportionately
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a¤ected by the scal cuts since slashing the size of the public sector had a larger
negative impact on those areas. Hence, we claim that the size of public sector acted
like a catalyst that exacerbated the e¤ect of economic adversity on turnout.
Hypothesis 3 The di¤erential (more negative) impact of public spending cuts
on voter turnout in regions with large public sector size is due to the prevalence and
stronger resilience of clientelistic links there.
Finally, our last hypothesis explores the causal link of the di¤erential impact that
expected public spending cuts had on regions with higher public sector employment
where the decline in turnout was larger. Since our other explanatory link (trust)
appears to move in parallel across regions (see Fig. C.3), we will examine a series of
alternative explanations (e.g. education/income, urbanization and clientelism) and
we will argue that the di¤erential decline in turnout was caused by stronger and more
salient party-group linkages in those regions. Testing this hypothesis is by far more
challenging due to the nature of those linkages. For their most part they are very
di¢ cult to observe and even harder to quantify and measure. As a result, to test our
third hypothesis we will follow a process of successive elimination of three alternative
explanatory stories before we present evidence in favour of our third Hypothesis.
3.2 Data and Identication
Before testing our hypotheses, we will rst describe our data sources. Initially, we
present our identication strategy in greater detail. Then, we will present our key
ndings and estimation results. First, let us start with the data.
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3.2.1 Data Description
Our data set is a compilation of data coming from various sources and own compu-
tations. Voter turnout, our key variable of interest, and other electoral data were
retrieved from the Greek Ministry of Interior. Data on voter turnout were reported
at the NUTS-3 level and aggregation to the periphery level (NUTS-2) was done by
own calculations. We have also supplemented our data on voter turn-out with a
series of economic and socio-demographic variables at the NUTS-3 level for reasons
of consistency with our main unit of analysis. Data on labour force composition, eco-
nomic and socio-demographic characteristics at the regional level were retrieved from
the EU Labor Force Survey (LFS) and the 2010 Eurostat Regional Yearbook. Data
on educational attainment and regional unemployment rates were retrieved from the
Greek statistical agency HELSTAT. Our sample spans from 1996 until 2010, but
data on regional unemployment at the NUTS-2 and -3 levels are reported only from
1999 and onwards.
The most challenging aspect in the compilation of our data set was the collec-
tion of data measuring trust in government, the party-system and the parliamentary
parties. To accomplish this task, we relied on data collected via the Eurobarometer
surveys from 1996 and onwards. The challenge was the disaggregation of the data
at the NUTS-2 level. Due to small sample size for the Greek section of the Eu-
robarometer (approximately 1,000 individuals were surveyed periodically) and the
large number of peripheries at the NUTS-2 level (12) disaggregation was not always
possible. The resulting sample base at the NUTS-2 level would have been too small
to conduct any meaningful statistical analysis. As a rule of thumb, we decided to
merge with a neighboring one any region with a sample base of less than 50 respon-
dents6. As a result, some recalculations were necessary. Finally, the Eurobarometer
6Because of this, we have excluded two regions from our analysis (Aegean islands and Ionian
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survey changed the major sub-sample units for which it reported disaggregated data
in 2006. For reasons of consistency, we recalculated those values using past method-
ology as a reference point. Needless to say that reporting data on trust for the
NUTS-3 level (prefecture) would have been pointless due to insu¢ cient sample size7.
Consequently, in order to test our rst hypothesis we will have to conne ourselves to
the NUTS-2 sample with a total of 90 observations. Introducing economic controls
further reduces our sample size to 70 observations (we lose two electoral contests in
1996 and 1998). Despite these limitations posed by sample size, we will continue
with our econometric estimation.
3.2.2 Identication Strategy
In order to test our rst hypothesis we will restrict our attention to the NUTS-2
sample since it is the only one that contains meaningful data for trust. As we have
argued, the information shock will allow us to capture the causal e¤ect that runs
from expected economic adversity -and the subsequent decline in trust and expected
public spending- to voter turnout. To test our second hypothesis and identify the
di¤erential impact of expected cuts in public spending and public sector job creation,
we will split our sample into two groups of regions: those with high share of public
sector employment (and higher growth rate of public sector job creation from 2000-
2008) and those with lower one. Table C.1 contains some basic summary statistics.
Our key identifying assumption is the following. Although the economic crisis
a¤ected all regions, the information shock had a di¤erential impact on those regions
that used to rely more on public sector jobs. The rationale is that the revelation of
new information generated expectations for drastic cuts in the size of the public sector
islands) and we merged Western with Central Macedonia.
7With the exception of Athens and Thessalonica no other region would have had the necessary
sample base in order to conduct any meaningful statistical analysis.
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in those regions, resulting inevitably in larger spending cuts since the statess ability
to generate jobs and transfer resources to voters and local authorities8 is severely
undermined for many years to come. Therefore, voters on those regions expect to
be disproportionately a¤ected by these spending cuts. As a result, we should expect
that the negative e¤ect of economic adversity on turnout will be exacerbated there.
In fact, as data reveal (Fig. C.2), voter turnout decreased more sharply (by three
percentage points more) in regions where the size of the public sector is larger. In
order to identify this relationship econometrically, we estimate a Di¤erences-in-
Di¤erencesmodel. Formally, we specify the following OLS model:
Turnouts;t =
0+s+t+1(Trust)s;t+2(HighPS)s2010+
2009P
=1996
 (HighPS)s+Xs;t+"s;t
where s are region (NUTS-2) dummies, t are electoral year dummies (i.e.
2010 is the post info-shock dummy) and High Public Sector2010 is the interaction
dummy. Turnout and trust are measured in percentage terms. Finally, Xs;t is the
set of other controls (e.g. unemployment, local elections dummy, socio-demographic
controls etc.). In some specications we interact the control variables with the High
Public Sector dummy in order to control for the possibility that some variables might
have a di¤erential impact on high public sector regions.
Clearly, the key coe¢ cients of interest are 1 and 2. The rst one (expected to
be positive) will test Hypothesis 1 (the relationship between trust and turnout). The
second one (expected to be negative) will test Hypothesis 2 which captures the larger
negative impact of expected scal adjustment and public sector job-cuts (identied
8Most of the funding towards Greek local administrations (80%) comes from direct central
government subsidies and EU structural funds. Local authorities in Greece have very limited
capacity in generating and raising revenues to nance their operations.
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through the information shock) on regions with higher share of public sector employ-
ment. Since we introduce regional dummies (at the NUTS-2 level), electoral year
dummies and the interaction terms
P
  (HighPS)s   , our chosen specication
is equivalent to a standard Di¤erences-in-Di¤erencesmodel with treatment leads.
3.2.3 Estimation Results: NUTS-2 Level
In Tables C.3 and C.4 we present our main results at the NUTS-2 level. In all speci-
cations the coe¢ cient on Year 2010 (the post-shock dummy) is highly negative (from
-5.1 to -9.6 percentage points) and statistically signicant capturing the negative
impact of expected spending cuts and economic adversity on turnout. Furthermore,
looking at Columns 1 and 2 (Table C.3), one can see that trust in government plays
no role in determining voter turnout,.since the coe¢ cient is not statistically signif-
icant at any conventional level. Contrary to that, the coe¢ cient on trust in the
party-system is positive (ranging from 0.12 to 0.2) and statistically signicant in all
subsequent specications and especially in Columns 3 and 4 (Table C.3) when the
full model is estimated. This, yields support to our rst hypothesis that only trust
in the party-system is positively associated with voter turnout.
In Columns 2 to 4 (Table C.4), we present the estimates of our main specication
with the inclusion of economic controls (unemployment and income) which we also
interact with the High Public Sector dummy. As hypothesized, the coe¢ cient on
the interaction term (2) is always negative (-6.4 percentage points) and statistically
signicant under all alternative specications, conrming our second hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, the inclusion of treatment leads (interaction terms
P
  (HighPS)s   )
reveals that none of them is statistically signicant at any conventional level. This
conrms the pre-shock parallel trends assumption for turnout among the two groups
of regions, something which was anticipated, as we can see from Figure C.2. Further-
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more, the decline in trust (caused by the falsication of scal data by both major
parties) did not follow a di¤erential pattern among high and low public sector re-
gions, as evidence suggest (Fig. C.3). Hence, the larger decline of turnout in regions
with high public sector as a response to the information shock cannot be attributed
to di¤erential changes in trust. Having eliminated the rst of the two possible links
through which economic adversity can have an impact on turnout, we conclude that
the di¤erential decline of turnout in high public sector regions can be attributed to
the di¤erential impact of expected cuts on those regions. Whether this is caused
by the weakening of linkages, or not, remains to be tested (Hypothesis 3). In sum,
evidence at the NUTS-2 level yield support for our rst two hypotheses. Yet, some
further analysis is warranted.
3.3 Identication revisited: Going NUTS-3
As stressed before, some caution needs to be taken in interpreting the results in Tables
C.3 and C.4 when testing our second and third hypotheses. This is so, because high
public sector employment might be a proxy for other characteristics, observed and
unobserved that are di¤erent across the two groups and might be responsible for the
di¤erential impact of expected spending cuts on turnout across the two groups. In the
case of observable characteristics (e.g. income per capita, unemployment, education
levels, degree of urbanization etc.), one can control for them, as we already did, by
interacting them with the high public sector dummy. Yet, a problem arises with
those unobservable characteristics that may vary di¤erentially across the two groups
over time and hence, they are not picked-up by the inclusion of xed e¤ects. As a
result, we need to introduce an instrumental variable in order to identify the causal
link between the size of public sector and voter turnout.
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Moreover, introducing an instrumental variable in the regression would prove to
be very useful in testing our third and nal hypothesis stating that the link through
which this e¤ect operates is the presence of more resilient clientelistic linkages in
regions with higher public sector employment. The reason is that there might be a
reverse causality problem: regions with high public sector employment, and stronger
linkages, might be the outcome of higher turnout and political participation. That
is, parties might target electorally and generate more public sector jobs in those
regions that historically had higher levels of political participation as they see more
potential voters and better chances of electoral success there. In order to account
both for the presence of time-variant unobservable characteristics and also for the
reverse causality issue we introduce an instrument that relates to the institutional set-
up during the days of the Ottoman Empire, on the eve of the creation of the modern
Greek State (early 19th century). That is, we will use the existence of an Ottoman
military district HQ (known as sanjak) within the administrative boundaries of a
current NUTS-3 region in Greece (prefecture) in order to instrument for regions
having larger public sector size. On a technical note, we will have to extend our
analysis to the NUTS-3 level in order to generate enough variation across regions for
our instrument to operate.
3.3.1 Identifying High Public Sector Regions with an Instru-
mental Variable
Before presenting our main econometric specication, it is necessary to say a few
words on the historical context and the institutional background that dictated the
choice of our instrumental variable and summarize the key points of our argument
behind its use. A more detailed historical account and details on the construction
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of our instrumental variable can be found in Appendix A.3. Briey, our argument
develops as follows: Ottoman military HQs (sanjak) within the region that con-
stitutes modern-day Greece, were chosen by Ottoman nobility (Sanjak Beyi) in the
16th century for geographical and strategic reasons in order to serve the Empires
military needs and maximize e¢ cient allocation of military resources (Inalcik, 1954).
Yet, with the arrival of industrial revolution the military innovations and the creation
of new nancial institutions in North Europe gave a military advantage to England
(Kennedy, 1989; Harrison, 2011) and increased the pressure on the Ottoman Empire.
By the late 18th century the Empire was gradually losing some of its territories. In
the eve of the 19th century the need for military modernization and re-organization
became more obvious than ever before (Inalc¬k et al., 1994). This need for reforms
initiated the Tanzimât (Period of Reforms) that lasted from 1826-1878. As a result,
French and German experts, known as the Men of the Tanzimât, were called upon
to assume the task of bringing the Ottoman ghting machine in level with other
western European militaries. Yet, those experts brought with them the bureaucratic
traditions of their states, instituting a vast amount of administrative services and
logistical support units ranging from military academies to hospitals etc. As a result,
in localities chosen by the Ottomans as military HQs of their feudal districts (san-
jak) bureaucracy developed at a much faster speed and the number of civil servants
doubled. At the end of the Tanzimât period the sheer size and scope of Ottoman
administration has grown enormously (Quataert, Pamuk et al., 1994).
At the same time, during the 19th century, the Greek state gained its indepen-
dence from the Ottomans (1831), and the gradual annexation of ex-Ottoman regions
to the newly-born state commenced (1881-1914). Given the very primitive resources
and administrative capabilities of the Greek state, the creation of a viable mili-
tary machine and of an e¤ective bureaucracy, once more, fell upon foreign advisors
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(Petropulos, 1968). In fact, the e¤ort to organize the Greek state as a modern west-
ern state percolated from the top to bottom (Kostis, 2005; Muzelis, 1991) much like
in the case of Ottoman administrative reforms (Quataert et al., 1994). Moreover,
there was a large degree of institutional continuity between the new Greek state and
the Ottoman empire (Kostis, 2005; Petropulos, 1968). Hence, foreign consultants
built upon the existing infrastructure of the Tanzimât era that was introduced dur-
ing the reforms (1826-1878), which coincided, for their most part, with the expansion
of the Greek state at the Ottomans expense (1831-1913). The result of this process
was for the Greek state to rely extensively on the administrative and institutional
infrastructure built during the Ottoman era, sometimes changing only the names of
the oldinstitutions and administrative centers into Greek, but maintaining their
previous functions, structure and composition (Kostis, 2005).
The link between Ottoman Institutions and Greek Administration
Our key identifying assumption is that, given this institutional inertia, regions with
Ottoman administrative centers (sanjak HQ) within their boundaries in the 17th
century, simply because of institutional inertia and pre-existing infrastructure, where
more likely to be chosen as hubs and administrative centers in the young Greek state.
Therefore, we should expect that the presence of an Ottoman administrative HQ
within the boundaries of a NUTS-3 region would increase the chances of this region
chosen as administrative center. Since public sector employment was historically
larger in the administrative centers in Greece, we are thus able to exploit this 17th
century randomization on the localities chosen as Ottoman military HQ and use
the existence of a such a center (sanjak) within a NUTS-3 region to instrument
for treatment regions with higher public sector employment share. A quick look on
Table C.2 shows that our instrument is as good as randomly assigned, since the two
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groups of regions seem to di¤er only in the level and the growth rate of the public
sector. Moreover, looking at the reduced form graph that captures the intensity to
treatment e¤ect (Fig. C.4), we can clearly see that the parallel trends assumption is
being satised. In addition, we present (Table C.5) the reduced form (intensity to
treatment) OLS estimates which conrm our identifying hypothesis. Our estimates
suggest that there was a larger decline in voter turnout in the treatment regions (-
3.3 percentage points when we include treatment leads and controls, -2.0 otherwise).
Moreover, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term Sanjak*Year2010 that measures
the di¤erential decline in turnout is statistically signicant at the 1% level.
3.3.2 Econometric Specication
We have already discussed the information shock a¤ecting di¤erentially the regions
that have a larger share of public sector by shifting voters expectations on the
severity of public spending cuts. As a result, we should be able to identify the
di¤erential impact of expected cuts on voter turn-out on those regions by interacting
our post-shock year dummy (Year 2010 ) with our instrumental variable (sanjak).
Clearly, as evidence in Figure C.4 suggest, the fall in voter turn-out was larger in
regions where there used to be a sanjak (instrumenting for regions with higher public
sector employment). In fact, voter turn-out in the treatment regions converged to
that of the control ones. To verify this claim, one would want to estimate the
following 2SLS model:
(HighPS)s  2010 =
0 + s + t + 1(SanjakHQ)s  2010 +
2009P
=1996
 (SanjakHQ)s   +Xs;t + s;t
and
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Turnouts;t =
0 + s + t + 1
\(HighPS)s  2010 +
2009P
=1996
 (SanjakHQ)s   +Xs;t + "s;t
where s are regional dummies (at the NUTS-3 level), t are year dummies (i.e.
2010 = 1, if t = 2010, is the post-information shock dummy) and \(HighPS)s  2010
is the predicted value of the interaction dummy that we instrument for in the rst
stage. Finally, Xs;t is the set of other controls (e.g. unemployment, local elections
dummy, income, education and other socio-demographic controls). Clearly the coef-
cient of interest is 1, capturing the di¤erential impact of expected public spending
cuts on turnout in the high public sector regions. According to our second hypothesis,
it should have a negative sign.
In the rst stage we run a Linear Probability Model, where we instrument for
High Public Sector Regions with the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if an Ot-
toman military center was stationed within the boundaries of the respective NUTS-3
region. Of those 48 regions, 23 used to have a sanjak within their boundaries. We
expect 1 > 0, according to our identifying hypothesis. Table C.7 presents the esti-
mates of the rst-stage regressions and conrms our hypothesis at any conventional
level of signicance (the rst-stage F -statistic score on the excluded IV is above the
conventionally accepted critical value of 10).
Robustness Checks
In order to insulate our estimations we take three important steps. Firstly, going
from the NUTS-2 to the NUTS-3 level we secure that the metropolitan regions of
Athens and Thessalonica, the two regions where the most sharp decrease in voter
turnout was recorded in the 2010 elections, are signicantly under-represented in the
sample. Rather than being two out of 12 regions (almost 17% of the sample) they
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are now recorded as two out of a total of 48 regions (only 4% of the sample).
Secondly, in some specications we completely exclude those regions to account
for the education e¤ect. That is, since the level of college graduates might be
higher in those regions and given that literature suggests that more educated voters
are more likely to perceive and process faster new information with regards to the
economic situation it might be the case that the di¤erence in voter turn-out we
pick up is driven by this e¤ect. Yet, by excluding those regions, we can account
for it.9 Since our results do not change dramatically, we decide to stick with this
specication.
Finally, we use treatment leads (the terms
P
  (SanjakHQ)s   in the esti-
mated equation) in order to analyze the trend of the treatment e¤ect over time. That
is, there might have been recorded in the past a wide di¤erence in voter turn-out
level among regions with high and low public sector employment. So, we might be
picking up this trend rather than the impact of the information shock that gener-
ated expectations for lower public spending. Nevertheless, the inclusion of treatment
leads accounts for this successfully. The general idea of all these steps is to arti-
cially suppress upwards the post-shock levels of voter turn-out, underestimating our
e¤ect. If we still manage to get a statistically signicant negative coe¢ cient on the
interaction term 1 then, this would imply that the e¤ect we are capturing is there.
As our results indicate in the next section, the di¤erence between the two groups
that we pick up can be attributed to the information shock.
We have addressed concerns arising due to the fact that we are using observations
both from national and regional elections in the previous Chapter. We do so, in more
length, in Appendix A.210. For a quick exposition, Figures C.5 and C.6 compare
9We come back to this point in more detail in the section that follows.
10Greek Local elections, as evidence in Figures B.11, B.12 and B.13 suggest (Appendix B), have
a avour of national mid-term elections. As a result all main parties that are represented in the
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the trend of voter turn-out among national and local elections both within (Fig.
C.5) and across (Fig. C.6) the two groups of regions. We can see that there is no
signicant di¤erence in the pre-shock trend of turnout. Since the parallel trends
assumptions is satised, we can proceed with our estimation. Nevertheless, in all
our specications we use a local elections dummy as a control to account for possible
unobserved heterogeneity.
3.3.3 Estimation Results: NUTS-3 Level
Tables C.8 and C.9, in the Appendix, contain the estimates of our basic IV model
under many alternative specications. In all of them our parameter of interest, the
coe¢ cient on the interaction term between high public sector regions and the post-
shock time variable is always negative, large in magnitude (ranging from -3.4 to -5.8
percentage-points) and statistically signicant at any conventional level. Column
4 in both tables C.8 and C.9, shows the estimates of our preferred specication
with the inclusion of treatment leads. In these estimates, we see that the coe¢ cient
of interest almost doubles in magnitude. Its negative value supports our second
Hypothesis that the expected public spending and government job cuts (less expected
rents) have led to decline in turnout which was larger (by more than 5.5 percentage-
points) in the treatment regions. The magnitude of the e¤ect is also quite large.
The point estimate on the coe¢ cient can be interpreted as saying that from the 12
percentage-points of the observed decline in turnout in those regions, almost half of
it can be attributed to the catalytic role of the public sector. That is, in regions
identied as having a large public sector share, the decline in turnout was about
60% larger than the respective gure in the control regions. This di¤erence can be
Parliament o¢ cially endorse candidates for each regional electoral competition both at the NUTS-2
and -3 levels. Moreover, in most of the cases those candidates are high-prole party members.
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attributed to the size of the public sector. Hence, we conclude that the e¤ect is not
only statistically, but also politically signicant, implying that the size of the public
sector acted as a catalyst that exacerbated the negative e¤ects of economic adversity
on turnout (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on the last treatment lead
(Sanjak*2009 ) fails to be statistically signicant at the conventional 5% level. This
implies that the role of public sector kicks-in only when the expectations-shifting
information shock occurred. In sum, our empirical ndings yield strong support in
favor of our second hypothesis. Yet, the task of identifying the causal link (or links)
through which public sector size a¤ects voter turnout is still an open question.
Alternative Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis states that expected cuts in public spending and job-creation
caused a di¤erential response in the regions where the size of the public sector is
large, due to stronger and more resilient clientelistic links between voters and parties.
Before examining its validity, we will rst examine some alternative hypotheses that
might explain this phenomenon. We examine them one-by-one.
Alternative Hypothesis 1: Trust One potential explanation for signicantly
larger decline in turnout in regions with larger public sector share could be a di¤er-
ential change in trust. As we have shown before, trust is a signicant determinant
of turnout. If in the treatment regions (the ones we instrumented for using sanjak)
trust declined more then, this could potentially explain our nding. Perhaps in those
regions voters have placed more hopes on the government and the parties concerning
their job prospects and personal welfare through higher public spending, subsidies
and job-creation. Hence, the revelation of the truth about the bad condition of public
nances has triggered a wave of mistrust against current and the past governments
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and the party-system as a whole. To the extent that this e¤ect was stronger in treat-
ment regions, it could have caused a much larger decline in trust, which in turn, can
be responsible for the di¤erential decline in turnout. Yet, we nd no evidence in the
data (Fig. C.7) of a di¤erential decline in trust among the two groups of regions.
That is, trust cannot constitute a valid alternative explanation11.
Alternative Hypothesis 2: Education One of the most consistently docu-
mented relationships in the eld of political behavior is the close association between
educational attainment, especially at the tertiary level, and formal political partic-
ipation like turnout. A number of studies over the past half century have found
that educated citizens are more likely to vote in elections and participate in the
campaigns of political parties (see Campbell et al., 1960; Hillygus, 2005; Nie et al.,
1996; Schlozman, 2002; Wolnger and Rosenstone, 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen,
1993). The reason is quite clear, according to scholars education helps citizens to
acquire the skills, resources and knowledge that are necessary for them in order to
participate in the political discourse and communicate their concerns to politicians
(Verba et. al, 1995). Furthermore, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, p. 136) argue
that [...] well educated citizens have the skills to understand the abstract subjects
of politics, follow the political campaigns and to search for and evaluate information
about the issues, the platforms and the candidates.
It is this last part that is the most relevant to our study. Since we have argued that
the falsication of Greek scal data constituted a large-scale information shock on
the expectations of voters vis-à-vis future public spending and job cuts, it should be
the case that more educated voters would have been both better informed about the
matter and also more able to process the information and adjust their expectations
11Recall that in the previous section, our results at the NUTS-2 level controlled for trust. There
as well, there was no evidence of a di¤erential change between high and low public sector regions.
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accordingly. As a result, to the extent which the size of public sector employment in
a region can be a proxy for urbanization and better educated work-force, it might be
the case that our estimates capture the e¤ect of education on political participation.
Normally, this should have been a great source of worry. Yet, a look in Table C.2
reveals that, once we instrument for the size of the public sector using the existence
of a sanjak within the boundaries of a NUTS-3 region, the two groups of regions
(treatment-sanjak and control) had almost identical levels of secondary and tertiary
education in 2009. Moreover, it is very unlikely that educational attainment levels
within each region varied signicantly in the last couple of years meaning that even
if there were some di¤erences among the two groups there were most likely time-
invariant and hence picked-up by our xed e¤ects estimators (much like all other
control variables). Finally, to further strengthen our point, recent empirical evidence
that came to surface supports our hypothesis and questions the large and direct e¤ect
of education on turnout (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011). They nd very little reliable
evidence that education signicantly increases participation rates. In fact, their
ndings indicate that education may not be the great game-changerwhen it comes
to electoral participation. Instead it may be a proxy of pre-existing conditions. One
of those, as we argue, might be the presence of party-group linkages and networks.
Hypothesis 3: Clientelism
With all the above in mind, the last explanation still remaining in the table is that
the size of the public sector acts as a proxy of stronger and more resilient clientelistic
links as many World Bank studies indicate. The rationale is that in these regions
it made sense for the citizens to invest in building closer relations with political
parties simply because the probability of those relations paying-o¤ was larger. That
is, the expectation of higher rent extraction (e.g. public sector jobs) was mobilizing
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voters to participate in the elections and vote for the dominant parties in anticipation
of securing some sort of preferential treatment by the state. As a result, stronger
linkages between voters and parties were forged in these regions since the market for
buying political support was more active. Hence, in the presence of the shock the
expectation is that the treatment regions are going to be more adversely impacted
by anticipated cuts in government spending and job-creation. The outcome was for
turnout to decline by almost 6 percentage-points more, as our empirical ndings
suggest. Our explanation is that this was due to the fact that the cliental basis of
the political system was severely undermined (public spending becomes unavailable).
3.3.4 Discussion of the Results
So far, we have found strong empirical support for the rst two hypotheses both at the
NUTS-2 and -3 levels. Our ndings suggest that there is an important link between
trust in the party-system and turnout (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, apart from this
channel, our ndings suggest that economic adversity a¤ected voter participation in
a more rationalistic way through expected economic transfers (public spending and
job-creation). That is, we nd strong evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 both at the
NUTS-2 and the NUTS-3 level, when we instrument for the size of public sector. The
causal link that we identify between the size of the public sector and voter turnout
conrms our initial hypothesis that public sector acts as a catalyst that exacerbates
the impact of economic adversity (positive or negative) on electoral participation.
In our case, the information shock updated for the worse voters expectations on
the scale of spending and job cuts. Thus, public sector size magnied the negative
impact of the shock on turnout. Evidence presented yield very strong support for
this nding. Moreover, our results are very robust to many alterations of the basic
econometric specication (inclusion of treatment leads, year xed e¤ects, economic
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and other controls). In Table C.6, we also conduct a placebo test, moving the
intensity to treatment three electoral periods into the past.
With respect to the relative magnitude of the two e¤ects we conclude that, at
least for the case of Greece, the relative size of the public sector seems to play a
more drastic role in determining political behavior and turnout. This might come
as no surprise, given the clientelistic nature of the political system and the strong
rent-seeking behavior that voters exhibit (see Appendix A.2). Collecting all evidence
together, we conclude that the expected reduction in public spending had an undis-
puted negative e¤ect on voter turn-out operating via two links: the decline in trust
(see Fig. C.7) and expected public spending cuts which a¤ected di¤erentially the
regions with larger public sector.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we have attempted to identify the impact of economic adversity on
voter turnout by focusing on two links, one direct (rent-seeking) and another indi-
rect (trust), which where either not considered to be that important determinants of
turnout (trust) or their e¤ect was largely disputed and ambiguous (economic hard-
ship). This presented us with a double challenge with respect to our identication
strategy. The rst one was the apparent endogeneity and reverse causality issues
with respect to the relationship between economic and political outcomes. Is it the
economy that a¤ects political outcomes or vice versa? In order to address this chal-
lenge we exploited the information shock in Greece as a natural experiment, where we
used the fact that Greek governments falsied scal data, that generated a shock on
expectations about future public spending and job cuts by the government (economic
adversity). This way, we were able to identify the link from expected economic hard-
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ship to turnout via rent-seeking voters. The second challenge was on how to identify
regions with larger public sector size since another issue of endogeneity arises. It
might be the case that public sector expanded exactly in those regions where voters
tended to participate more in electoral politics since the parties might have seen
a better prospect to invest in linkages there in expectation of getting more votes.
As a result, causality might run the other way around. To tackle this problem, we
instrumented for public sector size using an instrument from the historical context
of Ottoman institutions in the Balkans during the 16th century (existence of an Ot-
toman military center within the boundaries of modern NUTS-3 region in Greece).
Hence, using Greece as a case study (natural experiment) and exploiting its shared
institutional past with the Ottoman empire (selection of our IV) allowed us to study
both links.
Our ndings indicate that both links are important determinants of voter turnout.
This in part contrasts the literature that argued that there is no systematic relation-
ship between trust and turnout. We hypothesize that this di¤erence is due to the
fact that we focus on trust for the party-system at large not simply government.
Our second nding is more in line with literature and the rationalistic rent-seeking
incentives of voters who show up in polling stations in expectation of some benets
coming from the sides of the parties. Hence, economic adversity and expectations
for anticipated spending cuts (and thus less pork spending and rents) impacted neg-
atively on turnout through this link. This nding is consistent with similar ndings
in the literature (e.g. Rosenstone, 1982; Wolnger and Rosenstone, 1980). What is
important is that we document the catalytic role that public sector size played in
this relationship exacerbating the negative e¤ects of expected cuts on turnout, as
evidence we present reveals a larger decline of turnout in those regions. Yet, the
exact reason for this di¤erential decline still remains largely unresolved. Though we
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nd some evidence in favour of our clientelistic links hypothesiswhile rejecting
two other alternative stories, our empirical ndings only yield partial support to this
claim. Hence, we cannot claim conclusively that it was the anticipated weakening of
clientelistic linkages that caused the larger decline in turnout in regions with larger
public sector share.
These ndings can have important policy implications. Apart from uncovering
two causal links associated with turnout, we also make a relative assessment of
them. We nd that in the case of Greece, the relative strength of the rationalistic
link (rent-seeking behavior) that operates through the public sector size is larger
than that of the normative one (trust on the parties) since the largest component
of the decline in turnout in Greek elections, more than a half, can be attributed
to the former. As a result, our work highlights a line of caution for policy-making
that aims to increase civic engagement and participation in electoral politics. E¤orts
to increase turnout by increasing transparency and eliminating clientelistic links
might have second-order negative e¤ects operating through the rent-seeking link
which is found to be quite strong and resilient, at least in Greece. Our work can
also o¤er a potential explanation of why there is signicantly lower turnout in the
elections for the European Parliament, even among the same countries, despite the
fact that trust for EU institutions is equally low with trust towards domestic ones
(e.g. political parties). We hypothesize that one potential explanation might be the
stronger rationalistic incentives of voters to participate in national elections, either
through rent-seeking or through the general economic condition of the state and the
e¤ect it has on their individual well-being. Nevertheless, as it is the case with many
forms of political participation, determining what makes citizens to vote is still an
open question. Therefore, a more systematic study of what determines electoral
participation is warranted.
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Appendix A
The Greek Case-study
A.1 The Information Shock and the Timing of
Events
In this section, we rst present a brief time-line of events that lead to two the
consecutive revisions of the record of Greek public nances (October 2009 and 2010).
Then, it will become more clear why we can exploit the information shock that those
revisions generated as a natural experiment. The sequence of events is as follows:
1. In August of 2009, following its defeat on the elections for the European Par-
liament that took place in June, the conservative Greek Government [New
Democracy Party - Nea Dimokratia] calls for early elections to take place in
October. It cited its inability to execute the Budget for FY2009 as the main
reason due to the fact that the forecasted 5% decit for FY2009 had to be
signicantly revised upwards (it was projected to exceed 10%).
2. In October 2009, Eurostat in cooperation with Greek statistical authorities an-
nounce the results of the audit and revise the FY2009 decit upwards by almost
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8% (approximately 12.8%). Elections take place right after the announcement,
amidst a climate of tension caused by the incumbent governments misleading
estimates on public decit and the nancial audit process. As a result, the
conservative government was largely defeated in the elections by the centre-left
party [Greek Socialist Movement - PASOK ]1. Yet, voter turnout and electoral
fragmentation remained at the previous levels high levels (there was a minor
decline in turnout). Moreover, there seems to be no di¤erential impact among
regions with high and low public sector employment respectively. That is, only
the trust link might be operating, if any.
3. In April 2010, a new report published by Eurostat consolidates its estimates on
the FY2009 decit. According to these estimates the decit soared at 15.8%,
approximately 2 points more than anticipated. In the meantime the centre-left
government-elect, in collaboration with EU agencies, announces a new scal
audit that will cover all periods from 2005 and onwards. In May 2010 the
Greek government asks for the help of EU and IMF and a package of austerity
measures is decided.
4. In October 2010, the nal report of Eurostat is published and the FY2009
decit is nalized at 15.8%, almost 11% more than initially anticipated. Yet,
in comparison with previous estimates, the total revision of the Greek public
debt for FY2009 alone is an astonishing 24% (from 102% to 126%). Almost
half of it (11.7%) is attributed to hidden decits in the period from 2006-2008
when the previous government was mis-reporting the data. From this 11.7%
more than three quarters (or 8.3%) was solely attributed to excess decit in
FY2006.
1PASOK gained the 44% of the vote while Nea Dimokratia got a historically low 34%.
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5. In November 2010, Regional elections take place, after citizens are exposed
to this new information with respect to the hidden decits throughout the
period from 2006 to 2008. The incumbent government [PASOK] is not held
accountable since it was the policies of the previous administration that lead
to excess decits and the subsequent austerity measures. As a result, it wins
convincingly the local elections securing the victory of its preferred candidates
in 8 out of 13 regional administrations (including the Athens Metropolitan
Region with 3 million voters) and almost all major municipalities. Yet, as it
can be seen in Figures. C1 and C.2 voter turn-out collapses and a new historic-
low level is recorded (61% as opposed to 72% one year ago). At the same time
(see Fig. B.10) electoral fragmentation sky-rockets to a new record-high level
(69%) up from 65% one year ago.
The main reason that allows us to exploit the information shock on the level of
public debt comes from the fact that the new information was revealed prior to the
local elections but after the national ones. Yet, even though public nances were
already in bad shape since 2006, national elections took place without the voters
knowing this information. While there is no dramatic change in public nances and
the actual economic conditions in the period between October 2009 and October
2010 (there was a small update on the level decit by almost 2 percentage-points
which was signaled by Eurostat earlier that year and, thus was anticipated), there
is new information becoming available concerning the status of public nances in
the past. Hence, the revelation of the fact that Greek governments used to conceal
the true value of public debt and decits for 2006 and 2007 acts as a shock on the
information (there is an overall 12 percentage-point revision on past decits) which
alters signicantly votersexpectations on future public spending and job cuts and
the intensity of the required austerity and scal adjustment without altering current
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economic conditions. More so, in regions where public sector employment is larger
and the adjustment process (e.g. slashing public sector and freezing public sector
employment) is expected to be larger.
The fact that the change in expectations was caused by an information shock
solves for us the apparent endogeneity problem, which we have extensively discussed
in the previous section. If it were for current scal mismanagement causing the
revision of decit and debt in 2010, it would have been impossible to correctly identify
the e¤ect of decreased public spending on voter turn-out because the causal link
might have been reversed. But fortunately, in our case nothing has changed in the
fundamentals of the economy between the two electoral races in October 2009 and
November 2010 respectively. The status of the economy was equally bad both in late
2009 and in mid 2010 when the revelation of new data took place. What changed,
and with it so did the expectations of the public, was the information on how bad
the scal position of Greece was back in 2006. But this cannot be attributed to
current policies pursued by the current government during the period from 2009 to
2010. Rather, it is an outcome of past policies and most certainly of the clientelistic
nature of the party-system in Greece that pre-existed and characterized public life
for decades. Hence, exploiting this information shock provides us with the ground
for a natural experiment in order to identify the impact of reduced expected public
spending on voter turn-out through the link of clientelistic relations. Figure A.1
summarizes the discussion.
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A.2 The Greek Party-System: History and Struc-
ture
Greece has a stable bipartisan political system since 1974 dominated by two po-
litical parties (the centre-right Nea Dimokratia and the centre-left PASOK ) which
used to take turns in o¢ ce. As a result, coalition governments were never occurring.
The number of parties contesting elections and represented in Parliament remained
relatively stable over the years2. The two major parties (PASOK and Nea Dimokra-
tia) are getting around 80 percent of the votes. Moreover, voter turn-out ranged
historically between 75 and 80 percent, meaning that the Greek party-system is
characterized by stable bipartisanship and large political participation. That is, the
Persson-Tabellini argument that stresses the link between coalition governments and
high public spending is not applicable in our case3.
Apart from its bipartisan nature, another key characteristic of the Greek party-
system is clientelism which is at the epicenter of political competition. For years the
two major parties used their inuence in the administration to favour their clientele
by o¤ering public sector appointments and other privileges. Until 1994, when the
independent Supreme State Council for Personnel Selection [Anotato Simvoulio Epi-
logis Prosopikou- ASEP] was instituted, public sector was viewed as the prize for the
winning party. Consequently, public sector appointments were primarily made ac-
cording to partisan a¢ liation and political favoritism, in complete absence of meritoc-
racy. Furthermore, once the Council was instituted, the practice of non-meritocratic
2In addition to the two major ones there were on average three to four smaller parties. Their
combined vote shares never exceeded 20 percent.
3In fact, the Greek case provides a counter-argument to Persson & Tabellini. The recent grand-
coalition government was an outcome of the economic crisis not a causal factor, since a coalition
government has never occured before. It was the severe debt crisis that forced the PASOK govern-
ment, which held an absolute majority in the Parliament to seek the support of the opposition in
passing the austerity measures.
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public sector appointments, and the subsequent clientelistic link, passed from the
central government to regional administrations which were appointed by the central
government until 1994. But even after gaining electoral independence Greek local
authorities remained nancially and politically dependent on the political parties
reducing the level of their autonomy to a simple mid-term ballot opportunity which
was used by parties in order to count electoral power with an eye to the forthcoming
electoral battle. Hence, partisan favoritism moved from elected parliamentarians to
elected local administration o¢ cers (e.g. mayors and regional governors) but the
clientelistic nature of the Greek political system remained unchanged.
A.2.1 Greek Local Government: Structure and Operation4
In this section we present a very brief outline of the structure, functions and sources
of income of local government in Greece. Until 1994, the only elected forms of local
government were municipal and community councils, representing the rst level of
local government under the Constitution (Article 102/1)5. However, in 1994 the
Greek Parliament adopted a reform of the local government system (Laws 2218/94
and 2240/94) establishing elected prefectural administrations at the NUTS-3 level
(prefectures)6. These laws were formally implemented in January 1995, and the
rst ever local elections at the prefecture level took place in 1998. Since then, local
elections take place regularly every 4 years. These reforms brought about major
changes in the system of local government since they introduced another eld for
4This section is mainly adapted from the Council of Europe report (1994) titled Structure and
Operation of Local and Regional Democracy - Greeceand updated where necessary.
5Article 102/1 of the Greek Constitution provides for the institution of local government in
the following terms: The administration of local a¤airs shall be exercised by local government
agencies, the rst level of which comprises municipalities and communities. Other levels shall be
specied by law.
6Laws 2218/94 and 2240/94 established the second level of local government in Greece, which
is called Prefectural Self-Government and which has no relation with the rst level in terms of
hierarchy.
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political competition.
At regional level Greece is divided into peripheries (NUTS-2 regions), prefectures
(NUTS-3 regions) known as Nomoi. The basic level of administration are the munici-
palities [Demos], which total 227 at present7. The 48 prefectures are deconcentrated
units of central government, covering certain decentralized state servicesand their
role is to formulate proposals to the central government on works and policies of
national importance concerning the region (Law 2240/94). Nevertheless, despite
the important role that they are supposed to play, in practice, due to inadequate
funding, many of those assigned responsibilities still remain in paper. Through the
prefectural system, the central authorities also have extensive control over the mu-
nicipalities. Overall, as the CoE highlights: ... [I]t is not an exaggeration to say
that the structure of the Greek local government has not changed very much since
the beginning of this century. The reason is that legislative changes were not ac-
companied by the transfer of real political and nancial power to local jurisdictions.
As a result, central government still maintains a key role in determining policies,
even at the local level.
A.2.2 The Finances of Greek Local Government8
According to the report for the Council of Europe (1994): The proportion of GDP
accounted for by the public sector in Greece is approximately 48 per cent, which is
only slightly below the average of all the OECD countries. Yet, local governments
administrate less than 20 per cent of these resources - equivalent to 8 per cent of the
GDP, which is well below the OECD average.
7After the last reform of 2006.
8This section is mainly adapted from the Council of Europe report (1994) titled Structure and
Operation of Local and Regional Democracy - Greeceand updated where necessary. Some data
and tables in this section have been retrieved from Denny and Smith (1993) Local Taxation -
Report to the Commission DG XXI,prepared by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in London.
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Expenditures
Until 1990, the Greek local authorities had fairly limited areas of responsibility,
related to elementary services such as water supply, waste collection and recreation.
But as part of the administrative reforms implemented in the mid 1990s, there has
been a attempt to decentralize some state responsibilities to the Greek local author-
ities.9 Yet, this process remains still incomplete. These powers are described in the
laws mentioned above (2218/94 and 2240/94) and the transfer is taking place in
stages to ensure a smooth transition from the one system to the other,according
to the CoE (1994).
The report continues: When the prefectures were established the functions of
local authorities in Greece were split up into areas where the municipalities had
the exclusive responsibility, and areas where they shared responsibility with central
government. As a consequence of the recent reforms, central government has moved
more in the direction of developing powers and functions which can be exercised
at local level. Within the coming years all functions of the local authorities will be
exclusive and functions such as economic and regional planning will be transferred to
the prefectures. Yet, the public housing stock is mostly administrated by the central
government.10
The extent to which local authorities are subjected to central government control
is evidenced by the CoE: Within the social sector most of the functions of local
authorities involve shared responsibility. Furthermore, local authorities have no in-
dependent responsibilities in the educational sector. In areas where local government
have the competence, local government is free to raise the quality of services pro-
9New areas of responsibility are for instance: child care, elderly care, housing assistance and
other welfare services.
10The payment of housing benet and allocation of welfare accommodation to poor people are
examples of areas of housing policy in which municipalities with su¢ cient resources have been given
authority.
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vided to a higher standard depending on the requirements of the local community.
In practice though, due to inadequate funding this has rarely occurred. What is most
commonly observed is that ... [M]any services which formally fall within the compe-
tence of the municipalities are carried out by central government agencies because of
the inability of small, nancially non-viable local units. These include public utilities,
waterworks, irrigation works, sewage systems, roads and other public infrastructure
projectsas the CoE report stresses. The majority of local government spending -
nearly 70 per cent - goes to capital projects. But, when one takes into account that
most capital projects are funded through state grants, it becomes clear that local
government discretionary spending falls to less than 10 per cent of its total spending
(CoE 1993; Denny and Smith 1994). As a result, in practice local administrations
in Greece act as decentralized distributors of central government money rather than
autonomous entities.
Revenues
The situation is more or less identical when it comes to local government revenues.
Table A.1, from Denny and Smith (1993), shows how Greek local authorities nance
their activities. The main source of local revenues are central government transfers
- either in the form of tax sharing or grants and subsidies. Another signicant
component of local government revenues comes from EUs regional development and
structural funds. Together, these two sources of nance constitute more than two-
thirds of total local government revenues.
Denny and Smith (1993) further note that central government grants has be-
come an increasingly important part of local government revenues over the years. In
1975 these grants only accounted for 16 per cent of the local revenues. Until 1989,
grants were split into ordinary and extraordinary grants. Since then, ordinary grants
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have been gradually replaced by a tax revenue sharing system.11 The receipts from
the shared taxes (ordinary grants) are distributed according to a formula primarily
based on population density and other social criteria. The funds are allocated to
local authorities through a joint decision of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Finance. One-third of income tax is used to nance local authority investment, while
the rest goes on the current expenses of local authorities.
When it comes to extraordinary grants, contrary to the practices followed by
many other European states, there is no formula for their distribution. Hence, there
is a great amount of discretion from the central government to direct funds to certain
municipalities and localities based on political and opportunistic (partisan) consid-
erations. As a result, the direct line of scal responsibility is broken and the voters
cannot identify whether the lack of funds in a specic locality is due to ine¢ cient
management by the local authorities or due to lack of favoritism by the central gov-
ernment. This aspect of Greek local government further exacerbates its dependency
from central government and dominant parties.
Another source of funding can come from various forms of loans. According
to the report prepared for the EC [...] local authorities are, according to law,
allowed to borrow from the State, from other public institutions and from private
credit institutions. The main credit institution for local governments is the Loan
and Consignment Fund. Loans from this fund can, under certain circumstances, be
granted to local authorities at interest rates lower than at the private capital market.
Loans account for approximately 10 per cent of local government revenues.
When it comes to local taxes, the Greek municipalities have very limited authority
to set their own tax policies. As the CoE report notes: There are only three types of
11Local governments receive shares from the following central government taxes: Personal Income
tax: 20% Corporate Income tax: 20% Motor Vehicle tax: 50% Property tax 15%.
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taxes over which local government has some control. These are: taxes on electried
areas, taxes on immovable property and the advertisement tax.12 Most importantly,
local governments in Greece have no legislative power to set or collect local taxes.
All local taxation in Greece are levied under central government legislation. All own
taxes are collected by central government on behalf of local authorities, although some
of the larger municipalities can administer the raising of revenue from taxation.
This shows in a very stark manner that the nancial autonomy of local government
in Greece is severely undermined. In light of the above, it comes as no surprise that
local and central politics are so interdependent and interconnected.
A.2.3 Relationship between Local and Central Government
Up until 1989 local government nances were largely dependent on the extent to
which the government of the day handed out state subsidies to local authorities.
Law no. 1828/89 laid down the specic sources for local government funding with a
xed percentage coming from each source of income13 (CoE report, 1994). Accord-
ing to the CoE report [Law no. 1828/89] laid down the foundation for the nancial
autonomy of local authorities, although, to date, this autonomy has not really been
achieved to the extent that it was initially designed. To ensure correct implementa-
tion of this law, central government consults local authorities each year through their
umbrella organization, the Central Committee of Greek Municipalities and Commu-
nities (CCGMC), on the distribution of the CAR. In general, the CCGMC is the
top level instrument of local government inuence on central government decisions.
It expresses the demands and proposals of all local authorities and has the role as
to central government on topics related to local government. However, the actual
12Upper and lower limits for these tax rates are determined by the central government.
13These sources of funding are called Central Autonomous Resources (CAR).
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involvement of local government in the decisions a¤ecting local government nance is
not as enhanced as it should be, and does not match the impact which such decisions
have on local authorities (development laws, loans, interest rates etc.).
A.2.4 The Relationship between National and Local Politics
The lack of nancial autonomy of Greek local administration resulted in the lack of
autonomy in another equally important sphere: politics. Since most of the resources
towards local administrations are coming from a common source, central government,
it is not unusual for governments and political parties to interfere very actively in
local politics. In fact, in most of the cases, and certainly for the case of prefectural
elections, political parties and governments are very actively involved. In other
words, local politics are seen as a continuation of central politics at another domain.
The most common pattern of involvement in local politics is the following: political
parties represented in the Parliament always endorse openly candidates for local
elections. Usually, their endorsed candidates are high-prole, high-ranking party
o¢ cials. Partisan endorsement and a¢ liation are two extremely important factors
for electoral success (only few NUTS-3 administrations have had an independent,
non-a¢ liated and non-endorsed by any party chair-person).14 As a result, clientelism
and partisan favoritism also make their appearance in local politics. The most usual
form they take is that of public sector appointments.
Moreover, the similarities among national and local elections extend to the elec-
toral rule, which is a form of PR with a run-o¤.15 Hence, there is are incentive for
strategic voting neither in national nor in the rst round of local elections. Voting for
14Party members who disagree with leaderships choices or want to express a general disagreement
against its pursued policies may enter the race as rebel candidates. This phenomenon is very
common in greek local elections since their institution.
15In local elections, if no candidate gets the absolute majority a second round takes place.
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a non-winning candidate endorsed by a smaller party wont a¤ect the nal outcome.16
Since we measure electoral fragmentation and voter turnout during the rst round of
local elections, when all candidates and parties participate in the electoral contest,
the two electoral rules are equivalent in terms of induced voting behavior. Moreover,
the existence of a run-o¤ ensures that no coalition administration ever takes place
at the local level, another similarity between national and local politics. Therefore,
there is no need to worry about the impact of coalition governments, through the
electoral rule, on economic outcomes.
For all the above reasons, local elections are highly politicized. Moreover, the
fact that they take place every four years between national elections, gives them
a avour of mid-term elections where the performance of government is implicitly
evaluated. Hence, electoral and voting behavior in local elections is almost identical
with national ones. Stylized evidence in Figures B.11 through B.13 and C.5 provide a
very good visualization of this point. Both within and across groups, voting behavior
(electoral fragmentation) and turnout in local elections appears to follow an identical
trend with national ones. In most cases the two lines coincide. Therefore, we conclude
that local elections act as a proxy for mid-term national Elections. Since the political
characteristics between national and local elections are identical we need not worry
for combining electoral data from both of them in our analysis.
A.3 Constructing our IV
In our sample, we have data on greek elections (local and national) from 1996 until
2010. In total we have 423 observations at the NUTS-3 level. There are 48 NUTS-3
16If there is a winner in the rst round this means that she got more than 50% of the total votes.
Hence, voting strategically would have had no e¤ect. On the other hand, if no candidate gets the
absolute majority in the rst round, the run-o¤ takes place among the rst two in the previous
round. The equivalence of those two electoral systems is also stressed by Duverger (1954).
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regions in Greece. We assign 23 out of those 48 regions (accounting for the 60% of
the population) to the treatment group, using the presence of an Ottoman Military
District Head-Quarters (known as Sanjak HQ), within the current administrative
boundaries of a NUTS-3 region, as an instrumental variable (IV) in order to identify
those regions with larger public sector size and employment. The rationale for the
choice of our IV is explained in the next section. The remaining 25 regions are
assigned to the control group. In those regions, the main sources or economic activity
and employment are non-government related (e.g. tourism and agriculture). Table
A.2 shows a comprehensive list of all the locations that the HQs of Ottoman Military
Districts (sanjak) were stationed within the territorial boundaries of the area that
constitutes today modern Greece, during the 16th and 17th centuries.
One of the rst things that one can observe is that the degree of institutional
continuity and similarity, not only at the local level (NUTS-3) but also at the higher
ranks of administration (NUTS-2) is remarkable. More than 80% of the HQs of
Ottoman sanjak were situated in the exact same location where current prefectural
administrative capitals of Greek NUTS-3 regions (Nomoi) are stationed, as compari-
son between Columns 3 and 4 illustrates. Furthermore, comparing Columns 1 and 5,
it becomes clear that even at the higher administrative level (Periphery or NUTS-2)
the jurisdictions between Ottoman Eyâlet-i and Vilâet-i and Greek Peripheries are
very similar. Most of Greek prefectures (Nomoi) that used to belong to the same
Periphery (NUTS-2) were also Ottoman sanjak that used to belong to the same
Eyâlet-i or Vilâet-i. Hence, not only the structure and jurisdiction of an Ottoman
sanjak was similar to that of a Greek prefecture, but even at higher administrative
level, there appears to be a major overlap. This further strengthens our argument
in favor of using the existence of Ottoman sanjak as an instrument for regions with
larger public sector size.
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In constructing our IV we adapted the following convention: we generated a
dummy variable (Sanjak_HQ)s, that takes the value of 1, if at region (NUTS-3)
s an Ottoman sanjak was stationed during the past. As a result, all the NUTS-
3 regions included in Table A.2 belong in to this category. In order to identify
which regions used to house an Ottoman military HQ, we relied on three di¤erent
sources: Kiliç (1999), Malte-Brun and Huot (1834), and Skene (1851). For reasons
of consistency and historical accuracy, we included a region in the list of Table A.2
only if it appeared as having a sanjak HQ within its boundaries in at least two out
of the three sources mentioned previously. This way, given that historical archives of
that times present some inconsistencies, we can increase the accuracy of our IV. As a
result, the sanjak HQs that we list in Table A.2 together with the actual locality that
were stationed was cross-references across various sources. Furthermore, extra care
was taken to identify the exact place where the HQ was situated since it was very
common for places to change names regularly, especially during their transition from
the Ottoman Empire to the modern Greek state that was created in 1831 and kept
expanding until the beginning of the 20th century. Columns 2 and 3 (Table A.2) are
presenting both the original Turkish names of the sanjak HQs and the subsequently
adapted Greek names to make sure that we have identied them properly. In sum,
we have identied 23 such NUTS-3 regions (prefectures) and we have assigned them
to the treatment group. That is,.the dummy (Sanjak_HQ)s = 1 if s is a NUTS-
3 region that is listed in Table A.2. Summary statistics for these two groups are
presented in Table C.2. Next, we discuss in more detail the rationale behind the use
of our Instrumental Variable.
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A.3.1 From Ottoman Reforms to the Modern Greek State
In this section, we will explain how the existence of an Ottoman military district
(known as sanjak) head-quarter, during the 17th century, within the administrative
boundaries of a current NUTS-3 region (Nomoi) can be used as an instrument for
this region exhibiting higher share of public sector employment (and growth rate).
To justify this choice, we need to take a step back to the early years of Ottoman
presence in the Balkan peninsula. In a seminal paper, Inalc¬k (1954, Islamic Stud-
ies), a prominent scholar of Ottoman history, showed that the method of Ottoman
conquest had two stages: an indirect one, where the aim was to establish suzerainty,
and a direct one that proceeded with the elimination of native dynasties and the ap-
plication of the t¬mar system aiming at gradual assimilation. Quickly after conquest,
the Ottoman army was withdrawn and small garrisons were placed in fortresses of
strategic importance in order to minimize the size of the occupying force and the
risk of resistance emerging from local population (e¢ cient allocation of military re-
sources). T¬mars were then distributed to the elite Ottoman cavalry aristocrats
(Sipâhis) thus, imposing a feudal system of governance much like in many European
medieval states. T¬mars that were stationed near fortresses of strategic geographical
importance (Hisar-eri) constituted the centres of Ottoman military and administra-
tive command.
Moreover, conquered lands were usually preserved in their pre-Ottoman admin-
istrative boundaries and they were entrusted to a regional commander (sanjak bey)
according to size and importance. In practice sanjak was the real administrative and
military unit of the Ottoman Empire. Sanjak Bey (Local Lord) was the commander
of the t¬mar-holding sipâhis (knights) in his sanjak. Many sanjaks together formed
the larger administrative units of the Ottoman Empire (Eyâlet-i and Vilâyet-i). As
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a result, Ottoman conquest methods were based on maintaining previously exist-
ing structures, to a great extend, and bringing slow and non-revolutionary changes
from time to time (Inalc¬k, 1954). This non-revolutionary method of conquest was
maintained throughout the Ottoman history.
In the mid-18th century, technology that was developed during the Industrial
Revolution began to make its impact on military and naval warfare (Kennedy, 1989).
The uneven patterns of industrial and technological change coupled with changes
in the nancial sector, which were triggered by increased industrialism (Harrison,
2011), caused major shifts in the balance of power among great powers of that
time (English, Austrian, Russian and Ottoman Empires). These changes, in turn,
a¤ected the outcome of 19th century wars more than ever before. As a result, steam
engines and machine-made tools gave Europe decisive military advantages over less
technologically and nancially advanced empires (e.g. Ottoman, Russian). The
consequence of industrial revolution was for the United Kingdom to become the
unchallenged global superpower that threatened the Ottoman dominance in Eastern
Mediterranean.
In the eve of the 19th century, addressing growing military challenges by the
western powers, Sultan Mahmud II initiated in 1826 his Reform Program (Tanzimât)
of centralization and westernization of the military structures of the Ottoman state
(Quataert, Pamuk et al., eds. Inalc¬k, 1994; pp. 761-69). During the period of the
Reforms (Tanzimât), which lasted until 1877-78, western bureaucrats and military
experts from France and Austria replaced Sultans o¢ cials in charge of sanjak HQs.
This state-imposed reforms percolated from the top to the bottom. Rather than
being an outcome of grassroots societal change, they aspired to change the societal
structures and norms. As a result, the scope, responsibility and sheer size of Ottoman
government grew in an unprecedented manner. By the end of the 19th century the
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state employed more than one million civil servants (Quataert, Pamuk et al., 1994).
The newly-formed Greek state gained its independence from the Ottomans in
1831 comprising only Peloponnese and some islands. Yet, it expanded gradually
throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries (1881-1913) at the expense of the
Ottoman Empire by annexing gradually the seceding lands of the Empire. But the
Greek state was resource constrained and was relying heavily on foreign aid (military
and nancial), infrastructure and state-building. Since the creation of the Greek
state was happening in parallel (with a small time lag) with the modernization of
the Ottoman state, foreign experts were called-upon to help in a manner analogous
to that they have done couple of years before for the Ottomans17. As a result,
since the re-organization of the Ottoman state was taking place in parallel with the
creation of the rst-ever Greek state infrastructures, the Greek state utilized the
same structures and techniques that have developed for the Ottomans during the
Tanzimât period. In fact, the degree of institutional continuity between pre- and
post-Ottoman Greece is astonishing. As Kostis (2005) notes, the newly-adapted
westernized institutions were nothing more than the old pre-existing Ottoman
institutions, which were renamed (e.g. the Assembly of Notables became the new
Parliament) and continued to be occupied by the same families. Hence, the Ottoman
sanjak became the Greek equivalent of Nomoi (a term maintained until nowadays
to designate the administrative HQ of a NUTS-3 region).
17Bavarians assumed the responsibility to organize the bureaucracy, civil administration and
education, whereas French experts assumed the responsibility of military re-organization.
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A.4 Figures
Fig. A.1: Revised Data on Greek Public Finances (Debt and Decit) as % of GDP for
the Period from 2004-2010 (reported by Eurostat on October 2010)
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A.5 Tables
Table A.1: Sources of Financing of Municipal and Prefectural (NUTS-3 Regions)
Gross Expenditure in late 1990s.
Sources of Revenue Percentage (%) of
Gross Expenditure
Fees and Charges 25
Extraordinary Grants (from Central Govt.) 24
General Taxes (collected by Govt.) 29
Loans (Private and Formal Sector combined) 10
Immovable Property Income 4
Sale of Property 1
Local Taxes (collected by Local Administrations) 5
Other Sources 2
Total 100
Note: Figures taken from Council of Europe: Structure and operation of local and regional
democracy - Greece, CoE, Strasbourg. Data updated using information from the Greek
Ministry of Interior, Administrative A¤airs, Local Government and Decentralization when
necessary.
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Table A.2: The Allocation of Ottoman Military District (Sanjak) Head-Quarters dur-
ing the 16th-18th cent. across the Administrative Boundaries of present-time Greek
Regions (Nomos) at the NUTS-3 Level.
Region Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nomos Eyâlet-i or Sanjak HQ Modern Capital Periphery
(NUTS-3) Vilâyet-i Ottoman Greek (NUTS-3 Region) (NUTS-2)
Evros V. Edirne Dedea¼gaç Alexandroupoli Alexandroupoli Thrace
Rodopi " Gümülcüne Komotini Komotini "
Kavala V. Sêlan¬ky Taszos Thasos Kavala* E. Macedonia
Kavala " Kavala Kavala Kavala "
Drama V. Sêlan¬k Drama Drama Drama "
Serres " Siriz Serres Serres C. Macedonia
Thessalonica " Sêlan¬k Thessalonica Thessalonica "
Kozani E. Monast¬r Serçe Servia Kozanis Kozani* W. Macedonia
Kastoria " Kesriyé Kastoria Kastoria "
Ioannina V. Yanya Yanya Ioannina Ioannina Epirus
Arta " Narda Arta Arta "
Larissa E. Rumeli Yeni¸sehir Larissa Larissa Thessalia
Trikala " T¬rhala Trikala Trikala "
Magnissia " Velestinye Velestino Volos* "
Aitolia V. Moreay Nafpaktos Nafpaktos Agrinio* W. Greece
Achaia " Bal¬badra Patra Patra "
Korinthos V. Moreay Gördes Korinthos Korinthos Peloponnese
Arcadia " Tribl¬çe Tripolis Tripolis "
Argolida " Anabol¬ Nafplio Nafplio "
Chania E. Girit Canea Chania Chania Crete
Heraklio E. Girit Candia Chandakasz Heraklio "
Lesvos E. Archipelago M¬d¬ll¬ Mitilene Mitilene North Agean
Lesvos " Limna Limnos Limnos* "
Chios " Sak¬z Chios Chios "
Dodekanese " Rodoz Rhodos Rhodes South Agean
Kerkyra V. Yanyay Kerkira Kerkyra Corfu Ionian
Note: Data compiled from Kiliç (1999), Malte-Brun and Huot (1834), and Skene (1851).
Greek Nomoi (NUTS-3) appearing twice imply that within their administrative boundaries
multiple Ottoman military HQ existed. In 1998, Evros and Rodopi have been unied into
a single NUTS-3 Region. As a result, the actual number of NUTS-3 regions that housed a
Sanjak in their jurisdictions is 23. Eyâlet-i was the major Ottoman Administrative District
(equivalent to a Periphery at the NUTS-2 level). Vilâyet-i is a more modern version of the
previous structure adapted prior to the Reforms when redistricting took place. y Regions
which prior to redistricting belonged to Rumeli Eyâlet-i (a large region covering most of
continental Greece and Peloponnese) before it was broken into smaller administrative units
(Vilâyet-i). z Chandakas is the Byzantine (early-Greek) name for Heraklio.
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Table A.3: Summary Regional Statistics (at the NUTS-3 level) of High and Low
Public Sector Groups for the period from 2000 to 2010.
(1) (2)
Treatment Control
(High Public Sector) (Low Public Sector)
Annual Income p.c. (Harmonized PPP)
2000-08 Averages 14,808 15,103
2000 11,516 11,603
Education Level (2000-2010 Averages)
Secondary (%) 36.6 36.0
Tertiary (%) 24.1 23.9
Employment Sector Shares (2000-08 Averages)
Agriculture (%) 18.7 20.5
Industry (%) 21.6 20.5
Share of Public Sector Employment (% of total)
In 2000 22.1 18.3
In 2008 27.2 21.4
Average 2000-2008 25.0 20.1
Growth Rate (2000-08) 24.5 17.5
Public Sector Jobs (%)
(relative share of total public sector) 80.0 20.0
(relative share with agriculture) 1.5 1.1
Unemployment (2000-2009 Averages) 8.3 7.7
Long-Run Unemployment 4.0 3.9
Long-Run Unemployment (share of total %) 48.2 50.6
Number of NUTS-3 Regions 22 26
Note: Data on educational attainment are taken from ELSTAT (Greek Statistical Author-
ity)Population Census (2011). Data on regional unemployment (NUTS-3 level), income
and public sector employment statistics are taken from the Eurostat Regional Yearbook
(2010) and LFS Survey (2009). Income is measured in Harmonized PPP. Public sector
employment is given as a share of total employment.
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Appendix B
Supplementary Material for
Chapter 2
B.1 An Implicit Test on our Redistributive Mech-
anism
So far, we have not tested our mechanism of redistributive politics per se (Proposi-
tion 4). We provide one such tests here. As the reader may recall, we have shown
that as the two moderate parties converge ideologically, the two extremists will be
less willing to be strategical and sacrice even a tiny vote share, by promising
lower redistribution, in order to increase the probability that their ideological neigh-
bor becomes the formateur, simply because such a neighbor does not exist anymore
(it has converged to the median). Hence, they prefer to match-up the redistribution
promises of the moderate parties, leading to an equilibrium in which the redistri-
bution (economic policy) dimension is practically cancelled out. As a result, our
proposed link, through which unemployment a¤ects electoral fragmentation, cannot
be as e¤ective as before. Thus, if our model has correctly identied the redistributive
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voting mechanism through which unemployment a¤ects electoral fragmentation, we
should expect that as moderate parties move towards the median policy, fragmenta-
tion should not vary signicantly with the unemployment rate. The e¤ect has to be
much more weak once the above channel has been shut o¤.
In practical terms, this implies that if we estimate our basic IV model on a
restricted sample of countries, where moderate parties exhibit a very high degree of
ideological proximity, we should nd that the impact of unemployment on electoral
fragmentation is much lower. Perhaps it might even fail to be statistically signicant,
as the coe¢ cient 1 on unemployment becomes smaller in magnitude, yet negative
number. To test this prediction, we split our sample into two sub-groups. The rst
group contains the countries where the moderate parties have converged in terms
of ideology1. The second one contains those countries where the dominant parties
exhibit high ideological divergence. Based on this separation, we estimate our IV
model on the rst group. We present the results in Table 9 (Appendix B).
It is reassuring to observe that the estimation results on the restricted sample
of countries conrm our expectations. That is, they o¤er strong support in favor of
our models specications. We can see that in all specications, irrespective of the
choice of our instrument and the inclusion or not of extra controls, the coe¢ cient on
unemployment is always negative and strictly smaller in absolute value (range from
 0:8 to  0:4) compared to the estimates in Table 5 ( 1:3). That is, on average,
its size drops to almost a half. It also fails to be statistically signicant, under all
alternative specications and for any conventional level of statistical signicance. We
note the fact that our rst-stage estimates are statistically signicant at the 1% level
under all specications, and also the fact that the coe¢ cients on all other explana-
1According to the Schmidt Index. Figure B.9 shows the degree of ideological distance among
dominant parties in the OECD countries from 1960 to 2007.
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tory variables of interest (e.g. institutional constraints and incumbency dummy) are
statistically signicant, have the same sign and are identical in magnitude with the
respective ones in Table 5 (e.g. the coe¢ cient on institutional constraints is around
0:6 in both cases). As a result, taken altogether, it becomes clear that our estimate
on the coe¢ cient on unemployment became smaller in magnitude and lost its sig-
nicance due to the fact that we our mechanism is switched-o¤in this particular
sub-sample. Hence, the data lend some indirect support to the models mechanism
and structural elements as well.
B.2 The Economics Behind our Instrument: Oil
Prices and Unemployment
To understand the validity of our instrument we need to summarize the economic
relationship between oil price shocks and unemployment. Firstly, there is a growing
consensus among the literature, that the e¤ects of an oil price shock on unemploy-
ment were not constant overtime. Especially after the 1974 oil crisis, the impact of
oil price shocks on the macroeconomy has changed. In a early paper, van Wijnbergen
(1985) presents a theoretical model of inter-temporal analysis, where there is dise-
quilibrium in the goods and labour market in the rst period, in order to study the
e¤ect of oil price shocks on the labour market and the current account. Although his
analysis focuses mainly on the 1974-75 oil crisis, it can provide some critical insight
on what might have happened after the 1970s. Van Wijnbergen argues that in the
very short run the supply shock in the goods market, caused by an increase in oil
prices, dominates and causes unemployment to increase. Yet, in the medium and
long run the labour market adjusts. The increase in the price level causes real wage
to fall below the workers productivity and hence rms are willing to employ more
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and produce more, given demand. Then, if the hike in ination is met by a cut
in the rate of interest, investment will increase and there will be excess demand in
both labour and goods markets. Especially for the economies that run CA decits
the e¤ect of increased investment on employment will be larger2. This increase in
investment makes the long-run e¤ect of an increase in oil prices on employment to be
positive. That is, the initial negative shock that drives unemployment upwards, is
quickly reversed. Stylized facts on the US economy during the 1975 oil crisis conrm
this analysis. Unemployment in the US reached its peak in mid-1975 to rebound
shortly afterwards and start declining due to the e¤ect on the real wage.
One potential explanation for this is the ability of enterprises and industry to
better absorb the costs of higher oil prices by means of passing the e¤ect on the
consumers or by having stocks of output so that it can suspend production or even
shift production to less oil intensive goods. To the extend that consumers are more
adversely a¤ected by rising oil prices compared to the industry, and to the extend
that degree of substitutability is large enough, we can expect the e¤ect of falling real
wage to dominate over rising costs of production. Hence, after an initial negative
shock on employment, we can expect that soon enough employment picks up again.
In support of this latter hypothesis comes the paper by Keane and Prasad (1996),
who study the e¤ects of oil prices on real wage and employment, using panel data
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men in the US. In their paper,
they nd that while the short-run e¤ect of an oil price increase on employment is
negative, the long-run e¤ect is in fact positive. The main reason for this nding
is that increases in the price of oil unambiguously cause real wage to decline at the
aggregate level in all sectors of industry. Moreover, they estimate that the fall on real
2We note that at the time of this analysis refers to (mid seventies) the developed European Union
incorporated only 6 member states and many of our OECD economies (Greece, Spain, Portugal
and others) were considered to be developing ones.
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wage is on the level of 4-5% for a standard deviation increase in the price of oil (19%
approximately). Since the e¤ect of an oil price increase on labour demand depends
on the degree of substitutability between oil and labour, they explain their nding
by noting that labour and oil are not gross but net substitutes. As a result, the
fall in real wage is to be expected. Hence, they conclude that it is those changes in
relative wages and the sectorial changes in the labour market induced by the higher
oil prices that can explain the positive e¤ect on employment.
Blanchard and Gali (2007) study the structural changes in the labour market
induced by oil price changes, by applying structural VAR techniques in a sample of
advanced OECD economies to estimate the impact of an oil price shock to unem-
ployment, ination and output. In this sense their ndings, given their time span
and the set of countries are directly relevant to our present study. They derive three
main conclusions: Firstly, the impact of oil price shocks on the macroeconomy has
changed over time and in particular after the 1980s. In that respect the episodes of
1974 are not identical with those that followed afterwards. Secondly, they attest that
oil price shocks overtime have driven labour markets to become more exible, and
thirdly, that due the shocks the share of oil in production has decreased overtime.
In particular, with respect to unemployment and real wage, they show that the
magnitude and the direction vary between the episodes of 1973 and 1979 and the
episodes in early 2000. While unemployment rises sharply during the episodes of
the 1970s, this trend reverses in the 1999-2000 episode where unemployment falls
in a response to an increase in the oil prices. Moreover, in the 2002-2005 episode
unemployment is declining while oil prices are still on the rise. Given that our sample
contains data after 1970 for the majority of the countries, it is normal to expect b1
to be slightly negative. They estimated that CPI ination and wage ination reach
their peak at Q.4 after the incidence of an oil episode. This implies that due to more
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exible labour markets and the fall in the real wage, employment starts to pick up
during Q.4 and unemployment starts to decline in the same time. In addition, they
show that this trend is more characteristic of the late 1990s oil shocks, especially for
countries like Japan, France and Germany.
In light of the above, our estimates on coe¢ cient b1 should not come as a surprise,
given that we use the one year lagged industry-weighted price of imported oil as our
exogenous instrument. Table 6 (Appendix B) summarizes the rst stage results of
our IV model, presented in Table 5 (Appendix B). Columns (1) to (6) in Table 6 are
the corresponding rst-stage regressions of the IV models presented in Columns (1)
through (6) in Table 5.
Our estimates on the impact of an oil price increase on unemployment are robust
under all specications. In all ve of them we nd the e¤ect to be negative and
statistically signicant at the 1% level. Furthermore, the F statistic on the excluded
instrument is above the value of 10, under all alternative specications. Since the
estimates on our rst stage regressions have an economic interpretation, and more-
over they are highly statistically signicant under all specications, we conclude that
the lag or real oil prices is a valid instrument. After conducting a series of tests, we
conclude that our instrument is neither weak (as evidence from the rst stage show)
nor invalid (as the Hausman test statistic suggests). In Table B.8, we reproduce
the results of Table 4 (Appendix B) under alternative specications using di¤erent
versions of our instrument and other estimators (GMM). Since all of them are qual-
itatively equivalent and are numerically close, we have decided to focus only on this
specication, since the instrument we use is the simplest possible one.
The reason for not employing more complex indexation in measuring oil price
shocks is that introducing more complicated techniques might compromise our data
and allow room for extra critique directed at our instruments. In a sense, if industrial
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intensity-weighted, real oil prices are not on their own a valid instrument for unem-
ployment, then, it would be hard to argue that more indexation would make this
relationship to be statistically signicant. Furthermore, what is more reassuring, is
the fact that our IV model is extremely robust in the use of alternative techniques in
measuring the oil price shocks. In Table 8 (Appendix B), we present the estimates of
our Model in Table 5 using an alternative instrument: the trend component of real
imported oil prices at renery.3 The main reason for using the trend component of
oil prices is the ability to capture the long-run evolution of oil prices based on global
demand and not the cyclical component of the price attributed to political events.
We present the estimates of this model on Column (5) on the restricted sample.
Since the coe¢ cient estimates are statistically signicant at the 1% level, negative
and almost equal in magnitude ( 1:7 compared to  1:8) we think that there is no
need to elaborate further on this technique.
In the remaining columns, we use the predicted residuals on oil price, after we
allow it follow an AR(2) process.4 Since there is extensive literature suggesting this
technique,. we estimate the following model:
Pi;t = i;0 + i;1Pi;t 1 + i;2Pi;t 2 + ui;t
so that the 2nd Stage becomes:
qi;t = b0 + b1u^i;t +X
0
i;t + ai + t + "i;t
and the 3rd Stage becomes:
Fi;t = 0 + 1  q^i;t +X 0i;t + ai + t + i;t,
3To de-trend the oil prices we use the Hoddrick-Prescott lter with smoothing parameter 6.25,
given that we have yearly observations.
4The choice of an AR(2) process was far from being arbitrary. Given that we observed systematic
and signicant auto-correlation on all the residuals until the second lag, we concluded that an AR(2)
process was the optimal way to get the most accurate estimations on the real oil price shocks.
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where u^i;t is the predicted residual of the above AR(2) process on Pi;t and all the
other controls remain the same as before.
Once more, we observe that our estimation results do not change dramatically
compared to our estimates in Tables B.4 and B.5. All the coe¢ cients on unemploy-
ment are highly statistically signicant and the estimated values are all negative and
quite close in magnitude, ranging from  1:5 to  1:8. Moreover, in all cases the F
statistic on the excluded instrument is larger than the desired critical value. As a
result, we have decided to include our estimates as a further robustness check, but we
think that more discussion about the AR(2) process is not warranted in this section.
B.3 The Just-IndentiedModel with the Quadratic
Term
As explained in the main text, in order to address the concerns of weak instruments,
an outcome of using two endogenous regressors and averaging the data at the elec-
tion term level, which necessitated the use of multiple instruments (oil price shock
lags), we have resorted to the following solution: reducing the number of endogenous
regressors to just one (we used the linear term) and estimating the simplest possible
model (the just-identied IV model, using our single best instrument). While this
completely resolved the problem of weak instruments (as Table 5 clearly demon-
strates) it generated another minor concern. How to estimate a non-monotonic
(convex) relationship between unemployment and fragmentation when using a single
regressor: the linear term of unemployment? We have explained in great detail in
the main text why this should not be a major concern.5 Nevertheless, in this sec-
5In fact, we have made the claim that estimating the just-identied IV model with the linear
term and a single instrument actually strengthens our point.
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tion we repeat our estimation of the just-identied IV model, this time using the
quadratic term of unemployment. Our goal is to show the existence of a convex rela-
tionship between unemployment and electoral fragmentation. Formally, we estimate
the following model:
(qi;t   Q^min)2 = b0 + b1  u^i;t 1 +X 0i;t + i + t + i;t
and
Fi;t = 0 + 1
\(qi;t   Q^min)2 +X 0i;t + i + t + "i;t
where Q^min is the argument that minimizes the second stage predicted equation
of the 2SLS model. Formally, we dene Q^min    ^
2SLS
1
2^
2SLS
2
, where ^
2SLS
1 and ^
2SLS
2 are
the predicted coe¢ cients of the estimated 2SLS second-stage equation (see Chapter
2, Section 2.2.5).6
The reason for including this modied quadratic term is the following: Given the
absence of a linear term from our model (to allow for the use of one instrument),
in order for our coe¢ cient estimate 1 on the quadratic term to be meaningful we
need to use the square of the term (qi;t   Q^min) which measures the deviations from
the critical value of unemployment Q^min.7 We expect 1 > 0. We present the results
of those estimates in Table 12 (Appendix B). In all specications the coe¢ cient
on the quadratic term is positive and statistically signicant at any conventional
level. Moreover, the F statistic of the excluded rst-stage IV is signicantly larger
than 10, well above the critical zone, in almost all specications (see also Table 8,
6Recall we have estimated the following second-stage equation: Fi;t = 0 +   Z^
0
i;t + X
0
i;t +
i + t + i;t where  = (
2SLS
1 ; 
2SLS
2 )
7In practice, by estimating square deviations of unemployment from Q^min we e¤ectivelly trans-
pose the symmetry axis of the second-stage equation from zero to Q^min. As a result, we can
generate observations on the negative quadrant of the x-axis and our estimate relationship becomes
meaningful.
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Appendix B). Finally, the coe¢ cient on institutional constraints is again positive
(1.7) and statistically signicant.8 Hence, we conclude that there is no need to
worry about weak instruments, since all the alternative estimation methods that
we have employed (LIML estimator, just-identied IV models with both the linear
and the squared terms) produced identical results that yield strong support to our
rst hypothesis (H1): the convex relationship between unemployment and electoral
fragmentation.
B.4 Characterization Result forMixed-strategy Equi-
libria
Proposition 8 characterizes our mixed-strategy equilibria for every  2 (0; 1
2
).
Proposition 8 For every q 2 (0; 1), every m 2 (0;M), every  2 (0; 1), and every
 2 (0; 1
2
), 9   <  such that the following vector (t) = (l (tl) = r(tr);L(tL) =
R(tR)) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium of the electoral game in mixed strate-
gies, where l and 

r are non-degenerate with support on [0;  ] and E[

l (tl)] =
E[r(tr)] =   <  , whereas 

L, 

R are the degenerate strategies with 

L() =
R() = 1.
Proof of Proposition 8. For  > ^ it su¢ ces to consider the degenerate mix-
strategies l (tl = 0) = 

r(tr = 0) = 1 and 

L(tL = ) = 

R(tR = ) = 1. Then, we
have Proposition 1.
For  < ^, note that by Lemma 2 L and R have a strictly dominant strategy
tL = t

R =  . Then, w.l.o.g. we can x t

L = t

R =  and restrict attention to the
reduced two-player game G = (Tp; Vp)p2fl;rg, where Tp = [0;  ]. Then, we have a
8With one noteable exception when we use averaged data, since aggregation eliminates much of
the variation.
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standard game with discontinuous payo¤s. Observe that for  < ^ the constraint
vr(t
0
r = )   vr(t00r)   is not always satised (see Fig. B.15.b). As a result,
undercutting is not always protable. That is, there exist values of  such that the
gain in implemented ideology () does not su¢ ce to o¤set the incurred loss in the
vote share. Hence, the game has no pure-strategy equilibria9.
Yet, there exist a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. First, note that
game G = (Tp; Vp)p2fl;rg is a symmetric in pure strategies, compact, Hausdor¤ game,
since Tp is a compact Hausdor¤ space. In order to show that game G possesses
a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium we need only show that its mixed
extension G is better-reply secure10 along the diagonal, since quasi-symmetry of G
follows from the symmetry of G (Corollary 1.3; Reny, 1999). Consider the mixed
extension of the game G = (p; Vp)p2fl;rg, where we extend each Vp to  = l  r
by dening
Vp(l; r) =
R 
0
R 
0
Vp(tl; tr):dldr for all (l; r) 2 .
Then, in turn, betterreply security of G implies two conditions: (i) reciprocal
upper semi-continuity and (ii) payo¤ security along the diagonal. For (i) we only
need to verify that the sum of the payo¤s of the two parties
P
p Vp(t) is u.s.c. in t on
T . Then, by Proposition 5.1 (Reny, 1999) Pp RT Vp(t):d is also u.s.c. in  on 
and the mixed extension game G is reciprocally u.s.c. The payo¤ function for party
r (and by symmetry l) is as follows:
9Clearly, tr = tl =  cannot be an equilibrium because a Bertrand-style induced competition
will eventually lead to tr = tl = 0. But this cannot be an equilibrium either because r (or l) can
go all the way and promise tr =  since the gain in vote share max hvl(t0l = )  vl(t00l = 0)i = ^
exceeds the loss in utility  that is now incurred by the fact that party L wins with certainty.
10We would like to thank Philip Reny for suggesting the use of better-reply security in prooving
the result.
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Vr(tr; tl) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 1
2
+ + vr(tr; tl), if tr < tl
 1
2
+ vr(tr; tl), if tr = tl
 1
2
  + vr(tr; tl), if tr > tl
Then, by continuity of vp(tp; t p) for all tp; t p and 8p 2 fl; rg, it is clear thatP
p Vp(t) =  1 +
P
p vp(t) is continuous in t on T . As a result, condition (i) is
trivially satised. For diagonal payo¤ security in mixed strategies we need to show
that:
8p;8" > 0;8 2 , 9 ^p 2 p s.t. Vp(^p; 0 p)  Vp()   ", 80 p in some open
neighborhood of  p.
Clearly, this is always true. To see this pick any prole  = (l; r) such that
l = r and consider party r playing strategy ^r that assigns larger probability to
tr = 0 such that ^r(tr = 0) > r(tr = 0). Then, for small perturbations of 0l, close
enough to l, the condition is always satised since there is at most a small loss in
expected vote share that can be o¤set by a positive change in the expected outcome.
As a result, since both conditions are satised we conclude that mixed extension game
G is better-reply secure. Hence, 8 < ^ the reduced game G possesses a symmetric
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
(t) = (l (tl) = 

r(tr);

L(tL) = 

R(tR)),
such that l and 

r have nite support on [0;  ] with E[

l (tl)] = E[

r(tr)] =
  <  , whereas L, 

R are the degenerate strategies with 

L() = 

R() = 1. This
completes the proof.
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B.5 Correlated Dimensions of Electoral Competi-
tion: The Non-Symmetric Case
So far in the model, we have assumed that partiespositions are xed over the ideol-
ogy dimension (left-right) whereas on the economic policy (redistribution) dimension
a strategic choice tp is made. Nevertheless, the two dimensions might be correlated.
It might be the case that political parties (or voters) have preferences over redistri-
bution that are part of their ideological identity. That is they are not elements of
strategic choice, rather they are also given. For example, it is commonly believed
that left and centre-left parties have higher preference for taxation and consequently,
for redistribution. Yet, as we will argue shortly, as long as partiesheterogeneous
preferences over redistribution are an intrinsic part of their identity and are invariant
our comparative static results will remain qualitatively unchanged despite the fact
that our equilibrium characterization will change.
To see this, consider that left parties have stronger preference for redistribution
than the right ones11. Then their strategic choice tp 2 [0;  ] can be viewed as the top-
up amount of redistribution promised (or not) in the heat of electoral competition in
order to score opportunistic electoral gains. As a result, unemployed voters might be
more inclined to vote for left parties while the opposite will be true for the employed
ones. If we were to incorporate this ideology-determined, and thus xed, desire of the
parties for redistribution to their identity it would have been equivalent to assuming
that the distributions of the employed and unemployed voters are not uniform in
the [0; 1] interval. Rather, the mass of unemployed voters in the [0; 1=2] is larger
than that in [1=2; 1], the opposite being true for the employed. Then, depending
11Assume that apart from the strategic choice tp 2 [0;  ] that each party is making prior to the
elections, there is a component L or R that measures partisan preferences over redistribution
(e.g. L > R) and depends on their ideological identity which is xed. As a result, this extra
component does not vary and we have tp 2 [p;  + p],  > 0.
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on the shape of the two distributions one of the two moderate parties would have
an advantage compared to the symmetric case. This will induce a non-symmetric
equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, this will not a¤ect the strategic behavior of
the parties. It will still be a strictly dominant strategy for both moderate parties to
promise more top-upredistribution in order to increase their vote shares (Lemmata
1 and 2). Similarly, the two extremist parties will face the same dilemma as before:
how many votes will they be willing to sacrice in order to strategically manipulate
the outcome by boosting the chances of electoral success of their sister-party? The
trade-o¤ faced will be the same in nature. Yet, this time it will not be symmetric.
As a result, just as we have shown for the case of  < ^, there will be no pure-strategy
equilibrium of the game. Rather, we will have a non-symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies which will involve the two moderate parties proposing top-uptax rate
 , while the two extremists will play a mixed strategy which in expectation will be
strictly less than  (although non-symmetric). As a result, our comparative statics
analysis, even in this non-symmetric case, could go through as before.
B.6 Robustness of Institutional Set-Up: Electoral
Rules and Coalitions
So far in the analysis we have assumed that the party that wins most votes imple-
ments its platform (social policy and redistribution). That is, we have implicitly
assumed simple plurality (or the FPTP rule) and as a result, we have implicitly
excluded the possibility of coalition government formation. We have only briey
mentioned that our equilibrium characterization and comparative statics results do
not depend on the institutional architecture (electoral rule and coalition govern-
ments) because the incentives for strategic behavior and the trade-o¤ between votes
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and policy outcomes that the extreme parties face is also present in this di¤erent
institutional set-up. In this section we address those issues directly by examining
what happens when we introduce the proportional rule which, in turn, allows for
coalition governments. Before presenting the result, we need to comment that we
restrict attention only on the equilibrium of Proposition 4. We shall not worry with
issues of uniqueness of equilibrium here since the aim is to demonstrate that the
equilibrium we have characterized in Proposition 1 can arise even if we vary the
institutional set-up. Then, our comparative statics predictions, derived from that
equilibrium, can still carry forward despite altering the electoral rule. To x ideas
further, we make some assumptions on the institutions and the process of coalition
formation.
Assumption 1 If no party wins the absolute majority (that is if vp < 1=2 for
all p 2 P) a coalition of parties C P is formed such that Pp2C vp  12 and the
policy implemented is the weighted average of their most preferred policies. That is,
!(C) 
P
p2C(vpp)P
p2C vp
, for p 2 fl; L;A; ag  [0; 1].
The rst assumption is straightforward and very common in the literature of
coalition formation.
Assumption 2 The formateur p^(the party with most votes such that vp^ > v p^)
will always have to participate and lead the coalition C.
Assumption 3 Let C be the set of all possible coalitions C that satisfy the above
conditions. Then the formateur will form the minimum winning coalition such that
C 2 C and the distance d(p^; !(C)) is minimized for !, p^ 2 [0; 1].
The last two assumptions are also fairly intuitive. As it is common in almost all
real life examples, the winner becomes the formateur and is responsible of forming a
coalition. Also since in our model parties care not only about winning or being part
of a coalition but they are also policy motivated, it is normal to assume that they
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care about the policy outcome that each potential coalition will implement. Hence,
the formateur will strictly prefer to form the coalition that minimizes the distance
between its ideal point and the policy of the coalition. This means that its most
likely coalition partners are its spatial neighbors (in the social policy dimension).
Lastly, note that we have implicitly assumed that the electoral rule is some form of
proportional representation system. Finally, we want to restrict attention to stable
coalitions (Troubounis and Xefteris 2012). Formally:
Denition 9 A coalition C 2 C is stable i¤ @ a coalition C 0 2 C, satisfying A.1-A.3
such that p =2 C but p 2 C 0 and d(p; !(C 0)) < d(p; !(C)).
This denition basically says that for a coalition to be stable a party which is left
out of the coalition cannot have a protable deviation such that it makes it protable
for the formateur to form a new coalition that includes the deviating party. After
providing this denition we can now state and prove the result.
Proposition 10 Let Assumptions 1-3 hold. Also let conditions of Proposition 1 hold
(that is  > ^). Then, the following vector t = (tl ; t

L; t

R; t

r) = (0;  ;  ; 0) constitutes
a Nash equilibrium of the electoral game and induces the following stable coalition
C = fL;Ag with policy outcome: !(v(t)) = 1=2 (median).
Proof. First note that the vector t can induce a coalition that satises Assumptions
1 to 3. Clearly, as we have shown in Proposition 1 the resulting vote share allocation
v(t) is such that the two centrist parties L and A share the same amount of votes
and tie in the rst place (vL = vA = 1=4 + =2 + 1=2[z(q; )]). Then the two parties
are both the formateurs and join a coalition between themselves. Clearly, their vote
share is more than 1/2 and hence, there is no need to include any other party (even if
including another party was not ruled out by assumption it would still make no sense
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for parties L and A to include an extremist since it would cause !(C) to deteriorate
for at least one of them). The outcome of such a balanced coalition is obviously to
implement the median policy (1/2).We need now show two things. First, that this
allocation is indeed a NE. Second, that the resulting coalition C is indeed stable.
First consider deviations by parties L and A (by symmetry we need only examine
L). Clearly, there is no protable deviation for L. Any t0L 6= tL will cause it to lose
votes and cease being a formateur (not a winner any longer). So it will either end
up in the same coalition with less inuence over the outcome, or even worse another
coalition will be formed excluding it. In both cases this implies strictly lower utility
(less votes and worse outcome in expected terms).
W.l.o.g. consider an extremist party (say l) and its incentives to deviate from
tl = 0. Any t
0
l > 0 will increase its vote share but it will deprive (as we have shown
in the proof of Proposition 1) party L from some votes. Also note that the allocation
of votes between parties A and a will remain unchanged. As a result, party A is
the sure winner (yet not with absolute majority) and becomes the unique formateur.
Clearly, the only coalition that satisfy Assumptions 2 and 3 is C 0 = fA; ag (recall
that we are assuming throughout  > ^). As a result, deviating from tl to t
0
l cannot
cause party l to enter a more favorable coalition. In fact, it gives rise to a strictly
worse one (expected policy outcome of new coalition is to the right of the median
and hence, further away from 0). To show that this deviation is not protable we
have to compare the maximum gain in utility from deviating (vote gain) with the
loss of inducing a strictly worse outcome. From Proposition 4 we have:
maxfvgainl (t0l = )g = 1=2[z(q; )]
Then, the deviation is not protable if and only if the following is satised:
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z(q; )=2 < d(pl = 0; !(C
0))  d(pl = 0; !(C)) ()
1=2[z(q; )] < d(pl = 0; !(C
0))  1=2|{z}
d(0;!(C))
()
z(q; )=2 < 3=4  z(q; )=2 + 2 + z(q; )| {z }
d(0;!(C0))
 1=2 () z(q; ) < 1=4+2+z(q; )
which is always satised for every  > ^ since z() is bounded away from 1=4
and ^  1=2fmax z()g > 0. Hence, the deviation is never protable. Hence, t is a
NE. Since the equilibrium induces a stable coalition (as we have argued no extremist
party can unilaterally induce a better coalition) this completes the proof.
Remarks
Two brief comment with respect to the equilibrium characterization of Proposition 10
are now in order. Firstly, we note that this equilibrium need not be unique. In fact,
non uniqueness is not a problem in the following sense: the purpose of this section is
to demonstrate that our desired equilibrium properties, that we later employ in our
comparative statics analysis, are robust to alterations of the institutional architecture
(from plurality to proportionality and coalitions). Since our purpose is to show
that our equilibrium characterization, where moderate parties always propose more
redistribution than the extreme ones, and the resulting comparative static analysis
do not depend on the choice of particular electoral institutions, it su¢ ces to show
that: i) an equilibrium with those characteristics exist under proportionality and ii)
that such an equilibrium is stable, in the sense of Denition 9. And that is exactly
what we have shown in Proposition 5. Issues related with the full characterization
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of the complete set of NE for every possible institutional arrangement (and coalition
formation process) are beyond the scope of our analysis. Hence, we defer them for
future work.
Secondly, the reason that those alterations in the institutional architecture do
not a¤ect equilibrium characterization is that main drivers of our result remain in-
tact: the trade-o¤ between getting more votes (o¢ ce motivation) and altering the
policy outcome (policy motivation) and the strategic behavior on the part of extreme
parties that this trade-o¤ induces. Much like in the standard case, extreme parties
would be again shooting themselves on the foot (by causing a disfavored change in
the policy outcome) if they over-compete with moderate parties on the economic
(redistribution) dimension. Hence, extreme parties, once more, act strategically in
order to manipulate the policy outcome and bring it closer to their ideal point (by
attempting to alter the winning coalition). In fact, in this case this strategic behavior
of extreme parties can have an extra justication: it is not only policy motivations
(to alter the policy outcome by causing a more favorable to them coalition to occur)
but also o¢ ce motivations (they can themselves participate in government via the
coalition) that drive their strategic behavior. Consequently, the trade-o¤ and our
point is strengthened further.
B.6.1 Other Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. Continuity and di¤erentiability of z() are derived straight-
forward from the assumed properties of f(). Then, for (i) consider the function
z(q; t^p) and dene:
mf()  f(m^+ t^p)  f(m^) and Mf()  f(M^)  f(M^   t^p).
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Then, z() takes the following form:
z() = qmf()  (1  q)Mf()
Taking a rst-order Taylor expansion we have:
mf()  f(m^+ t^p)  f(m^) = t^pf 0(m^) and Mf()  f(M^)  f(M^   t^p) =
t^pf
0(M^   t^p).
We need only show that for every concave f() the following is true:
qmf() > (1  q)Mf() () qt^pf 0(m^) > (1  q)t^pf 0(M^   t^p) =)
f 0(m^) > f 0(M^   t^p), since q = q(1  q)(M  m) = (1  q).
For any concave f() this implies: m^ < M^   t^p =)
m^z }| {
m+ (1  q)(M  m)| {z }

t p <
M^z }| {
M   q(M  m)| {z }

t p   q(M  m)| {z }

(tp   t p)| {z }
t^p
=)
(M  m)[(1  q)t p + qtp] < M  m =) (1  q)t p + qtp < 1
which is always true 8q; tp; t p 2 (0; 1). Hence, z() is always positive.
For (ii) we rst compute:
134
@z(; t^p)=@tp = qf 0(m^+ t^p)   (1  q)f 0(M^   t^p).12
Now, we need only show that @z(; t^p)=@tp > 0. But, observe that:
@z(; t^p)=@tp > 0 i¤ q
h
f 0(m^+ t^p)  f 0(M^   t^p)
i
> 0 ()
f 0(m^+ t^p) > f 0(M^   t^p) () m^+ t^p < M^   t^p ()
m+ t p| {z }
m^
+ (tp   t p)| {z }
t^p
< M   t p| {z }
M^
 (tp   t p)| {z }
t^p
() (+)tp < M  m ()
(M  m)tp < M  m which is always true for all tp 2 (0; 1). This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to show that the proposed equilibrium is
indeed a symmetric NE, we need to show that no party has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally from its equilibrium strategy, that is:
8p 2 P ; Vp(tp; t p) > Vp(t0p; t p); 8 t0p; t p.
First, we calculate the vote share vp(tp; t p) that each party receives as a function
of its strategy (tax rate proposal) tp, for every tp; t p 2 [0;  ]. To do so, we have to
identify the voter who is indi¤erent between voting for party a or A, A or L and L
or l respectively. Then, we can compute the vote share for each party. We begin by
identifying the indi¤erent voter between parties a and A13. Formally, the following
12Note that m^ and M^ do not depend on tp, whereas t^ is a linear function of tp.
13We need only examine the case where x 2 [; 12 ], since by single-peakedness and the fact that
in equilibrium party r o¤ers tr = 0, any voters to the left of  will never face the dillemma between
L and r for that matter.
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equality must hold for an unemployed voter (y = m):
Uy;x(1; tr) = Uy;x(1=2 + ; tA) =)  j1   xj + f(m + T (ta)) =  j1=2 +    xj +
f(m+ T (tA)) ()
 (1 x)+f(m+(1 q)(M m)ta) =  (x 1=2 )+f(m+(1 q)(M m)tA) ()
x = 3
4
+ 
2
+ 1
2
[f(m+ tA)  f(m+ ta)] = 34 + 2 + 12

f(m^+ t^A)  f(m^)

14
By analogy, for an employed voter (y = M) the condition becomes:
x = 3
4
+ 
2
  1
2
[f(M   ta)  f(M   tA)] = 34 + 2   12
h
f(M^)  f(M^   t^A)
i
Given that a fraction q of the electorate has y = m and the remaining 1  q has
y = M , and given that the two continua of voters are identical in all other respects,
we can then compute the aggregate indi¤erent voter:
x = 3
4
+ 
2
+ 1
2
n
q

f(m^+ t^A)  f(m^)
  (1  q) hf(M^)  f(M^   t^A)io = 34 +

2
+ 1
2
[z(q; t^A)]
Then, all voters to the right of x will vote for party a whereas all voters to the
left of x (and till voter ) will voter for party A. By a symmetric argument a similar
analysis applies when we compare the indi¤erent voter between parties L and l.
We now repeat the same exercise for parties A and L15. In a symmetric equilib-
14Here, w.l.o.g. let tp = tA and t p = ta.
15We focus on the voters on the interval [1=2  ; 1=2 + ] since the other voters are not relevant
for this comparison.
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rium by denition tL = tA. Hence, the following equality must hold:
Uy;x(tL) = Uy;x(tA) =)  j1=2  xj+f(y+T (tL)) =  j1=2+ xj+f(y+T (tA))
Since T (tL) = T (tA), we have that f(y + T (tL)) = f(y + T (tA)) for every y 2
fm;Mg.Hence, we conclude that the indi¤erent voter is the median (x = 1=2). Then,
we can compute the (symmetric) vote share allocation for each party as a function
of its strategy choice (by symmetry it su¢ ces to do so for parties A and a):
vA(tA) =
1
4
+ 
2
+ 1
2
n
q

f(m^+ t^A)  f(m^)
  (1  q) hf(M^)  f(M^   t^A)io =
= 1
4
+ 
2
+ 1
2
[z(q; t^A)] and by analogy
va(ta) =
1
4
  
2
+ 1
2
[z(q; t^a)] =
1
4
  
2
  1
2
[z(q; t^A)]
16
Then observe that: @vR
@tR
= 1
2
h
@z(;t^R)
@tR
i
and @vr
@tr
= 1
2
h
@z(;t^r)
@tr
i
Clearly, we have that @vp
@tp
> 0 i¤ @z(; t^p)=@tp > 0, which by Lemma 1 is always
true 8q;m and all tp 2 [0;  ] such that  2 (0; 1). Hence, the vote share vp for every
party p 2 P is strictly increasing in tp. Before proving the main result, we rst prove
a useful Lemma.
Lemma 11 For all  > 0 and every t A (and t L respectively), strategy tA = 
(and tL =  respectively) is strictly dominant for party R (and L respectively).
16Note that if we instead dene t^a  ta   tA we then have z(q; t^a) =  z(q; t^A) and Lemma 1
applies again.
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Proof of Lemma 11. The proof follows three steps. The rst step is to show
that vote shares are increasing in tax rates, that is @vp=@tp > 0 for p 2 fL;Ag.
This was already shown above. The second step is to show whenever a centrist party
(either L or A) chooses tL;A =  then the two extremists (l and a) can never win. To
prove this statement, w.l.o.g. x tA =  and compute the minimum vote share that
party A can get when choosing tA =  . Then we compare it against the maximum
vote share that party l can get for any tl. We will show that vminA (tA =  ; t A) >
vmaxl (tl; t l) for any t A and every tl; t l.
vminA (tA =  ; t A = ) =
1
4
+ 
2
17 and vmaxl (tl =  ; t l) <
1
4
+ 
2
18 =) vminA > vmaxl
A directly analogous argument can be constructed for parties L and a. As a
result, the two extremist parties can never win when tA;L =  . Hence, either party
A is the sure winner or party L, or they both win with probability 1=2. Step three
entails an exhaustive case by case analysis when either A or L choose tL;A <  . By
symmetry, we only work with party A. Let tA <  . Then, consider the following
cases.
Case 1 : Party A is the sure winner. Then, switching to tA =  results in an
increase in its utility (same outcome but more votes, since by Step 1 we have shown
that @vp=@tp > 0 for p 2 fL;Ag)
Case 2 : Party L is the sure winner. Then, switching to tA =  results in an
17Since all parties propose the same tax rate  , the economic dimension is cancelled out and only
the ideology dimension matters.
18The strict inequality follows from the following: consider the case that party L vanishes. Since
we have xed tA =  and vmaxl implies tl =  , the economic dimension is cancelled-out and parties
A and l will split the votes in the interval [0; 12 + ] (the indi¤erent voter is the equidistant voter
xind = 1=4 + =2). Hence, at most vmaxl = 1=4 + =2. But notice that even if L plays tL = 0 against
tR = tl =  , vL = 1=4 + =2   z(q; t^l = )=2   z(q; t^A = )=2 = 1=4 + =2   z(q; ). But we know
that z(q; )  1=4 (bounded above). Hence, vL  =2 6= 0. Thus, vmaxl < 1=4 + =2.
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increase in its utility (more votes by Step 1 and same or better outcome, since by
Step 2 the only possible outcomes are: either party A is the sure winner or party L,
or they both win with probability 1=2).
Case 3 : Parties A and L tie in rst place. Then, switching to tA =  results in
an increase in its utility (more votes by Step 1 and strictly better outcome, since
now by Step 2, A must be the sure winner).
Case 4 : An extremist party (either l or a) is the sure winner. Then, switching to
tA =  causes A to win with certainty (by Step 2 that is the only possible outcome
out of the three since for an extremist to win in the rst place we must have had
that both tL;A < ). Hence, this results in an increase in its utility (more votes by
Step 1 and strictly better outcome).
Case 5 : The two extremists (l and a) tie in rst place. This implies that party L
o¤ers a tL that is strictly less than tl. Then, switching to tA =  causes A to be the
sure winner (since by Step 2 that is the only possible outcome). Hence, this results
in more utility for party A (more votes by Step 1 and better outcome).
Case 6 : There is a tie between a centrist (L or A) and an extremist (l or a)
party. There are 4 sub-cases: i) fA; ag; ii) fA; lg; iii) fL; ag and iv) fL; lg. Then,
switching to tA =  results in an increase in its utility. In all sub-cases A gets more
votes by Step 1 and at the same time it wins by Step 2 (better outcome). To verify
this recall that for L to tie with l (or a) it implies that tL <  , hence switching to
tA =  causes A to win with certainty.
Case 7 : There is a tie among any three parties. If A is among the winners,
then, switching to tA =  results in more utility (more votes by Step 1 and better
outcome, sure winner by Step 2). If A is not among the winners, then tA =  results
in more utility (more votes and better outcome in expected terms) since it wins with
certainty (recall that by Step 2 a tie between L and one or more extremists implies
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that tL < ).
Case 8 : All four parties tie. Then, switching to tA =  causes A to win with
certainty (Step 1). So, it increases its utility (more votes and better outcome).
Hence, we conclude that strategy tA;L =  is strictly dominant for parties A and
L. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
Then, by Lemma 11 we can iteratively eliminate all other strategies for the two
moderate parties and conclude that in equilibrium it must be the case that both A
and L play tL = t

A =  . But then, the two extremist parties can never win in
equilibrium. As a result they face a constrained vote maximization program. Taking
tL = t

A =  as given, assume for a moment that since
@vp
@tp
> 0 they also choose
t0r = t
0
l =  . By Lemma 11, in equilibrium, parties L and A tie in rst place. Then,
any of the extremist parties (say a) has an incentive to undercut l (that is to propose
t00a < t
0
a = t
0
l = ) and cause party A to win with certainty i¤ :
|{z}
Gain from causing a shift in policy outcome
 va(t0a = )  vr(t00a < )| {z }
Loss of votes due to deviation from t0a to t00a
But given tA = t

L =  , we know that 8ta; t a the maximum loss in votes is equal
to the following expression:
maxfva(t0a = )  va(t00a = 0)g = 1=4  =2 
h
1=4  =2 + z(q;t^a)
2
i
=  1
2
z(q; t^a) =
1
2
z(q; t^A) =
1
2
z(q; )19,
But then, notice that we have dened ^  1
2
max
q;
fz(q; )g < 1
8
20, which in turn
19Recall that t^r = t00r   tR =   and t^R = tR   t00r =  . Hence, the last two equalities follow.
20By Lemma 1 we have shown that z() is a positive and continuous function. It can be checked
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implies that 9 ^ 2 (0; 1=2) such that for every  > ^ undercutting is always protable.
That is, the constraint is always satised with strict inequality. Formally, this means
that:
 > maxfva(t0a = )  va(t00a = 0)g = 12 maxq; fz(q; )g  ^
Since by symmetry, undercutting is always protable for party l as well, we
conclude that in equilibrium we must have ta = t

l = min ft j t 2 [0;  ]g = 0. Hence
we conclude that for every  > ^ the unique Nash equilibrium strategy prole is
t = (tl ; t

L; t

A; t

a) = (0;  ;  ; 0). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Recall that we have computed:
F (q; ) = 1  2C   z(q; ) [z(q; ) + 2].
Then, we compute:
@F (q;:)
@q
= @F
@z(:)
@z(:)
@q
=  2[z(q; ) + ]@z(:)
@q
We have shown (Lemma 3) that z(q; ) is a positive, continuous and di¤erentiable
function in [0; 1]. Next, we need to show that z(q; ) is also strictly concave in (0; 1)
w.r.t. q. That is, @
2z(q;:)
@q2
< 0 for all q and 8m;  2 (0; 1). Note that in the case of
Proposition 1, we have t^p = tL tl = tR tr =  . Then, with some abuse of notation,
we can rewrite (q) and (q) as functions of q and z() becomes:
that the expression z(q; )  q[f(m+) f(m)] (1 q)[f(M) f(M )] obtains its maximum
when q = 34 , m = 0 and  = 1. Hence, it is bounded above away from 1=4.
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z(q; ) = q[f(m+ (q))  f(m)]  (1  q)[f(M)  f(M   (q))].
First note that m+ (q) < M   (q) =)
m+ (1  q)(M  m) < M   q(M  m) =) (M  m) < M  m
which is true for all  2 (0; 1). Then, we compute:
@2z(q;:)
@q2
= 2
h
f 0(m+ (q))

@(q)
@q


+ f 0(M   (q))

@(q)
@q

i
+
q

f 00(m+ (q))

@(q)
@q

2
+ (1  q)

f 00(M   (q))

@(q)
@q
2
.
Observe that @(q)
@q
=  @(q)
@q
. Hence,

@(q)
@q
2
=

@(q)
@q
2
. So we can write the
above expression as follows:
@2z(q;:)
@q2
= 2

@(q)
@q


[f 0(M   (q))  f 0(m+ (q))]+

@(q)
@q

2
[qf 00(m+ (q)) + (1  q)f 00(M   (q))]
We need to show that @
2z(q;:)
@q2
< 0 for all f(:) and 8q;m;  2 (0; 1). Since f 00(:) < 0
we have that:

@(q)
@q
2
[qf 00(m+ (q)) + (1  q)f 00(M   (q))] < 0.
Then, @
2z(q;:)
@q2
< 0 i¤ f 0(M   (q))  f 0(m+ (q)) < 0 ()
f 0(M   (q)) < f 0(m+ (q)) () M   (q) > m+ (q)
which is always true. Hence, z(q; ) is concave w.r.t. q.
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Since also  > 0, we have that  2[z(q; :) + ] < 0 for all q 2 (0; 1) and 8
m;  2 (0; 1). Then, we need only show that:
@z(:)
@q
> 0 for all q 2 (0; ~q) and 8 m;  2 (0; 1), whereas @z(:)
@q
< 0 for all q 2 (~q; 1)
and 8 m;  2 (0; 1).
Since z(q; :) is continuous on [0; 1] and strictly concave and di¤erentiable on (0; 1)
we can apply Rolles version of the Mean Value Theorem. Observe that: z(q = 0) = 0
and z(q = 1) = 0. Then, by Rolles Theorem we have that:
9 ~q 2 (0; 1) such that z0(~q; :) = 0
But notice that z0(~q; :) = 0 also implies that F 0(~q; :) = 0. Moreover, by strict
concavity of z(q; :), we also have that ~q is unique. Hence, we have that @z(:)
@q
> 0 and
consequently @F (q;:)
@q
< 0 for all q 2 (0; ~q), and @z(:)
@q
< 0 and consequently @F (q;:)
@q
> 0
for all q 2 (~q; 1). That is, F (q; :) is strictly decreasing for every q < ~q and strictly
increasing for every q > ~q. This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 6. Recall that we have computed:
@F (q;:)
@q
= @F
@z(:)
@z(:)
@q
=  2[z(q; ) + ]@z(:)
@q
But then, observe that:
@z(:)
@q
= f(m+ (q))  f(m) + qf 0(m+ (q))

@(q)
@q


+ f(M)  f(M   (q)) 
(1  q)f 0(M   (q))

@(q)
@q


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By a First-Order Taylor expansion we get:
@z(:)
@q
= (q)f 0(m)+qf 0(m+(q))

@(q)
@q


+(q)f 0(M (q)) (1 q)f 0(M 
(q))

@(q)
@q


or21
@z(:)
@q
= (q)f 0(m)   (q)f 0(m + (q)) + (q)f 0(M   (q))   (q)f 0(M  
(q)) =
= (q) [f 0(m)  f 0(M   (q))]  (q) [f 0(m+ (q))  f 0(M   (q))]
Further note that z0(~q)= 0 in turn implies that:
(~q)[f 0(m)  f 0(M   (~q))] = (~q)[f 0(m+ (~q))  f 0(M   (~q))]
But since m < m+ (q) < M   (q) for all q;m;  2 (0; 1) we have that:
f 0(m)  f 0(M   (~q)) > f 0(m+ (~q))  f 0(M   (~q)) > 0.
As a result: (~q)
(~q)
= 1 ~q
~q
= f
0(m+(~q)) f 0(M (~q))
f 0(m) f 0(M (~q))  1.
Express the root ~q that solves z0(~q; :) = 0 as a function of m and  , ~q(m; ) such
that z0(~q(m; )) = 0. Then, observe that the above expression implies that ~q  1
2
.
As m increases, observe that the ratio converges monotonically to 1. That is
lim
m!M
f 0(m+(~q)) f 0(M (~q))
f 0(m) f 0(M (~q)) = 1.
21Observe that  (q) = q @(q)@q and (q) = (1  q)@(q)@q
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Hence, ~q(m; ) ! 1
2
. As a result we have that @~q(m;)
@m
< 0. Furthermore, as 
converges to 1 the numerator f 0(m+(~q)) f 0(M (~q)) monotonically converges
to 0 and as a result so does the ratio. Hence, this implies that ~q(m; )! 1. That is,
we have @~q(m;)
@
> 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. We have to show that @F ( ;:)
@
< 0. First, compute:
@F
@
= @F
@z(:)
@z(:)
@
=  2[z(q; ) + ]@z(:)
@
.
Since we know that  2[z(q; ) + ] < 0 and by Lemma 1 we have shown that
@z(; t^p)=@tp > 0, which implies @z(; )=@ > 022 we conclude that @F ( ;:)@ < 0 for all
 2 (0; 1) and every q;m 2 (0; 1). This completes both parts of the proof.
22Recall that in equilibrium of Proposition 1 we had that t^p = tp   t p =  and tp =  for
p 2 fL;Rg.
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B.7 Graphs and Figures
Fig. B.1: Electoral Fragmentation (Rae Index in %) and Unemployment
Rates (%) in OECD Economies from 1960-2007 (national averages)
Fig. B.2: Electoral Fragmentation and Unemployment in OECD (1960-2007).
Testing the linear hypothesis
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Fig. B.3.a: Institutional Constraints (e.g. scal, constitutional, political)
and Electoral Fragmentation in OECD (1970-2007)
Fig. B.3.b: Political Independence of Central Banks and Electoral Frag-
-mentation in OECD (1970-2002)
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Fig. B.4: Oil Price Shocks and Unemployment in the OECD (1960-2007): 1st-stage relationship (visual IV)
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Fig.4.a: USA Fig.4.b: United Kingdom
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Fig. 4.c: Switzerland Fig. 4.d: Sweden
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Fig. 4.e: Spain Fig. 4.f: Portugal
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Fig. 4.g: Norway Fig. 4.h: New Zealand
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Fig. 4.i: Netherlands Fig. 4.j: Luxemburg
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Fig. 4.k: Japan Fig. 4.l: Italy
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Fig. 4.m: Ireland Fig. 4.n: Iceland
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Fig. 4.o: Greece Fig. 4.p: Germany
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Fig. 4.q: France Fig. 4.r: Finland
0
1
2
3
4
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Log Real Oil Prices Unemployment (%)
1
2
3
4
5
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Log Real Oil Prices Unemployment (%)
Fig. 4.s: Denmark Fig. 4.t: Canada
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Fig. 4.u: Belgium Fig. 4.v: Austria
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Fig. 4.w: Australia
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Fig. B.5a: Electoral Fragmentation for calibrated values of m and  (OECD averages)
Fig. B.5b: Electoral Fragmentation for m = 0 and  = 1.
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Fig. B.6a: Tolerancelevels of Unemployment ~q(m; ), as a function of m;  2 [0; 1]:
Fig. B.6b: Graphical Representation of Propositions 3 and 4152
Fig. B.7.a: Net gain in votes for a party proposing high tax-rate as a function of q and 
Fig. B.7.b: Net gain in votes for a party proposing high tax-rate as a function of q and m
153
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
De
ns
ity
0 5 10 15 20 25
Unemployment (%)
Fig. B.8: Kernel (red) and Normal (blue) simulated distributions of unemployment rates
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Fig. B.9: Ideological Convergence of Moderate Parties in OECD Countries overtime (1960-2007)
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Fig. B.10: The Di¤erential Impact of the Shock on Regions with High Public Sector
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Fig. B.11: The Identical Trend of Electoral Fragmentation among National and Local Elections
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Fig. B.12.a: National Elections: Pre-shock Trend of Electoral
Fragmentation across High and Low Public Sector Regions
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Fig. B.12.b: Local Elections: Pre-shock Trend of Electoral
Fragmentation across High and Low Public Sector Regions
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Fig. B.13.a: Pre-shock Trend of Electoral Fragmentation in Local &
National Elections within High Public Sector Regions (NUTS-3)
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Fig. B.13.b: Pre-shock Trend of Electoral Fragmentation in Local &
National Elections within Low Public Sector Regions (NUTS-3)157
Fig. B.14: Utility VR of a moderate party R, as a function of q 2 (0; 1) for each of the two
possible strategies: equilibrium strategy (tR = ) resulting in payo¤ VR(t
) and from a
deviation to t0R = 0, where t
0
 R = t

 R for every other party, resulting in payo¤ VR(t
0)
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Fig. B.15.a: Utility Vr(tr; t r) for extremist party r as a function of its tax-rate choice  , given
equilibrium play by other parties (the discontinuity is due to a change in outcome)
Fig. B.15.b: Utility Vr(tr; t r) for extremist party r as a function of its tax-rate choice  , given
equilibrium play by other parties when the change in outcome  is smaller than ^
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B.8 Tables of Results
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Table 1: OLS Estimates of the Basic Model Under Various Econometric Specications
Dependent Variable Basic Model Year E¤ects All Countries Exclude US
Electoral Fragmentation (0-100) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unemployment Rate (%) - (1) -.- -.- -.985 -.568 -.648
(0.336) (0.269) (0.278)
Unemployment-squared (2) -.- -.- 0.027 0.02 0.018
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
Inst. ConstraintsUnemployment -.- -.- 0.214 0.098 0.136
(0.061) (0.06) (0.062)
Institutional Constraints (3) 1.822 1.122 -.184 -.131 -.433
(0.709) (0.67) (0.961) (0.828) (0.91)
First-Past-the-Post ER (Dummy) -8.067 -16.485 -11.988 5.022 2.133
(3.209) (3.859) (3.446) (1.893) (2.170)
Number of Parties -.- -.- -.- 1.748 1.759
(0.295) (0.28)
Incumbent Govt. Defeated -1.978 -1.828 -1.919 -1.084 -1.142
(0.88) (1.124) (1.005) (0.854) (0.886)
Other Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 210 210 217 217 194
R2 0.899 0.944 0.941 0.958 0.922
Note: Robust Standard Errors, clustered at the Country level reported in parentheses. (***) p < 0.01; (**) p < 0.05; (*)
p < 0.10. Variable institutional constraints (instcons) is the Index of institutional constraints of central state government
according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6; Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful
constraints, low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room available to central state government. Description: additive
index composed of 6 dummy-variables (1= constraints, 0=else) (1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state
structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions (very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central
bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt (1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data.
Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973,
Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Incumbent Government Defeated Dummy takes the value of 1 if the incumbent
lost the elections. Other controls include: GDP growth rate, Debt/GDP ratio, voter turnout, coalition government dummy,
number of parties etc. Sample size varies (e.g. in Columns 1 and 2 we have less observations due to missing data on some of
the control variables for the period from 1960-1970). Furthermore, in Column 5 we exclude the US from the sample because
it has a Presidential system (and only two parties).
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Table 2: Comparison of 2SLS with OLS estimates of the baseline model on the restricted sample (excluding oil
producers and USA)
All Countries Excluding US and Oil Producers (e.g. Norway)
Dependent Variable Rae Index of Electoral Fragmentation (range from 0-100) Top-2
2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unemployment (in %) -2.977 -.568 -3.073 -.648 -3.188 -2.120 8.266
(1.345) (0.269) (1.167) (0.278) (1.130) (0.993) (2.451)
Unemployment ^2 0.169 0.02 0.167 0.018 0.178 0.096 -.617
(0.093) (0.009) (0.082) (0.009) (0.078) (0.091) (0.227)
Institutional Constraints 2.197 -.131 1.801 -.433 1.836 2.425 -.735
(0.945) (0.828) (0.97) (0.91) (0.961) (3.590) (2.669)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Instruments 3 N/A 3 N/A 3 2 3
Industry Weights? Yes N/A Yes N/A No No Yes
Obs. 202 217 180 194 180 184 174
R2 0.917 0.958 0.849 0.922 0.836 0.902 0.56
J-test score (2) 0.82 N/A 0.44 N/A 0.62 N/A 0.003
(p-value) 0.36 -.- 0.51 -.- 0.43 -.- 0.95
F statistic (1st-stage) 8.1 N/A 7.4 N/A 7.0 4.9 5.6
Note: (***) p < 0.01; (**) p < 0.05; (*) p < 0.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level reported in
parentheses. Corrected standard errors reported in columns 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7 (2SLS models) by estimating the models using the
"ivregress" routine in Stata. Instrumental Variable: Lags of oil price shocks. Oil price-shocks were estimated by predicting
the residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery. In columns 1, 3 and 7 predicted oil price shocks
were weighted by the constructed index of industrial intensity (using OECD data on industrial production and employment).
In columns 5 and 6 no weights are used. In columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 the model is overidentied (2 endogenous regressors and 3
instruments) whereas, in column 6 the model is just-identied (2 instruments for 2 endogenous regressors). In column 7 we
re-estimate the model presented in column 3 by replacing the dependent variable (electoral fragmentation index) with the sum
of vote shares of the two dominant parties (indicated as Top-2). In all other columns the dependent variable is the standard
index of electoral fragmentation (as dened in the main text). Whenever applicable (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7) the Sargan
statistic of a Hansen/J-test on overidentifying restrictions is reported. Variable "Institutional constraints" is the Index of
institutional constraints of central state government according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6;
Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints, low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room
available to central state government. Description: additive index composed of 6 dummy-variables (1= constraints, 0=else)
(1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions
(very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt
(1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data. Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123).
Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973, Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Other controls include:
rst-past-the-post electoral rule dummy, incumbent government defeated dummy, number of parties, Debt/GDP ratio, GDP
growth rate and government revenues (income tax receipts) as percent of GDP. Incumbent Govt Defeated Dummy takes the
value of 1 if the incumbent has lost the elections.
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Table 3: Estimates of the overidentied 2SLS model on the restricted sample of countries (dropped USA and oil
producers) using data averaged at the election term level under alternative model and instrument specications
Dependent Variable Rae Index of Electoral (Party-system) Fragmentation (range 0-100) Top-2
Basic Model Data Averaged at Election Term Level (3-year. averages)
2SLS(LDV) 2SLS LDV 2SLS LDV 2SLS 2SLS
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Unemployment Rate (in %) -3.312 -3.272 -3.248 -3.319 -3.224 -2.233 6.207
(Electoral Term Average) (0.965)
 (1.013) (1.153) (1.165) (1.330) (0.674) (2.206)
Unemployment ^2 0.195 0.215 0.238 0.23 0.253 0.100 -.555
(Electoral Term Average) (0.062)
 (0.082) (0.078) (0.093) (0.087) (0.059) (0.148)
Institutional Constraints 1.924 0.377 0.118 0.237 -.116 1.266 4.075
(1.000) (1.130) (1.065) (1.187) (1.140) (2.770) (3.150)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Instruments 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Industry weights? Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
Obs. 179 180 179 180 179 180 174
R2 0.81 0.78 0.72 0.75 0.67 0.90 0.62
J-test score (2) 0.348 0.265 0.16 0.408 0.276 0.26 0.04
(p-value) 0.56 0.61 0.69 0.52 0.60 0.60 0.85
F statistic (1st- Stage) 6.9 3.4 3.1 2.5 2.4 3.3 3.7
Note: (***) p < 0.01; (**) p < 0.05; (*) p < 0.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level reported in
parentheses. Corrected standard errors reported in columns 1 through 7 (2SLS models) by estimating the models using the
"ivregress" routine in Stata. In columns 1, 3 and 5 a lagged dependent variable (LDV) was introduced into the model.
Column 1 reports the estimates of the 2SLS model presented in column 3 of Table 2 with the addition of a lagged dependent
variable (data not aggregated per electoral term). Columns 3 and 5 reproduce the estimates of Columns 2 and 4 using a
Lagged Dependent Variable Model. In columns 2 through 7, all data were aggregated at the election term level (electoral term
averages). In column 7 we re-estimate the model of column 2 by replacing the dependent variable (electoral fragmentation
index) with the sum of vote shares of the two dominant parties (indicated as Top-2). In all other columns the dependent
variable is the standard index of electoral fragmentation (as dened in the main text). Instrumental Variables: With the
exception of column 6, in all other columns lags of oil price-shocks are used. Oil price shocks were estimated by predicting
the residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery. In column 6, simple lags of real imported oil prices
were employed. In columns 1-3 and 7 predicted oil price shocks were weighted by the index of industrial intensity constructed
using OECD data. In columns 4 through 6 no weights are used. We use 3 lags in all specications (overidentied model with
3 instruments) due to the use of averaged data at the election term level (in most cases 3 year averages). The Sargan statistic
of a J-test on overidentifying restrictions (3 IVs and 2 endogenous regressors) is reported. Variable instcons is the Index
of institutional constraints of central state government according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6;
Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints, low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room
available to central state government. Description: additive index composed of 6 dummy-variables (1= constraints, 0=else)
(1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions
(very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt
(1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data. Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123).
Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973, Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Other controls include:
rst-past-the-post electoral rule dummy, number of parties, incumbent government defeated dummy, Debt/GDP ratio, GDP
growth rate and government revenues (income tax receipts) as percent of GDP. Incumbent Govt Defeated Dummy takes the
value of 1 if the incumbent has lost the elections.
163
Table 4: Comparison of 2SLS and LIML estimates of the e¤ect of unemployment (key explanotory variable) on
fragmentation (and the vote shares of dominant parties) in the overidentied models (1 endogenous regressor and
multiple lags/ IVs) under various alternative combinations of IV specications and control variables
Dependent Variable Rae Index of Electoral Fragmentation (range 0-100) Top-2 PartiesVote Shares
Baseline Model Alternative IV (No Weights) Baseline Model
Unemployment Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS -1.231 -.812 -.854 -.933 -1.042 4.912 4.064 2.173
(0.528) (0.4) (0.371) (0.469) (0.504) (2.471) (1.755) (0.915)
R2 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.886 0.74 0.79 0.87
J-test score (2) 0.19 0.68 3.46 1.12 3.31 0.04 0.02 2.87
(p-value) 0.66 0.41 0.18 0.29 0.19 0.83 0.90 0.24
LIML -1.248 -.853 -1.205 -1.057 -1.803 4.965 4.072 3.454
(0.535) (0.4) (0.594) (0.541) (1.149) (2.507) (1.759) (1.938)
R2 0.87 0.91 0.87 0.895 0.81 0.735 0.79 0.82
J-test score (Rubin 2) 0.12 0.67 1.56 1.08 4.24 0.04 0.02 4.07
(p-value) 0.73 0.41 0.22 0.30 0.12 0.83 0.90 0.13
Weights Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Num. of excluded IVs 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3
LDV? No Yes No Yes No N/A N/A N/A
Other Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F statistic (1st-Stage) 4.52 4.24 3.54 2.80 2.10 1.77 2.46 3.14
Obs. 182 183 180 183 182 174 174 174
Note: (***) p < 0.01; (**) p < 0.05; (*) p < 0.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Country level reported in
parentheses. Corrected standard errors reported in all columns (2SLS and LIML models) by estimating the models using the
"ivregress" routine in Stata. Columns 1 through 3 present the 2SLS and LIML estimates of the baseline model. Columns
4 and 5 replicate the estimates of Columns 2 and 3 using alternative instruments. Columns 6-8 reproduce the estimates of
the same (LIML or 2SLS) model as in columns 1,3 and 5 repsectively,by replacing our main dependent variable (electoral
fragmentation) with the sum of vote shares or the two (top) dominant parties. In columns 2 and 4 we add a lagged dependent
variable to the models. In all columns data are averaged at the election term level. We use at least 2 instruments (lags of oil
price shocks) and all models are overidntied (one endogenous regressor and at least two instruments). For the 2SLS models
we report the Sargan statistic of a J-test on overidentifying restrictions. For the LIML models we report the Anderson-Rubin
statistic. In all columns the rst-stage F-score on the excluded IVs is reported. Instrumental Variables: In all columns, lags
of oil price-shocks are used. Oil price shocks were estimated by predicting the residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported
oil prices at renery. In columns 1-3 and 7-8 predicted oil price shocks were weighted by the index of industrial intensity
(constructed from OECD data). In columns 4-6 no weights are used. Variable "Institutional constraints" is the index of
institutional constraints of central state government according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6;
Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints, low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room
available to central state government. Description: additive index composed of 6 dummy-variables (1= constraints, 0=else)
(1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions
(very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt
(1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data. Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123).
Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973, Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Other controls include:
rst-past-the-post electoral rule dummy, number of parties, incumbent government defeated, debt/GDP ratio, GDP growth
rate and government revenues (income tax receipts) as % of GDP. Incumbent Govt Defeated Dummy takes the value of 1 if
the incumbent has lost the elections.
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Table 5: Estimation results of the just-identied IV model (with one endogenous regressor) on the restricted sample
of countries (dropped USA and oil producers) under various alternative econometric specications
Dependent Variable Electoral (Party-System) Fragmentation (Rae Index from 0-100) Top-2 Vote Shares
Model Specication Baseline IV Model No Weights Alternative IV Baseline IV Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unemployment Rate (%) -1.089 -.800 -1.270 -.965 -1.223 -.794 2.854 2.239
(0.448) (0.382) (0.545) (0.466) (0.478) (0.363) (1.330) (1.357)
Institutional Constraints 1.119 0.916 1.262 1.059 1.225 0.911 -.522 0.383
(0.923) (0.77) (1.045) (0.893) (0.997) (0.777) (2.205) (1.958)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument Oil Price Shocks (predicted AR(2) residuals) Real Oil Prices Oil Price Shocks
Industry-related weights? Yes Yes No No No No Yes No
Number of Instruments 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
LDV? No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Obs. 183 182 183 182 183 182 183 175
R2 0.874 0.909 0.856 0.897 0.861 0.909 0.845 0.849
F statistic (1st-Stage) 14.45 11.11 18.84 13.92 18.15 12.77 9.82 23.51
Note: (***) p < 0.01; (**) p < 0.05; (*) p < 0.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level reported in
parentheses. Corrected standard errors reported in all columns, since the models were estimated using the "ivregress" routine
in Stata. Columns 2, 4 and 6 reproduce the estimates of the same IV model, as in columns 1, 3 and 5 repsectively, with the
addition of a lagged dependent variable (LDV). Columns 7 and 8 reproduce the estimates of models in columns 1 and 3 by
replacing the standard dependent variable (electoral fragmentation index) with the sum of vote shares of the two dominant
(top-2) parties. In all columns the model is just-identied. In all columns the F-statistic of the rst-stage on the excluded
IV is reported. IVs: In all columns, but columns 5 and 6 lags of oil price-shocks are used. Oil price shocks were estimated
by predicting the residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery. In columns 5 and 6 ordinary lags
of real imported oil prices were employed. In columns 1, 2 and 7 predicted oil price shocks were weighted by the index of
industrial intensity, constructed using OECD data. In columns 3-6 and 8 no weights are used. We use only 1 lag (instrument)
in all specications (just-identied models). Variable "Institutional constraints" is the index of institutional constraints of
central state government according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6; Range of data from 0 to
5, high values indicate powerful constraints, low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room available to central state
government. Description: additive index composed of 6 dummy-variables (1= constraints, 0=else) (1) EU membership=1,
(2) degree of centralisation of state structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions (very di¢ cult=1) (4)
strong bicameralism =1 (5) central bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt (1996: 172) transformed
into time variant annual data. Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period covered: 1960-
2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973, Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Other controls include: rst-past-the-post
electoral rule dummy, number of parties, incumbent government defeated dummy, debt/GDP ratio, GDP growth rate and the
share of government revenues (income tax receipts) as % of GDP. Incumbent Govt Defeated Dummy takes the value of 1 if
the incumbent has lost the elections.
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Table 6: First-stage OLS estimates of the overidentied 2SLS (Tables B.2 and B.3) and the just-indentied IV model
(Table B.5) on the restricted sample of countries (excluding oil producers and the US) under various alternative IV
specications.
Dependent Variable: OLS Regressions of the Excluded IV (Oil Prices & Oil Price Shocks) on Unemployment
Unemployment Rate(%) Electoral Term Avg. At Election Year (Not Averaged over the whole Electoral Term)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IV Specication
L. Oil Price shocks -.029 -.034 -.011 -.011 -.- -.- -.- -.-
Weighted AR(2) res. (0.014)
 (0.015) (0.003) (0.003)
L. Oil Price shocks -.- -.025 -.- -.- -.010 -.010 -.- -.-
Unweighted AR(2) res. (0.013)
 (0.002) (0.003)
L. Real Oil Prices -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.009 -.010
(at renery) (0.002)
 (0.003)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Weights? Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Number of Lags 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Obs. 180 180 180 183 182 183 182 183 182
R2 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
F  statistic 3.42 2.46 7.40 14.45 11.11 18.84 13.92 18.15 12.77
Note: Robust standard errors, corrected and clustered at the country level reported in parentheses. (***) p < 0.001; (**) p
< 0.01; (*) p < 0.05. Columns 1 and 2 are the rst-stages of overidentied 2SLS model with averaged data at the electoral
term lelvel (columns 2 and 4 in Table 3). Column 3 is the rst-stage of the baseline model (2SLS) presented in column 3,
Table 2. Columns 4 to 9 present the estimates of the rst-stage OLS regressions of the just-identied IV models presented
in Columns 1-6 (Table 5) respectively. F-statistics on the excluded IVs reported in all columns. Instrumental Variables:
In all columns, but columns 8 and 9, lags of oil price-shocks are used. Oil price shocks were estimated by predicting the
residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery. In columns 8 and 9 ordinary lags of real imported oil
prices were employed. In columns 1, 3, 4 and 5 predicted oil price shocks were weighted by the index of industrial intensity
(constructed using OECD data on industrial employment and activity). In column 2 and columns 6-9 no weights are used.
In columns 1-3 we use multiple instruments (lags) as the models are overidentied (and the data are averaged at the election
term level). In the remaining columns (4-9) we use only 1 lag (instrtument) since the models are just-identied (models
presented in columns 1-6 of Table 5) and as a consequence, unemployment rate is measured at election year (not averaged
over the whole electoral term, since this would require the usage of more than one lag). Other controls include: rst-past-
the-post electoral rule dummy, number of parties, degree of institutional constraints, incumbent government defeated dummy,
Debt/GDP ratio, GDP growth rate, government revenues (income tax receipts) as percent of GDP and coalition government
dummy. Variable "Institutional constraints" is the index of institutional constraints of central state government according to
Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6; Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints,
low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room available to central state government. Description: additive index
composed of 6 dummy-variables (1 = constraints, 0=else) (1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state
structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions (very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central
bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt (1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data.
Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973,
Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Incumbent Government Defeated Dummy takes the value of 1 if the incumbent has
lost the elections.
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Table 7: Reduced form OLS estimates on the e¤ect of oil price shocks (Instrumental Variable) on electoral frag-
mentation and the re-election probability of the incumbent (overidentied 2SLS and just-identied IV models on the
restricted sample of countries, excluding oil producers and the US)
Dependent Variable Electoral Fragmentation (Rae Index 0-100) Incumbent Lost Elections
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L. Oil Price shocks 0.030 0.012 -.- -.- 0.0004 -.- -.-
(Weighted AR(2) residuals) (0.0128)
 (0.007) (0.0005)
L. Oil Price shocks -.- -.- 0.012 -.- -.- 0.0005 -.-
(Unweighted AR(2) residuals) (0.0069)
 (0.0005)
L. Real Imported Oil Prices -.- -.- -.- 0.012 -.- -.- 0.0004
(at renery) (0.0051)
 (0.0005)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial Intensity Weights? Yes Yes No No Yes No No
Lags 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Obs. 180 183 183 183 183 183 183
R2 0.93 0.93 0.925 0.925 0.57 0.57 0.57
F statistic
Note: Robust standard errors, corrected and clustered at the country level reported in parantheses. (***) p < 0.01; (**) p <
0.05; (*) p < 0.10. Incumbent Lost Elections is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the incumbent was defeated by
the challenger in recent elections. Instrumental Variables: In columns 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 lags of oil price-shocks are employed.
Oil price shocks were estimated by predicting the residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery. In
columns 4 and 7 ordinary lags of real imported oil prices were employed. In columns 1, 2 and 5 predicted oil price shocks were
weighted by the index of industrial intensity (constructed using OECD data). In the remaining columns no weights are used.
In column 1 we estimate the reduced form of the overidentied 2SLS model (with two endogenous regressors and three IVs,
where data are averaged at the electoral term level) presented in Table 3, column 2. In columns 2 to 4 we estimate the reduced
form of the just-identied IV model (columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 5, respectively). As a result, we use 3 instruments (lags) in
column 1, but only 1 lag (instrument) in all remaining specications. Other controls include: rst-past-the-post electoral rule
dummy, number of parties, degree of institutional constraints, incumbent government defeated dummy (apart from columns
5 to 7 where it is the dependent variable), debt/GDP ratio, GDP growth rate, government revenues (income tax receipts)
as a percent of GDP and a coalition government dummy. Variable "Institutional constraints" is the Index of institutional
constraints of central state government according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6; Range of data
from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints, low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room available to
central state government. Description: additive index composed of 6 dummy-variables (1= constraints, 0=else) (1) EU
membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions (very
di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt (1996:
172) transformed into time variant annual data. Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period
covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973, Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977.
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Table 8: Replication of Estimates of Reduced IV Model under Alternative Instrument and Estimators on the Re-
stricted Sample (excluding US and Oil Producing Countries).
Dependent Variable Restricted Sample (Excluding US and Oil Producers)
Electoral Fragmentation (%) IV IV IV LDV IV IV
Rae Index (0-100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment Rate (%) -1.87 -2.17 -2.01 -1.47 -2.05 -2.00
(0.4637) (0.543) (0.509) (0.422) (0.501) (0.48)
Incumbent Govt Defeated -1.49 -1.365 -1.431 -1.360 -1.412 -1.435
(0.7924) (0.816) (0.793) (0.669) (0.801) (0.796)
First-Past-the-Post ER -4.67 -3.180 -3.992 -2.064 -3.761 -4.042
(2.6531) (3.040) (2.829) (2.083) (2.861) (2.721)
Institutional Constraints 0.542 0.617 0.576 0.426 0.588 0.574
(0.1205) (0.139) (0.129) (0.113) (0.129) (0.124)
Country Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Oil Importing Countries Only
Instrument L.1 Price AR(2) Residual on Real Oil Prices Trend of Real Oil Price
Industrial Intensity Weights? No No Yes Yes No Yes
Obs. 185 185 185 185 185 185
R2 0.803 0.836 0.847 0.887 0.844 0.847
F statistic (1st Stage) 37.03 23.85 15.27 11.03 43.24 30.57
Note: Robust Standard Errors, clustered at the Country level reported in parantheses. (***) p < 0.01; (**) p < 0.05; (*) p
< 0.10. IV: In Column 1 we use the one year lag of real imported oil prices at renery. In Columns 2 to 4 we use the lag
of the predicted residual of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery. In Columns 5 and 6 we use the trend of
real imported oil prices at renery. In Columns 3, 4 and 6 we use an index or relative industrial intensity for each country to
weight the impact of the real oil price shocks on employment. Column 4 repeats the estimates of Column 3 using a model with
lagged dependent variable. Variable instcons is the Index of institutional constraints of central state government according to
Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6; Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints,
low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room available to central state government. Description: additive index
composed of 6 dummy-variables (1 = constraints, 0=else) (1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state
structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions (very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central
bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt (1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data.
Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973,
Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Incumbent Government Defeated Dummy takes the value of 1 if the incumbent
has lost the elections. Other controls include: number of parties, Debt/GDP ratio, GDP growth and other socio-demographic
characteristics..
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Table 9: IV Estimates on the Diminishing E¤ect of Unemployment on Electoral Fragmentation on the Sample of
Countries where Moderate Parties Exhibit High Ideological Proximity
Dependent Variable Restricted Sample (High Ideological Proximity)
Electoral Fragmentation (%) IV IV IV IV
Rae Index (0-100) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Rate (%) -.394 -.478 -1.107 -.973
(1.607) (1.099) (0.981) (1.079)
First-past-the-post ER Dummy -28.627 -33.726 -32.866 -33.050
(3.565) (2.581) (2.731) (2.745)
Institutional Constraints -.- 0.777 -.872 -.520
(1.458) (1.639) (1.672)
Institutional Constraints -.- 0.525 0.775 0.722
Interaction Dummy (0.312)
 (0.294) (0.324)
Incumbent Govt. Defeated -.- -2.215 -2.045 -2.081
(1.021) (1.099) (1.081)
Other Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Const. 83.894 84.344 85.226 85.038
(0.835) (1.907) (2.282) (2.216)
Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument (Real Oil Prices) Trend Trend AR(2) Lag 1
Obs. 122 122 122 122
R2 0.962 0.968 0.963 0.965
F statistic (excluded IV) 21.07*** 13.66*** 8.99** 6.99**
Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the Country level reported in parantheses. (***) Statistically signicant at the
1% level; (**) Statistically signicant at the 5% level; (*) Statistically signicant at the 10% level. In Columns 2 to 4 other
economic controls include: number of partis, Debt/GDP ratio, GDP growth rate, income per capita etc. In Columns 1 and
2 we use the trend of real (industry-weighted) imported oil prices at renery obtained using the Hoddrick-Prescott lter. In
Column 3 we use the lags of the predicted residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery weighted by the
index of relative industrial intensity. In Column 4 we use the one year lag of real imported oil prices at renery. Ideological
proximity is measured according to the Schmidt Index (Max value is 4 Min value is -4 and Max distance is 8). Variable
instcons is the Index of institutional constraints of central state government according to Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0;
Maximum value=6; Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints, low values are indicative of a large
maneuvering room available to central state government. Description: additive index composed of 6 dummy-variables (1=
constraints, 0=else) (1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of
amending constitutions (very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda
= 1. Source: Schmidt (1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data. Data for central bank autonomy are taken
from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973, Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977.
Incumbent Government Defeated Dummy takes the value of 1 when the incumbent was defeated in the elections.
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Table 10: OLS Estimates of the Impact of Reduced Expected Government Spending (triggered by the Information
Shock) on Electoral Fragmentation in Greek Elections (2006-2010) in Regions (NUTS-3) with Large Public Sector
Size
Dependent Variable Small Sample (2009-10) Large Sample (2006-2010)
Electoral Fragmentation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(Rae Index 0-100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High Public SectorPOST -.- -.- 3.316 3.146 3.325 2.669 3.143 2.560
(1.433) (1.477) (1.167) (1.210) (1.199) (1.246)
POST (Electoral Year 2010) 1.973 2.057 0.561 0.596 5.398 5.260 5.392 5.260
(0.889) (0.885) (0.772) (0.775) (1.367) (1.381) (1.368) (1.383)
High Public Sector2009 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.741 -.445 -.771 -.509
(First Lead) (0.519) (0.629) (0.553) (0.655)
Year 2009 (Dummy) -.- -.- -.- -.- 1.785 1.648 1.778 1.648
(0.356) (0.376) (0.355) (0.377)
Regional Unemployment (%) 0.109 0.172 0.15 0.118 0.038 -.099 0.031 -.099
(0.382) (0.394) (0.329) (0.328) (0.155) (0.157) (0.153) (0.157)
UnemploymentHigh PS -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- 0.576 -.- 0.556
(0.284) (0.286)
Local Elections Dummy No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment Leads (2009-2006) No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-3) Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electoral Year Dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 92 96 96 92 192 192 184 184
R2 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.72 0.73
Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the NUTS-3 (Region) level reported in parentheses. (***) p < 0.001 ; (**) p <
0.01 ; (*) p < 0.05. Regional Fixed e¤ects reported at the NUTS-3 level. POST dummy and Electoral Year 2010 dummy are
the same variable. Electoral Year Dummies included in all reported specications apart from the rst four columns (they are
collinear with the Post dummy since we only have two electoral years in the sample). Also in the rst four columns, where
we use the small sample, local elections dummies are not included due to collinearity. In Columns 1, 4, 7 and 8 we exclude
the Athens and Thessaloniki Greater Metropolitan Regions from the regressions. In Columns 5 to 8 we use the large sample
with electoral observations from 2006 to 2010. Hence, we can use pre-trend lead dummies. In Columns 6 and 8 we interact
some of the controls with the treatment (High Public Sector) dummy.
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Table 11: OLS Estimates of the Di¤erential Impact of the Information Shock on Electoral Fragmentation in Greek
Elections (1996-2010) in Regions (NUTS-3) with Large Public Sector Size
Dependent Variable Full Sample Small Sample (2000-2010)
Electoral Fragmentation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(Rae Index 0-100) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High Public Sector*Year 2010 2.370 2.871 2.468 2.852 8.953
(1.013) (1.004) (1.055) (1.035) (3.366)
Post Dummy (Year 2010) 2.917 3.493 1.126 0.786 0.786
(0.938) (1.150) (0.541) (0.522) (0.522)
First Lead -.- -.457 -.- -.383 5.718
(High Public Sector*2009) (0.604) (0.738) (3.273)
Local Elections Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Controls*Treatment No No No No Yes
Treatment Leads (2009-1996) No Yes No Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-3) Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 384 384 288 288 288
R2 0.624 0.629 0.679 0.681 0.681
F statistic . . . . .
Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered at the NUTS-3 region level reported in parentheses. (***) Statistically signicant at
the 1% level; (**) Statistically signicant at the 5% level; (*) Statistically signicant at the 10% level. Regional Fixed e¤ects
reported at the NUTS-2 (Periphery) level. Electoral Year Dummies included in all reported specications. Other controls
include: education and income per capita at regional (NUTS-3) level and level of urbanization. Attica and Thessalonica
Metropolitan Regions are excluded from the sample.
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Table 12: Estimates of the just-identied IV model using the quadratic term of unemployment on the restricted
sample of countries (dropped USA and oil producers) under various instrument specications
Dependent Variable Rae Index of Electoral (Party-system) Fragmentation (range 0-100)
Baseline Models Averaged Data (at Election Term)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS/LDV 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS/LDV
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unemployment Squared 0.146 0.157 0.125 -.- -.- -.-
(at Election Year) (0.052)
 (0.059) (0.057)
Unemployment Squared -.- -.- -.- 0.185 0.100 0.072
(Election Term Average) (0.071)
 (0.028) (0.027)
Institutional Constraints 1.710 1.757 1.556 0.485 1.372 0.841
(0.844) (0.862) (0.831) (0.925) (1.674) (1.238)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed E¤ects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry weights? Yes No Yes Yes No No
Number of Instruments 1 1 1 1 1 1
Obs. 183 183 182 183 183 182
R2 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.90 0.92
F statistic (1st- Stage) 14.01 12.53 9.42 4.80 23.54 24.03
Note: (***) p < 0.01; (**) p < 0.05; (*) p < 0.10. Robust standard errors, clustered at the country level reported in
parentheses. Corrected standard errors reported in all columns (by estimating the models using the "ivregress" routine in
Stata). In columns 3 and 6 a lagged dependent variable (LDV) was introduced into the model. Estimates of the squared
undemployment term in column 1 are based on the predicted coe¢ cient values of the basic 2SLS model presented in column 3
of Table 2. Estimates in Column 2 are based on the 2SLS model of column 5 in Table 2. Column 3 adds a LDV (estimates of
the squared term are based on the coe¢ cient estimates of the model presented in column 1 of Table 3. In columns 4 through
6 data were aggregated at the election term level (electoral term averages). Estimates in column 4 are based on the model
of column 2 in Table 3, whereas those of column 5 are based on the model presented in column 6 of Table 3. Column 6
adds a LDV. Instrumental Variables: In columns 1-4 lags of oil price-shocks are used. Oil price shocks were estimated by
predicting the residuals of an AR(2) process on real imported oil prices at renery. In columns 5 and 6, simple lags of real
imported oil prices were employed. In columns 1, 3 and 4 predicted oil price shocks were weighted by the index of industrial
intensity constructed using OECD data. In columns 2, 5 and 6 no weights are used. We use 1 instrument in all specications
(just-identied model). Variable instcons is the Index of institutional constraints of central state government according to
Schmidt (1996); Minimum value=0; Maximum value=6; Range of data from 0 to 5, high values indicate powerful constraints,
low values are indicative of a large maneuvering room available to central state government. Description: additive index
composed of 6 dummy-variables (1 = constraints, 0=else) (1) EU membership=1, (2) degree of centralisation of state
structure (federalism=1), (3) di¢ culty of amending constitutions (very di¢ cult=1) (4) strong bicameralism =1 (5) central
bank autonomy =1 (6) frequent referenda = 1. Source: Schmidt (1996: 172) transformed into time variant annual data.
Data for central bank autonomy are taken from Beyeler (2007: 123). Period covered: 1960-2007. Missing: Greece 1967-1973,
Portugal until 1975 and Spain until 1977. Other controls include: rst-past-the-post electoral rule dummy, number of parties,
incumbent government defeated dummy, Debt/GDP ratio, GDP growth rate and government revenues (income tax receipts)
as percent of GDP. Incumbent Govt Defeated Dummy takes the value of 1 if the incumbent has lost the elections.
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Fig. C.2: The larger Decline of Turnout in High Public Sector Regions
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Fig. C.3: The Parallel Movement of Trust in Parties (above) and Government (below) across
High &Low Public Sector Regions (NUTS-2 Level) post Information Shock (10/2009)
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Fig. C.4: The Di¤erential Impact of the Information Shock on High Public Sector Regions
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Fig. C.5: The Parallel Trends Assumption between National and Local Elections
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Fig. C.7.a: The Parallel Decline of Trust in Parties across Treatment
& Control Regions (NUTS-2) post Information Shock (10/2009)
Fig. C.7.b: The Parallel Decline of Trust in Govt across Treatment &
& Control Regions (NUTS-2) post Information Shock (10/2009)
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Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Population and Public Sector Employment at the
Periphery (NUTS-2) Level (2000-2008)
Region Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Periphery Capital Public Sector Population No of NUTS-2
(NUTS-3) Share (%) Growth (%) (in 1,000s) Regions
Thrace Komitini 25.36 39.57 658 3
Macedonia Thessaloniki 24.48 18.32 2,001 11
Thessaly Larissa 26.54 31.29 719 4
Epirus Ioannina 28.23 13.76 385 4
Ionian Islands Kerkira 18.59 -2.29 237 3
W. Greece Patras 25.06 27.71 700 3
Ctr. Greece Lamia 20.53 29.56 551 5
Peloponnese Tripoli 21.94 26.70 711 5
Attica Athens 29.06 3.24 2,792 1
North Aegean Mytelene 31.89 39.06 250 3
South Aegean Rhodos 22.12 14.66 305 2
Crete Heraklio 20.80 17.90 528 4
Greece (Total) Athens 25.93 14.73 9,845 48
Sources: Data collected from HELLSTAT 2011 Census, Greek Ministry of Interior and Pub-
lic Administration, EUROSTAT 2010 Regional Yearbook and LFS survey (2009). Compu-
tation of growth rates in Col. 3 is from own calculations. We measure the size of the public
sector as the share of public sector (central government, SOEs and local government) em-
ployment over total employment. Population statistics refer those eligible to vote ( > 18
y.o.). Athens Metropolitan region (Attica) is at the same time both a NYUTS-2 and -3
region.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics of Treatment (Sanjak HQ) and Control Groups
(NUTS-3 level)
(1) (2)
Treatment (Sanjak HQ) Control
Annual Income p.c. (HPPP) 19,263 18,637
Education
Secondary (%) 36.2 35.9
Tertiary (%) 24.1 24.0
Employment Share
Agriculture (%) 18.7 20.5
Industry (%) 21.6 20.5
Public Sector Employment
(% of total) in 2000 21.0 20.1
Growth Rate (2000-08) 27.9 15.1
(% of total) in 2009 26.4 22.9
Public Sector Jobs (%)
(relative share of total public sector) 80.1 19.9
(relative share with agriculture) 1.5 1.1
Unemployment 7.8 8.6
Long-Run Unemployment 3.9 4.0
Long-Run Unemployment 51.5 46.7
(share of total %)
Number of NUTS-3 Regions 23 25
Note: Data from HELSTAT Population Census (2011) and Eurostat Regional Yearbook
(2010) and LFS Survey (2009). Income is measured in Harmonized PPP. Public sector
employment is given as a share of total employment.
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Table C.3: OLS Estimates of our Basic Di¤erences-in-Diferences Model on the Full
Sample (1996-2010) at NUTS-2 Level
Dependent Variable Full Sample (1996-2010)
Voter Turnout (%) OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Public Sector*Year 2010 -.- -.- -6.463 -6.482
(3.386) (3.173)
Year 2010 (Post Dummy) -8.704 -9.563 -6.598 -5.170
(1.643) (1.701) (1.620) (1.598)
High Public Sector*Year 2009 -.- -.- -1.363 -1.801
(Last lead) (1.485) (1.070)
Trust in Party-system (%) 0.119 -.- 0.200 0.146
(0.065) (0.06) (0.069)
Trust in Government (%) -.- 0.042 -.- -.-
(0.048)
Trust*Local Elections Dummy -.- -.- -.- 0.136
(0.034)
Treatment Leads (1996-2009) No No Yes Yes
Local Elections Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electoral Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-2) Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 90 90 90 90
R2 0.812 0.796 0.842 0.85
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the region level (NUTS-2) reported in parenthe-
ses. (*) Statistically signicant at the 10% level. (**) Statistically signicant at the 5%
level. (***) Statistically signicant at the 1% level. Demographic controls include education
and urbanization levels at the regional level. Trust in Government and in the Party-system
is reported at the regional level, as the percentage of the population who gave a positive
response to a binary question. High Public Sector dummy is a binary variable taking the
value of 1 if the percentage of public sector employment over total employment in 2009 was
above the national average.
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Table C.4: OLS Estimates of our Basic Di¤erences-in-Diferences Model on the Re-
stricted Sample of Elections (2000-2010) at NUTS-2 Level
Dependent Variable Small Sample (2000-2010)
Voter Turnout (%) OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Public Sector*Year 2010 -6.315 -6.217 -6.483 -6.415
(3.130) (3.500) (2.990) (2.882)
Year 2010 (Post Dummy) -6.782 -6.873 -7.690 -5.073
(2.157) (2.629) (1.524) (3.067)
High Public Sector*Year 2009 -1.828 -1.599 -1.361 -1.685
(Last lead) (1.107) (1.634) (1.721) (1.328)
Trust in Party-system (%) 0.132 0.136 0.164 0.167
(0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.062)
Trust in Govt (%) -.- -.- -.- -.050
(0.034)
Trust*Local elections Dummy -.- -.- 0.063 0.088
(0.057) (0.063)
Treatment Leads (2000-2010) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Elections Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Econ. Controls * Treatment No Yes No Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Electoral Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-2) Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 70 70 70 70
R2 0.886 0.887 0.892 0.894
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level (NUTS-2) reported in paren-
theses. (*) Statistically signicant at the 10% level. (**) Statistically signicant at the 5%
level. (***) Statistically signicant at the 1% level. Demographic controls include educa-
tion and urbanization levels at the regional level. Economic controls include unemployment
rate and income per capita at the regional level (from 1999 and onwards). Trust in Gov-
ernment and in the Party-system is reported at the regional level, as the percentage of the
population who gave a positive response to a binary question. High Public Sector dummy
is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the percentage of public sector employment over
total employment in 2009 was above the national average.
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Table C.5: Reduced Form OLS Estimations (Intensity to Treatment E¤ect) on the
Di¤erential Decline of Voter Turn-out on Regions (NUTS-3 Level) with High Public
Sector
Dependent Variable Full Sample Small Sample
Voter Turnout (%) OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sanjak HQ*Year 2010 -1.964 -3.272 -1.975 -3.370
(1.002)* (1.141)** (0.791)* (1.277)**
Year 2010 (Post Dummy) -10.084 -10.180 -10.062 -10.275
(1.387)*** (1.990)*** (1.298)*** (2.004)***
Sanjak HQ*2009 (Last lead) -.- -1.190 -.- -1.316
(0.673) (0.814)
Treatment Leads (1996-2010) No Yes No Yes
Electoral Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-3) FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Election Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes
Const. 74.771 74.316 65.985 66.483
(0.941) (1.663) (3.869) (4.792)
Obs. 423 423 329 329
R2 0.783 0.784 0.867 0.868
F statistic -.- -.- -.- -.-
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level (NUTS-3) reported in parenthe-
ses. (*) p < 0.05. (**) p < 0.01. (***) p < 0.001. High public sector regions are identied
by the presence of an Ottoman Military HQ (Sanjak) within their current administrative
boundaries (see Table A.2). Full sample runs from 1996-2010. Small sample runs from
2000-2010. Demographic controls include education and urbanization levels at the regional
level. Economic controls include unemployment rate and income per capita at the regional
level (from 1999 and onwards).
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Table C.6: Placebo Tests on Basic OLS Model moving the Treatment E¤ect (Infor-
mation Shock) three Electoral Periods in the Past (2009, 2007 and 2006).
Dependent Variable 2009 2007 2006
Voter Turnout (%) OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sanjak HQ*Year 2009 -1.138 -1.278 -.- -.- -.- -.-
(0.638) (0.783)
Sanjak HQ*Year 2007 -.- -.- -.470 -.497 -.- -.-
(1.423) (0.845)
Sanjak HQ*Year 2006 -.- -.- -.- -.- -.808 -.904
(1.697) (1.041)
Year 2009 (Post) -3.953 -3.415 -.- -.- -.- -.-
(1.887)* (2.544)
Year 2007 (Post) -.- -.- -1.607 -1.159 -.- -.-
(1.398) (0.671)
Year 2006 (Post) -.- -.- -.- -.- -1.195 -2.054
(2.007) (1.398)
Electoral Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS 3) FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Election Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Const. 69.568 60.331 65.923 60.161 65.859 71.782
(0.703) (1.566) (0.783) (0.559) (0.687) (1.949)
Obs. 376 282 329 235 282 188
R2 0.75 0.841 0.735 0.818 0.728 0.794
F statistic -.- -.- -.- -.- -.- -.-
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level (NUTS-3) reported in parenthe-
ses. (*) p < 0.05. (**) p < 0.01. (***) p < 0.001. High public sector regions are identied
by the presence of an Ottoman Military HQ (Sanjak) within their current administrative
boundaries (see Table A.2). Demographic controls include education and urbanization levels
at the regional level. Economic controls include unemployment rate and income per capita
at the regional level (from 1999 and onwards).
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Table C.7: First-Stage OLS Regressions of Basic IV Model presented in Tables C.8
and C.9.
Dependent Variable 1st Stage Regressions
High Public Sector Full (1996-2010) Small (2000-2010)
Region (NUTS 3)* 2010 OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sanjak HQ*Year 2010 0.5725 0.5739 0.5741 0.5771
(.129)*** (.130)*** (.131)*** (.132)***
Treatment Leads No Yes No Yes
Electoral Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-3) FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Election Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No Yes Yes
Obs. 423 423 329 329
R2 0.783 0.784 0.867 0.868
F statistic (excluded IV) 19.68*** 19.51*** 19.12*** 19.03***
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level (NUTS-3) reported in paren-
theses. ((*) p < 0.05. (**) p < 0.01. (***) p < 0.001. IV: High public sector regions are
instrumented by a dummy taking value 1 if an Ottoman Military HQ (Sanjak) was situ-
ated within their current administrative boundaries (see Table A.2). Full sample runs from
1996-2010. Small sample runs from 2000-2010. Demographic controls include education
and urbanization levels at the regional level. Economic controls include unemployment rate
and income per capita at the regional level (from 1999 and onwards). Columns 1 and 2 are
the 1st-stages of Columns 2 and 4 in C.8, whereas 3 and 4 are the respective 1st-stages of
Columns 2 and 4 in C.9.
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Table C.8: IV and OLS Estimates on the Di¤erential Declined in Turnout
(Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences Model) across NUTS-3 regions (Full Sample).
Dependent Variable Full Sample (1996-2010)
Voter Turnout (%) OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Public Sector*2010 -2.045 -3.423 -3.721 -5.701
(0.990)* (1.645)* (0.922)*** (1.761)***
Year 2010 (Post Dummy) -10.130 -7.250 -10.509 -7.054
(1.420)*** (1.419)*** (1.991)*** (1.843)***
Last Lead (sanjak*2009) -.- -.- -.- -1.18
(0.61)
Treatment Leads (1996-2009) No No Yes Yes
Electoral Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-3) FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Elections Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls No No No No
Instrument for High Public N/A Sanjak HQ N/A Sanjak HQ
Sector Regions (NUTS-3)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.7827 0.7798 0.7871 0.7769
F statistic (excluded IV) N/A 19.68*** N/A 19.51***
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level (NUTS-3) reported in parenthe-
ses. (*) p < 0.05. (**) p < 0.01. (***) p < 0.001. IV for High Public sector regions: Ex-
istence of Ottoman military district (Sanjak) HQ within the current administrative bound-
aries of a NUTS-3 region. Demographic controls include education and urbanization levels
at the regional level. Athens and Thessalonica Metropolitan regions were excluded from the
sample of regions in order to account for the "urbanization-education" e¤ect.
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Table C.9: IV and OLS Estimates on the Di¤erential Declined in Turnout
(Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences Model) across NUTS-3 regions (Including Economic Con-
trols)
Dependent Variable Small Sample (2000-2010)
Voter Turnout (%) OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Public Sector*2010 -2.495 -3.440 -3.686 -5.840
(0.770)** (1.199)** (0.955)*** (1.921)**
Year 2010 (Post Dummy) -9.910 -6.984 -10.490 -6.792
(1.334)*** (0.734)*** (2.033)*** (1.035)***
Sanjak HQ*2009 (Last lead) -.- -.- -.- -1.298
(0.721)
Treatment Leads (2000-2009) No No Yes Yes
Electoral Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (NUTS-3) FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local Elections Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument for High Public -.- Sanjak HQ -.- Sanjak HQ
Sector Regions (NUTS-3)
Obs. 329 329 329 329
R2 0.8674 0.8655 0.8694 0.8627
F statistic (excluded IV) -.- 19.12*** -.- 19.03***
Note: Robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level (NUTS-3) reported in paren-
theses. (*) p < 0.05. (**) p < 0.01. (***) p < 0.001. IV for High Public sector
regions: Existence of Ottoman military district (Sanjak) HQ within the current admin-
istrative boundaries of a NUTS-3 region. Demographic controls include education and
urbanization levels at the regional level. Economic controls include unemployment rate and
income per capita at the regional level (from 2000 and onwards). Athens and Thessalonica
Metropolitan regions were excluded from the sample of NUTS-3 regions in order to account
for the "urbanization-education" e¤ect.
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